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 KEY F INDINGS AT A GLANCE  
PR I V A T E  F I N A N CE  
Social impact bond projects are the latest new ‘buy-now, pay later’, off-balance sheet schemes to 
increase private finance of public services and the welfare state, driven by austerity policies and 
neoliberal ideology.  
They are a complex venture capitalist model applied to the provision of social services, health, 
education and other public services. Private investors provide working capital to social impact bond 
projects with the expectation of an annual rate of return or profit of 15% - 30% or more, dependent on 
the achievement of specified outcomes. 
Early intervention/development and prevention are only part of a strategy to tackle the root causes of 
poverty and inequality. However, social impact bonds and pay-for-success are designed to deliver 
selective social outcomes. 
The social impact bond project lobby embrace neoliberalism and a ‘government failure’ model to justify 
their approach, but they are in denial of market failure and the cause of the global financial crisis.  
The social impact bond project lobby is, however, happy to accept public money in the form of tax 
breaks, grants, subsidies and guarantees to extend corporate welfare. Nearly £520m of UK public 
money has been given to social enterprises and social impact bond projects in recent years in the form 
of grants and financial support. 
International bodies have advanced the case for social impact bonds projects - the G8 group of 
countries established a Social Impact Investment Taskforce, the Organisation for Economic 
Development and Cooperation (OECD) and World Economic Forum (2013) extolling their virtues. 
Global banks such as Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase and Co. and 
Morgan Stanley, have played a key role in promoting and funding social impact bond projects in 
anticipation of attracting wider private investor interest and a new ‘asset class’.  
There are currently 54 operational social impact bond projects in 13 countries with at least a further 23 
at the planning or procurement stage. The UK is the global leader with 32 operational projects with 
outcome payments valued at £91m, followed by the US with 9 projects.  
ECO N O M I C A N D  S O CI A L  F LA W S  
The level of innovation is exaggerated. Private investors will fund projects that use proven evidence-
based methods to minimize risk. The organisational structure of social impact bond projects is more 
innovative than the services they deliver and the methods they use to achieve outcomes, but 
nevertheless has basic flaws and negative consequences. 
Social impact bonds are a development in the mutation of privatisation.  
No attempt is made to compare the social impact project with other innovative and improved public 
services. This has a double effect of excluding in-house public service delivery and virtually guarantees 
the project will show some improvement (and financial return) because it is applying proven 
techniques. 
Social impact bond projects increase the financialising of public services with private investors providing 
operating capital and whilst outcomes are 
monetised by agreeing a fixed sum of 
money for each outcome. 
The model is built on claims of public 
expenditure savings similar to those made 
for outsourcing and privatisation. They are 
ii WISeR & ESSU (2015) 
frequently exaggerated and often fail to meet targets. 
Payment-by-Results is a fundamental part of social impact bond projects and has been more widely 
used in government contracts in several countries and by the World Bank. The UK’s Troubled Families 
PbR contracts achieved 100% performance even in major industrial cities and assumed the turn around 
in people’s lives was permanent! 
Further, their structure outside of the public sector, results in the outsourcing of commissioning 
functions, such as monitoring and evaluation, and service delivery. They increase the rate of 
commodification, marketisation and privatisation processes.  
Democratic accountability and transparency is absent from the case studies and documents promoting 
social impact bonds. 
There are few references to jobs, terms and conditions for staff either displaced by, or employed in, 
organisations delivering social impact bond projects. With non-profit average wages 20% - 30% less 
than the national average wage, let alone the equivalent public sector wage in many industrialised 
countries, wider use of temporary staff, fewer in pension schemes, lower trade union membership, 
social impact bond projects will have a significantly negative effect on employment and economic well 
being. 
Participation of service users and staff has been tokenistic with emphasis on stakeholder engagement 
limited to private investors, intermediary organisations and contractors. 
DE V E LO P M E N T  I M P A CT  B O N D S  
Advocates of development impact bonds in the global south make the same claims about ‘government 
failure’, citing poor targeting of resources, inadequate incentives to focus on outcomes, limited 
innovation, short-term funding and insufficient evidence to support decision-making, whilst ignoring 
the historic role of private companies and market failures.   
Development impact bonds have similar objectives, organisation and operating methods as social 
impact bonds, but they are currently funded by aid agencies and/or foundations rather than private 
investors. However, they have the same basic flaws. 
AL T E R N A T I V E  S T R A T E G Y  
A four-part strategy is required: 1) An alternative vision of public services that provide early 
intervention and prevention, good quality integrated core services and multi purpose use of public 
buildings; 2) Public Service Innovation and Improvement Plans at departmental or service level; 3) An 
agreement not to propose or approve social and development impact bond/pay-for-success projects; 4) 
Action strategies to build alliances of staff/trade unions, service users/community organisations and 
other campaigns to organise support for strategies and scope for transnational action. 
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TABLE 1:  30  NEGATIVE ELEMENTS OF SOCIAL IMPACT BOND PROJECTS 
Investors select social needs that are profitable, but ignore 
needs that are not. 
Address the symptoms, but not the causes of poverty and 
inequality. 
Privatise the design, finance, service delivery, contract 
management, monitoring and evaluation of projects. 
Extend markets and market forces further into the welfare 
state that could ultimately threaten social rights. 
Monetize the value of outcomes by agreeing a sum of 
money for each outcome. 
Private and institutional investors will increasingly replace 
‘social investors’. 
Make social need dependent on private markets and 
decrease publicly provided services. 
Democratic accountability, participation and transparency 
are eroded by the contract culture. 
Blur important distinctions between public, non-profit and 
private provision of public services. 
Risks are borne by government, service users, staff and 
contractors, not just private investors. 
Commodification and monetising early intervention and 
prevention will have a negative impact for women in social 
reproduction, in training and employment and will intensify 
gender inequality. 
Creates a new source of accumulation for private investors 
in public services with annual rate of return of up to 15% - 
30% or more. 
Employees have private/non-profit sector terms and 
conditions, less job security and trade union representation. 
Performance-based contracts lead to commercialisation of 
non-profit and voluntary sector organisations. 
Private finance, alternative providers, making markets, 
competition, privatisation, deregulation and public grants 
and subsidies are the components of neoliberal public 
management. 
A secondary market is likely to emerge to trade in social 
impact bond investments that could be transferred to 
offshore tax havens following the PFI/PPP model. 
Do not deliver additional resources, as public sector has to 
repay private/social investors with profit.  
Banks and financial institutions will increase their power to 
shape public policies. 
Project organisation is a neoliberal innovation, but services 
are rarely innovative - they apply proven methods to new 
population groups. 
High set-up or transaction costs including a coterie of 
consultants, financial advisers, lawyers and evaluators. 
Lack of evidence of savings in public spending, which are 
only valid if the full public cost of reconfiguring public 
services and infrastructure legacy costs are included. 
Early intervention and prevention should be part of public 
sector initiatives and integrated with core services. 
Exclusive focus on outcomes despite inputs, processes (and 
outputs in some cases) having a direct effect on the quality 
of public services. 
Claims of ‘social or public value’ or ‘public benefit’ are 
vague, are not meaningful and conceal class interests. 
The comparison of outcomes with unimproved public 
service provision is fundamentally flawed and designed to 
exaggerate the effect of social impact bonds. 
Impose a new set of power relations between private 
investors, intermediary organisation, contractors, 
consultants, evaluator and the government or public body. 
Exploit the most vulnerable, poorest and others dependent 
on public services and the welfare state. 
Deliberately exclude and deny there are viable and more 
effective public sector alternatives. 
Advocates make assertions about ’government failure’ when 
market failure is the cause of financial and economic crises. 
Development impact bond model threatens to impose more 
profiteering and privatisation in the global south. 
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1 PRIVATE INVESTMENT TO PRIVATISE THE WELFARE STATE  
Governments increasingly seek new ‘buy-now, pay later’, off-balance sheet schemes to increase private 
finance of public services and the welfare state, driven by austerity policies and neoliberal ideology. 
One such scheme is a social impact bond project (known as pay-for-success in the US, social benefit 
bond in Australia and development impact bond in the global south). Social and development impact 
bonds are similar. Private investors and/or foundations provide working capital to social impact bond 
projects, whereas aid agencies and/or foundations finance development impact bond projects. There 
are currently 54 operational social impact bond projects globally with a further 23 at the design stage. 
The UK is the global leader with 32 operational projects followed by the US with 9. UK project outcome 
payments are valued at £91m. 
The social impact bond model is intended to attract ‘new’ private investment with a commercial rate of 
return, to deliver early intervention and prevention policies on a payment-by-results basis for the 
outcomes achieved. The model is claimed to increase innovation, because services are delivered by 
social enterprises and non-profit organisations managed by social entrepreneurs. It is claimed that 
social impact bond projects improve efficiency because projects are not burdened by bureaucracy, risk 
is transferred to private investors and large savings in public spending are achieved as the need for 
crisis interventions are reduced. 
Social and development impact bonds should not be confused with bonds or fixed income securities 
issued by municipal, state and national governments or companies to raise capital to fund projects as 
an alternative to public debt or a bank loan. These bonds have a defined period with a fixed or variable 
interest rate. In contrast, social impact bonds are ‘multi-stakeholder partnerships managed through a 
series of contracts’ (McKinsey, 2012). The term ‘social impact bond projects’ is used in this study. 
Social impact bond projects are a venture capital model applied to the provision of social services, 
health, education and other public services. Private investors provide working capital to social impact 
bond projects with the expectation of an annual rate of return or profit of 15% - 30% or more, 
dependent on the achievement of specified outcomes. Government or public bodies must allocate 
funds in future budgets to repay private investors and expect to obtain financial savings from a 
reduction in the cost of service provision. Foundations, trusts and charities have part-funded many of 
the early social impact bond projects in an attempt to establish the model, but they will gradually be 
replaced by banks and other financial institutions, such as private equity funds, pension funds and 
wealthy individual investors when more projects are developed.  
One project was lauded as “…an innovative way to fund promising new programs at no cost to 
taxpayers” (Office of the Mayor of New York City, 2012). However, this was a unique case and the 
project has since been terminated, because it failed to reduce reoffending. Although social impact bond 
projects are branded as being innovative, most are not (see Part 4).  Early intervention and prevention 
policies are not new. Furthermore, savings could be achieved by direct government funding and service 
provision. The greater the innovation, the bigger the risk, and the higher the rate of return required by 
private investors. 
A new intermediary organisation or special purpose company is set up for each project outside of the 
public sector to recruit investors, appoint contractor(s), consultants and an evaluator and to manage 
and monitor the project. It is also the conduit by which the government or public body repays private 
investors. Projects (usually run for 3-5 years) have focused on employment and training for young 
people, reducing reoffending, support for disadvantaged families and young children, keeping children 
out of the care system, early childhood education and reducing homelessness. This study also draws on 
the experience of Payment-by-Results (PbR) in public service outsourcing contracts where payment is 
linked to the achievement of outcomes. PbR has a longer track record and is a critical component of 
social impact bond projects. 
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1.1 NEW DEVELOPMENT IN THE MUTATION OF PRIVAT ISATION  
Social impact bonds are a development in the mutation of privatisation (Whitfield, 2012b). Government 
and public bodies outsource a significant part of their commissioning responsibilities and the public 
sector has been excluded from delivering services in social impact bond projects. 
Although there is limited evidence available to assess the performance of social impact bonds there is 
extensive evidence of the effects of the component parts of these projects, namely competition, private 
finance, markets, outcomes, pay-for-success, profit and commercialisation, PPPs and privatisation. 
These are the components of neoliberal public management, commonly used to financialise, marketise 
and privatise public services and the welfare state. This is the concept of the neoliberal state in which 
“…the public sector will increasingly act as a facilitator of services, rather than a direct provider, with all 
areas of service delivery opened to competition” (Western Australia Audit, quoted in Impact Investing 
Australia, 2014). 
The first social impact bond project at Peterborough Prison, UK, was terminated because the 
government decided to privatise probation services nationally and the project failed to meet its 10% 
target reduction in reoffending. The New York City project failed because it did not reduce recidivism. 
Second-year performance of the Newpin project in New South Wales included eight cases of children 
returning to care, but these reversals had not been accounted for in the payment mechanism (further 
details on performance in Part 4).  
Outcomes are the current obsession in neoliberal public management, which has switched from one fad 
to another over the last three decades – compulsory tendering, quasi markets, private finance, 
marketisation, performance targets, and now outcomes and payment by results. They too are likely to 
have a limited life as a result of pressure from investors to reduce the risk of larger investments. 
Eventually, common sense may prevail and inputs, processes, outputs and outcomes will again be 
considered important and jointly assessed. 
Social finance organisations have targeted early intervention and prevention arguing that they are 
uniquely placed to operate social impact bond projects. They have adopted the classic neoliberal 
‘government failure’ model to justify their role and have chosen to ignore the reality of market failure. 
Governments have been too slow to implement early intervention and prevention policies, but there is 
no evidence that a privatised model will be more effective as it has many negative consequences.  
Despite the relatively small number of operational social impact bonds and payment-by-results 
contracts, they have international support (G8 group of countries and several nation states including US 
and UK); from global institutions (World Bank and OECD); the involvement of big banks (JP Morgan, 
Goldman Sachs, Bank of America Merrill Lynch) and major foundations and charities (Rockefeller).  
The spread of social impact bonds is at a pivotal stage – will they fade as little more than an experiment 
or will they expand more rapidly with projects in more countries spanning a wider range of services? 
Social impact bonds are rooted in neoliberal public sector reform, so it is important to understand their 
political economy and the impact and motives of their advocates to ‘grow the market for welfare 
services’. A new generation of partnership contracts could emerge to further marketise public services. 
However, so-called social entrepreneurs will not only have hastened their own demise, but speeded up 
the privatisation of the welfare state. 
1.2 AUSTERITY ACCELERATED  NEOLIBERALISM  
The global financial crisis and austerity policies created an opportunity for governments, particularly the 
UK, to accelerate neoliberalism in the public sector. Public expenditure cuts and severe budget 
constraints increased pressure to outsource, close facilities, transfer services to social enterprises, and 
encourage voluntary sector contracting and a social investment market. This resulted in the 
fragmentation of services into outsourcing contracts, arms length trading companies and social 
enterprises leaving under-funded in-house public services.  
…austerity policies have resulted in a destabilised and weaker economy; the 
dispossession of wages, pensions, homes and services; the depoliticisation of 
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communities as management of the economy is increasingly ceded to business interests 
and technocrats; disinvestment in the public infrastructure and economic development; 
and the attempts to disempower trade unions, community and civil society organisations 
(Whitfield and Spoehr, 2015). 
The new emphasis on financialising and personalising services to create new pathways for the mutation 
of privatisation recognised that health, education and social services could not be sold off in the same 
way as state owned corporations. It ensured marketisation and privatisation were permanent and not 
dependent on outsourcing, which could be reversed by terminating or not renewing contracts 
(Whitfield, 2012a and 2012b). 
Austerity policies also coincided with the mainstreaming of commissioning in the public sector. Deep 
cuts in public spending accelerated the split between the purchaser/client and provider/contractor 
functions and widened the ideological and operational split between the client and in-house contractor.  
1.3 EARLY INTERVENTION AND PREVENTION  
Early intervention/development and prevention strategies have important benefits for children and 
adults (Allen, 2011 and Heckman, 2011). 
Heckman’s research (2011) concluded “…cognitive abilities alone are not as powerful as a package of 
cognitive skills and social skills—defined as attentiveness, perseverance, impulse control, and 
sociability…….Investment in early education for disadvantaged children from birth to age 5 helps reduce 
the achievement gap, reduce the need for special education, increase the likelihood of healthier 
lifestyles, lower the crime rate, and reduce overall social costs.”  
Second chance education and training opportunities for adults are important too. 
Predistribution – improving the early lives of disadvantaged children - is considered much more 
effective than redistribution in promoting social inclusion, economic efficiency and workforce 
productivity (Heckman, 2013). The pace of adoption of early intervention strategies was criticised by 
Allen (2011), which led to recommendations to attract external investment. However, this appeared to 
underestimate the extent of early intervention and the financial difficulties of reconfiguring services in a 
period of deep public spending cuts. 
We know Head Start saves government at least $7 for every dollar spent on it. If 
Goldman and Morgan Stanley have their way, we’ll soon have to pay them and their 
clients a portion of those savings for having replaced taxpayer funding for such programs 
with private capital investments. Let’s call it what it is: private profit crowding out a 
public good (Rosenman, 2014). 
Health promotion policies that promote well being enable people to live, learn, work and participate 
more successfully, achieve a better work-life balance and can reduce inequalities. “The cost of illness 
resulting from health inequality costs the NHS well in excess of £5.5 billion per year and between £20 
and £32 million in terms of lost taxes and higher welfare payments” (NHS England, 2015). Many chronic 
diseases are preventable, or rates can significantly be reduced, which reduce the cost of healthcare, 
reduce absenteeism and health and safety risks whilst increase productivity and opportunities for 
workplace development (The Marmot Review, 2010). 
Many other intervention initiatives have positive impacts. For example, a new analysis of the US federal 
Moving to Opportunity experiment in five large cities concluded that children under 13, whose families 
moved to a ‘lower-poverty neighbourhood’ using experimental vouchers, had improved college 
attendance rates and annual income $3,477 (31%) higher on average in a control group in their mid-
twenties (Chetty et al, 2015). The programme had no effect on adult’s economic outcomes. The findings 
suggest “…that efforts to integrate disadvantaged families into mixed-income communities are likely to 
reduce the persistence of poverty across generations” (ibid). Moving all children out of ‘lower poverty 
neighbourhoods’ would have positive outcomes such as ameliorating living conditions and increasing 
life opportunities, but would not address the conditions that cause low income neighbourhoods. 
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…early-intervention policy avoids some of the ideological minefields in current political 
discourse. But it reflects a troubling increase in policy interventions in poor people’s lives 
that don’t address the fact that they are poor. We target their behaviors, beliefs, 
nutrition, and schools and say less and less about the sources of their poverty: growing 
inequality, the absence of jobs, lack of affordable housing (Rose, 2012). 
Early intervention and prevention are only part of a strategy to tackle the root causes of poverty and 
inequality. More fundamental policies are required, such as progressive taxation, economic 
development, good quality jobs, public investment and affordable housing. However, social impact 
bonds and pay-for-success projects are designed to deliver selective social outcomes and, therefore, are 
subject to a challenge about who does the selecting. 
1.4 RECONFIGURING PUBLIC SERVICES AND THE WELFARE STATE  
Public services and the welfare state need to be reconfigured to combine early intervention and 
preventative policies, comprehensive provision of integrated good quality core health and social care, 
education, criminal justice and other public services and multi-service use of the welfare state 
infrastructure.  
Although important strides have been made by governments and public bodies to implement early 
intervention and prevention policies, the process has been too slow. Bureaucratic and professional 
conservatism often led to inertia and retention of the status quo. When innovative change was 
successful, application elsewhere and lessons learnt were limited. The global financial crisis and 
recession, and subsequent austerity policies, caused the public sector to consolidate deep spending 
cuts, thus making it more difficult to launch early intervention and prevention initiatives.  
However, a service provision approach is limited in the extent to which it contributes towards reducing 
poverty and inequalities. The causes of poverty and inequality must be tackled – lack of jobs, low 
income, financial exploitation, overcrowded and poor living conditions, crime and violence, 
environmental hazards and ill health. For example, many of the UK Department for Work and Pensions 
social impact bonds have ‘finding work for the unemployed’ as a key outcome. This approach does not 
create jobs by adding to the total number of jobs in the economy, although it increases skills levels of 
the workforce. Those finding employment may move out of receipt of welfare benefits, but are 
replaced by another group of unemployed – the shifting sands of welfare benefit costs, with limited net 
gain for the economy or public expenditure unless economic growth outpaces the net effect of 
increases in the workforce. 
Commissioning and the transfer of services to the latest ‘partnership’ or social enterprise model were 
considered to be innovative. But market forces limit innovation, with most private contractors focusing 
on winning contracts to build market share, minimising wages and maximising profits.  
Social impact bond projects have expressed little or no interest in organising and building a political 
movement that is a fundamental necessity to achieve sustainable reductions in poverty and inequality. 
They have not advocated the involvement of service users and community organisations, staff and 
trade unions and have expressed little, if any, concern for employment conditions in social impact bond 
projects. 
Social impact bond projects are claimed to make significant savings for governments, but this is heavily 
reliant on taking a limited range of costs into account. Selective cost analysis avoids taking account of 
the full transaction and reconfiguration costs. Outsourcing ‘savings’ rarely materialise, if at all, but the 
real impact is concealed by the lamentable lack of post-contract or project impact assessment, except in 
cases of large-scale cost overruns and private sector performance failure (Whitfield, 2007). 
The growing attention for SIBs may distract from more meaningful social policy reforms. 
For example, reducing recidivism rates for one prison ignores the institutional policies 
that systematically perpetuates the mass incarceration of particular populations. 
Politicians may use SIBs to superficially advocate for an issue without delving deeper into 
long-term and systematic solutions (Princeton University, 2014).  
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Trade unions have been caught between maintaining the status quo in the belief that this was the most 
effective way to maintain terms and conditions for members, whereas being proactive could lead to job 
losses (the traditional jobs, terms and conditions mandate). Others often successfully advanced 
alternative policies and plans and built alliances, but were sometimes accused of ‘doing management’s 
job’. Industrial relations frameworks and the effect of the procurement process on jobs, terms and 
conditions also restricted the scope of innovation. 
The exclusion of public sector alternatives is similar to outsourcing and PPP strategic partnership 
contracts where an options appraisal precedes the procurement process. A ‘business as usual’ option is 
adopted, which is designed to fail to ensure procurement proceeds only with external bids. The social 
impact bond process does not require the constructive dismissal of an in-house option, because the 
ideology of impact investing assumes that an in-house option does not exist. 
Through the SIB model, investors can produce a social impact in a targeted community, 
reap a financial return, diversify their portfolios, and improve their public image. These 
benefits are part of an emerging interest in conscious capitalism, whereby corporations 
can both make profits and facilitate positive social changes (Princeton University, 2014). 
This statement assumes that finance capital and ‘socially responsible’ corporations, together with social 
investment organisations and philanthrocapitalism (foundations and trusts seeking a return on their 
investment), are able to transform public services, radically improve the life opportunities and well 
being of the poor, and make a market rate return on their investment. 
However, there is a strong case that early intervention and prevention should not be subjected to 
profiteering, and that to knowingly profit from others misfortunes, personal vulnerabilities, poverty and 
inequalities is morally and ethically wrong.  
The OECD claim that social impact bonds “…are perhaps the most pure form of public private 
partnerships in this field and represent an opportunity to change the way government approaches social 
problems” (OECD, 2014a). Typically, this is not supported by evidence or any reference to the track 
record of PPPs, strategic partnerships, commercialisation and privatisation. 
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BOX 1:  OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS AND PAY-FOR-SUCCESS 
 
Social impact bonds and pay-for-success contracts seek to deliver specific outcomes to a defined population or group 
of service users. Each project is organised with: 
 A government or public body 
 A target population 
 Private and/or social investors and foundations 
 An intermediary organisation of company 
 Private or non-profit contractors 
 Consultants, advisers and lawyers 
 Independent evaluator 
Services are outsourced to a social investment intermediary, initially financed by private investors and/or foundations, 
delivered by non-profit or private contractors, advised by consultants and lawyers, performance is assessed by 
independent evaluators, with government or a public sector body responsible for the repayment of capital and profits 
to investors dependent on performance.  
Social or development impact bonds should not be confused with bonds or fixed income securities issued by municipal, 
state and national governments or companies to raise capital to fund projects as an alternative to public debt or a bank 
loan. These bonds have a defined period with a fixed or variable interest rate. Social impact bonds are multi-
stakeholder partnerships managed through a series of contracts (McKinsey, 2012).  
Payment-by-results means that investor profits are linked to the success or failure of the project. If the project achieves 
all its targets then they can achieve a 15% - 30% or more rate of return (profit) per annum. If a social impact bond 
project fails to achieve the performance targets they will normally get the original investment back, but with reduced 
or no profit. 
Social impact bond projects have been funded to varying degrees by foundations, charities, social investment 
organisations, governments or public bodies, banks, venture capital funds and private investors (see Table 4). However, 
global banks and impact investing organisations are likely to turn social impact bond projects into a new asset class to 
open up new investment opportunities for private institutional investors. 
Social impact bond projects have been established to: 
– Reduce reoffending – Help patients manage long-term conditions 
– Drug and alcohol treatment – Adult mental health 
– Social care – Improve early childhood education 
– Special educational needs – Reduce out-of home foster care placement 
– Adoption of hard to place children – Support for single mothers and children 
– Family support to reduce children in care – Support disadvantaged young people into 
education or work 
– Improve employability of migrants – Reduce homelessness 
Why some governments support social impact bonds 
Social impact bonds are another manifestation of neoliberalism, which promotes free trade, competition and markets 
to allocate resources and deliver services; deregulate to create new opportunities for accumulation; reconfigure the 
state to reduce its role in the economy; and reduce the cost and power of labour.  Motives include: 
 Cost savings; 
 Deferred payment for service provision – ‘buy now, pay later’; 
 An additional method of marketising and privatising public services; 
 Transfer operational responsibility for service delivery; 
 Relinquish responsibility for employing staff and industrial relations;  
 Public relations advantage by claiming innovation. 
In practice they mean new risks for government, public costs, plus wider economic, employment, social and equality 
impacts. UK social impact bonds are regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority, although this is not evident from 
their website. 
See Table 1 for a summary of the negative effects of social impact bond and pay-for-success projects. 
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1.5 THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS  
A New Zealand agricultural economist, Ronnie Horesh, first proposed Social Policy Bonds in 1988, 
followed by an article in Economic Affairs, a journal of the right wing Institute of Economic Affairs 
(Horesh, 1988 and 2000). His concept of Social Policy Bonds “…would be issued by local or national 
government and auctioned to the highest bidders. Government would undertake to redeem these bonds 
for a fixed sum only when a specified social objective has been achieved. The bonds would be freely 
tradable after issue, and their market value would rise and fall” (Horesh, 2000). Significantly, 
government would initially suffer a financial loss on the initial sale and redemption of bonds, but would 
obtain financial and social benefits once the objectives are achieved. The original target areas were the 
same as the current scope of social impact bond projects.  
Horesh (2015) is now critical of the current social impact bond model because they do not bring about 
“…creative destruction into the achievement of social and environmental outcomes”, and are not 
tradable in a free market.  
The concept of social impact bonds emerged in the UK in 2008-2009 through the Council on Social 
Action set up by the Blair government “…to bring together innovators from every sector to generate 
ideas and initiatives through which government and other key stakeholders can catalyse, develop and 
celebrate social action” (Council on Social Action, 2008 and 2009, Cabinet Office, 2013a). The fifteen-
member Council included representatives from Community Links, an east London charity; various social 
investment and communications advisers; the Young and Joseph Rowntree Foundations; organisations 
promoting social and criminal justice solutions and volunteering; management consultants Accenture; 
lawyers Allen and Overy; Royal Mail; and a fair trade chocolate company. 
The Council on Social Action was preceded by the first Social Investment Task Force in 2000, an 
initiative of the UK Social Investment Forum, New Economics Foundation and the Development Trusts 
Association, and chaired by the founder of a private equity group. Other members included the chief 
executives of the PPP Healthcare Medical Trust and Guide Dogs for the Blind, founders of a large 
women’s fashion retailer and a computer company, the ex-director of a Chicago community 
development bank and a journalist! They recommended a community development tax credit and 
venture funds, support for community development financial institutions and encouragement for 
foundations and trusts to invest in community development initiatives including for-profit initiatives 
(Social Investment Task Force, 2000).  
The Young Foundation cited their role in advancing social impact bonds as:   
…a financial tool being developed in the UK (by the Young Foundation and Social 
Finance) to provide a new way to invest money in social outcomes. Their key innovation 
is to link investments (by commercial investors or foundations); a programme of actions 
to improve the prospects of a particular group (for example 14-16 year olds in a 
particular area at risk of crime or unemployment); and commitments by national 
government to make payments linked to outcomes achieved in improving the lives of the 
group (for example, lower numbers in prison, and lower benefits payments) (Murray et 
al, 2009).  
The 1997-2010 Labour government produced various reports outlining its approach to public sector 
reform to “…pilot social impact bonds as a new way of funding the third sector to provide services” (HM 
Government, 2009).  
Often the right supplier of a service is a social enterprise, a private sector provider, a 
public sector organisation with the autonomy and freedom to innovate or, increasingly, 
communities and individuals themselves (ibid).  
To enable this process, Social Finance was set up in 2007 to “…marry the needs of investors and the 
social sector, and to connect the sector to capital markets” (Social Finance, 2009a). The concluding 
commentary of the Council for Social Action describes how its first meeting agreed to develop a 
proposal from two members, Peter Wheeler, partner at Goldman Sachs and David Robinson of 
Community Links, a East London charity working with young offenders, to obtain longer term funding 
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based on outcomes. A Sainsbury family trust agreed to fund Social Finance to explore how the 
International Finance Facility for Immunisation Bond model, (which front-loads funding for 
immunisation in developing countries), could be applied in the UK on behalf of the Council (Council for 
Social Action, 2009). 
PO LI T I CA L  S U P P O R T  
It is no coincidence that conservative governments have promoted social impact bonds in the UK, 
Canada and Australia, supported by US Democrats and Republicans. However, the first social impact 
bond in Peterborough, UK, was developed and approved during the 1997-2010 Labour government. It is 
yet another example of how New Labour policy is being mainstreamed by conservative governments. 
The timeline shows that the policy and proposal, discussions with the HM Treasury and Ministry of 
Justice (who prepared the draft contract), outcome measures, operating model, structuring and 
discussions with potential investors, took place between late 2008 and March 2010 prior to the election 
of the Conservative/Liberal Democratic coalition government and their promotion of so-called ‘Big 
Society’.   
EU R O P E A N  P E R S P E CT I V E  
The European Commission adopted its Social Investment for Growth and Cohesion strategy in 2013, 
which made a brief reference to social impact bonds that “…incentivise private investors to finance 
social programmes by offering returns from the public sector if the programmes achieve positive social 
outcomes”. The Commission agreed to facilitate the exchange of experience between Member States 
(European Commission, (2013). 
The following year the European Social Policy Network (ESPN) produced country reports and an overall 
report on how they could contribute to the implementation of the Commission’s social investment 
strategy. The UK report made only a brief reference to social impact bonds, despite the UK being the 
global leader in these projects (European Commission, 2015a). The overall European report made no 
reference social impact bonds (European Commission, 2015b). A European Parliament briefing for 
Members was largely supportive of social impact bonds (European Parliament, 2014). 
An example of a UK public body expressing support for social impact bond projects is set out in Box 2 
together with comment following their italicised statements. 
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BOX 2:  D ISTORTED RATIONALE  
 
1.6 LANGUAGE OF THE MARKETPLACE  
The impact investing, social impact bond and pay-for-success literature unashamedly uses terms such 
as private investors, investment market, rates of return, profit, venture capital, and equity-style returns. 
These terms are the language of financial markets and business and directly conflict with the principles 
and values of public service, most non-profit organisations and community organisations. The choice of 
language promoting a ‘rate of return’ instead of a ‘public service’ is ideologically revealing. “To engage 
more mainstream investors, including institutional investors, will require framing the discussion in 
language they can relate to, not purely in “social investment” terms” (OECD, 2014).  
The language of the marketplace – competition, contestability, contracts, procurement, making 
markets, mixed economy, level playing field, business, brokers, and soft market tests – is intended to 
change attitudes, priorities and embed the idea of marketisation in the public sector (Whitfield, 2006).  
Similarly the description of contractors as ‘providers’ is an attempt to neutralise and make acceptable 
the language of procurement, despite the fact that a legal contract and company status are basic 
conditions for participating in the procurement process. 
New Economy, which delivers policy, strategy and research for the Greater Manchester Combined 
Authority and the Greater Manchester Local Enterprise Partnership, is an example of the way social 
impact bonds are promoted. A review of financial instruments to inform the North West’s 2014-2020 EU 
Funding Strategy contained the following statements on social impact bonds (New Economy, 2013). 
Firstly, SIBs allow for private financing of interventions aimed at alleviating social 
problems. This has the advantage of bringing in investment which otherwise would not 
be available to the public sector.   
Comment: The public sector has to pay for the investment plus the profits to investors and is therefore 
not additional investment. It replaces public investment at a much higher cost.  
Secondly, SIBs provide businesses with a way to invest in social projects that provide the 
possibility of financial return while also benefiting society. This widening of access to and 
supply of finance is especially important when government budgets are limited and 
opportunities to fund interventions through traditional funding streams are 
correspondingly reduced.   
Comment: These are public services, but re-designating them, as ‘social projects’ for profitable business 
investment is marketisation and privatisation. Social impact bonds are ultimately financed by the public 
sector when private investors are repaid. It would be financially advantageous if early intervention and 
prevention policies were directly provided by the public sector to avoid having to pay the 15% - 30% or 
more annual rate of return to private investors. The solution lies in increased public spending through 
progressive taxation and economic development strategies, not in accepting austerity and neoliberalism. 
Thirdly and finally, by increasing the number of investors, SIBs also transfer a portion of 
the risk of failure of an intervention away from the public sector: if the intervention fails, 
investors lose a proportional amount of their money whilst the public agency has not 
had to reallocate budgets away from acute services in order to pay for the intervention” 
(New Economy, 2013). 
Comment: If the intervention fails it will almost certainly impact on service users and staff, but this is 
never referred to. The public sector, service users, staff and contractors bear risks as well as private 
investors. If the public sector funds social impact bonds it must reconfigure existing services and 
continue to operate acute services at a time of continuing public spending cuts. The failure to achieve the 
outcome targets may not be evident for several years so avoiding reallocation of budgets is a myth. 
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The branding of projects and policies as ‘social’ and ‘community’ is an established tactic. The 
Conservative/Liberal Democrat UK Coalition frequently used the term ‘community action’, a use 
unheard of even in the Thatcher era.  
The focus on selective words to the exclusion of others is another tactic. For example, the current 
obsession with outcomes excludes the value of inputs (skills and experience of staff), processes 
(working methods, participation) and outputs (location and quality of affordable housing) when all the 
criteria are equally important in determining the quality of public services.  
1.7 OBJECTIVES AND STRUCTURE OF THIS REPORT  
This study examines the impact investing sector and social impact bonds and pay-for-success projects.  
 Part 2 describes the role of global banks and philanthrocapitalism in promoting impact 
investing and social impact bond projects.  
 Part 3 examines the political economy of social impact bond projects identifying the reasons 
why and how they developed, the similarities and key differences with PPPs. 
 The financial, organisational and operational aspects of social impact bond projects are 
discussed in Part 4 including the degree of innovation, risks and long-term effects, high 
transaction costs, exaggerated savings, the impact of profiteering and lack of economic, social 
and equality impacts.  
 Changes in the finance of development aid in the global south and planned use of 
Development Impact Bonds are examined in Part 5.  
 Part 6 examines the lack of democratic accountability, participation and transparency. Equally 
significant is the absence of service users and communities in the planning, design and 
operation of social impact bond projects. 
 Part 7 reveals the almost total absence of references to the employment terms and conditions 
of those engaged in delivering social impact bond projects.  
 Part 8 details the scope for public sector innovation and improvement and sets out the policies 
and strategies that are needed. The concluding section considers the potential effects of 
private investment and the future of the welfare state. 
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2 BIG BANKS ,  PHILANTHROCAPITALISM AND IMPACT INVESTING  
2.1 PRIVATE,  SOCIAL AND PHILANTHROPIC FUNDING MODELS  
At one level social investment is broadly defined as “…investing in people. It means policies designed to 
strengthen people’s skills and capacities and support them to participate fully in employment and social 
life” (European Union, 2014). The term has also described public and private investment in 
infrastructure and services (Allens, 2015). Impact investing is another dimension of social investment 
that combines the demand for a rate of return or profit with achieving social and environmental 
targets. A business and commercial approach provides “…an opportunity to complement precious 
philanthropic capital and to promote market-driven solutions” (Rodin and Brandenberg, 2014).  
SO CI A L LY  RE S P O N S I B LE  I N V E S T M E N T  A N D  CO R P O R A T E  S O CI A L  RE S P O N S I B I L I T Y   
Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) describes investments made into companies that engage in, or 
adopt policies, for sustainable/clean energy, social investment, environmental protection and human 
rights. It can also include investments made to try to improve corporate policies. It is investor led. 
Many large corporations adopt Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) policies, which usually allocate a 
small part of their annual budget to charitable work and have policies that may promote environmental 
and social policies and good working conditions. It is corporate led in contrast to SRI. 
IM P A CT  I N V E S T I N G  
Impact investing is defined as “...investments made into companies, organizations, and funds with the 
intention to generate measurable social and environmental impact alongside a financial return”  (Global 
Impact Investing Network, 2015). Sectors include sustainable agriculture, affordable housing, 
healthcare, clean technology and financial services. 
Impact investment has four dimensions – investors, social objectives, measuring impact and financial 
return (some investors may accept a return of capital as a minimum requirement). 
There is a strong case for increased social investment in new or improved community housing, 
community enterprises and facilities, regeneration and other citywide or local projects. This is distinct 
from privatising public services and the welfare state, which is the subject of this study. 
PH I LA N T H R O CA P I T A L I S M  –  D E M A N D  F O R  I N V E S T M E N T  A N D  F I N A N CI A L  R E T U R N  
Philanthrocapitalism describes the growth of foundations and trusts that are critical of awarding grants 
and instead believe in the application of business practice and market forces to ensure resources are 
invested at market rates of return. This approach raises key issues and questions that cannot be 
examined in detail here, but the following comments are indicative: 
 …philanthrocapitalists have helped to perpetuate a dubious belief: the idea that 
corporations and private entrepreneurs are subsidising gaps in development financing 
created by increasingly non-interventionist states. In reality, it is often governments 
subsidising the philanthrocapitalists. (McGoey, 2014). 
…doubt that analogizing charitable work to that of capitalist entrepreneurs and Wall 
Street investors will enrich the way nonprofits are governed and the way they carry out 
their activities—particularly to the extent that nonprofit work disproportionately affects 
non-elites in society, i.e., poor, disadvantaged, and middle-class people (Jenkins, 2011).  
…Philanthrocapitalism may well produce a vaccine against malaria, but there’s no 
vaccine against greed, fear, poverty, inequality, corruption, lousy government, personal 
alienation, and all the other things that plague us (Edwards, 2010). 
Instead of making a profit to help the most vulnerable, the goal becomes making a profit 
from the most vulnerable (National Union of Public and General Employees, Canada, 
2014). 
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Philanthrocapitalism is the embedding of neoliberalism into the activities of foundations and trusts. It is 
a means of marketising and privatising social development aid in the global south. It has also been 
described as Philanthropic Colonialism:  
Whether it involved farming methods, education practices, job training or business 
development, over and over I would hear people discuss transplanting what worked in 
one setting directly into another with little regard for culture, geography or societal 
norms (Buffett, 2013).  
In the article appropriately titled The Charitable-Industrial Complex, he observed:  
…As more lives and communities are destroyed by the system that creates vast amounts 
of wealth for the few, the more heroic it sounds to “give back.” It’s what I would call 
“conscience laundering” — feeling better about accumulating more than any one person 
could possibly need to live on by sprinkling a little around as an act of charity. But this 
just keeps the existing structure of inequality in place (ibid). 
The replacement of public finance and grants from public/foundations/trusts to community 
organisations, voluntary organisations and social enterprises with ‘social investment’, requiring a return 
on investment, means that all activities must be profitable. This will have a profound impact on the 
ability to regenerate to meet social and community needs. The merging of PPPs, impacting investing 
and philanthrocapitalism would be complete! 
GR A N T  F U N D I N G  F O U N D A T I O N S ,  T R U S T S  A N D  CH A R I T I E S  
Two types of funding practices are evident by foundations, trust and charities. The first is the traditional 
grant-aided support for a wide range of non-profit social action ranging from campaigns to community 
initiatives and the provision of services. It ranges from one-off grants or donations, to limited-term 
support for projects that meet the foundation, trust or charity objectives. Some may provide pump-
prime funding to support an organisation’s work to help it attract wider funding. 
The second type is the funding of political and business campaigns by some philanthrocapitalists. A 
powerful US group of neo-conservative organisations and wealthy individuals raise/distribute millions 
of dollars annually to finance right wing candidates, promote low taxes, anti-trade union legislation, 
corporate welfare, and the implementation of neoliberal public policies (such as charter schools). Many, 
such as Koch companies and foundations, operate through the American Legislative Exchange Council 
(Center for Effective Government, 2013 and In the Public Interest, 2012). Other foundations such as the 
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Walton Foundation (Walmart) and the Eli and Edythe Broad 
Foundation have played a key role in funding and promoting charter schools to compete with the public 
school system (Barkan, 2011). Similar philanthrocapitalists operate in Europe and other parts of the 
world. 
The four models of private, social and philanthropic funding are descried in Table 2. Investors include 
individual private investors, banks and other financial institutions, companies and charitable 
organisations such as foundations and trusts. 
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TABLE 2:  PRIVATE, SOCIAL AND PHILANTHR OPIC FUNDING MODELS  
Socially responsible 
investment (SRI) and 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) 
Impact investing Philanthrocapitalism 
Grant funding 
foundations, trusts and 
charities 
Investment in SRI 
companies that engage in 
sustainable/clean energy 
and other projects with 
positive social and human 
rights impacts. 
Companies adopt 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility policies to 
allocate a fraction of their 
resources for charitable 
work and have policies that 
claim to promote 
environmental and social 
policies.  
Impact investments are 
investments made into 
companies, funds and 
organisations with the 
intention to generate both 
a market-rate financial 
return and social and 
environmental outcomes. 
Some prioritise ‘finance’ 
first, others ‘impact’ first. 
Impact investments can 
include cash deposits, 
loans, and purchase of 
shares in a company or 
combination of these. 
Foundations and trusts 
make investments in social 
enterprises and expect a 
market rate of return. Can 
include loans or other 
financial instruments with 
repayment and profit. 
The application of business 
practices and market 
theory to foundation 
funding of projects.  
Limited term or one-off 
grants/donations to non-
profit groups, community 
organisations and citizen 
initiatives. Venture 
philanthropy targets new 
or expanding organisations 
to provide operational 
support in addition to 
grants.  
Cash funding of political 
campaigns and business 
organisations by wealthy 
individuals and private 
foundations usually in 
pursuit of neoliberal 
objectives. 
Related ideology and objectives 
Profit, markets and 
business planning and 
practices. 
SRI or ethical investors buy 
shares only in companies 
with social and 
environmental policies. 
CSR companies seek 
reputational advantage by 
contributing to good 
causes and local causes 
where they are located.  
Profit, markets and idea 
that combining the profit 
motive with social and 
environmental objectives 
will produce a net gain for 
shareholders, ‘customers’, 
employees, suppliers and 
communities. 
Profit, markets and 
business planning and 
practices. Investment in 
enterprises with results- 
driven conditions to make 
repayment of loans with 
profit.  
 
Non-profit funding of 
causes, campaigns, 
services, research and 
innovative projects. 
Venture philanthropy has 
objective of creating 
sustainable innovative 
organisations by providing 
business planning and 
support alongside grants, 
but do not require a return 
on investment. 
 
 
2.2 PROMOTING SOCIAL IMPACT BOND AND PAY-FOR-SUCCESS PROJECTS  
Global banks such as Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase and Co. and 
Morgan Stanley have played a key role in promoting and funding social impact bond projects in 
anticipation of attracting wider private investor interest. Foundations, in particular the Rockefeller 
Foundation and the J.B. and M.K. Pritzker Family Foundation, have similarly promoted and funded 
projects. Impact investment and social finance organisations have published reports that portray social 
impact bonds as the ‘best thing since sliced bread’. 
International bodies have also advanced the cause of social impact bond projects. The G8 group of 
countries established a Social Impact Investment Taskforce (Social Impact Investment Taskforce, 
2014a), the OECD produced two reports on social investment (OECD, 2014a and 2015) and the World 
Economic Forum (WEF) reported on the opportunities to engage mainstream private investors (WEF, 
2013). The World Bank launched its own version of payment-by-results, Program-for-Results (P4R), in 
2012 (World Bank, 2015). 
A  M U L T I -B I LL I O N  M A R K E T ?   
The fifth annual global impact investor survey revealed that 82 organisations that responded in both 
2013 and 2014 reported a 7% growth in capital committed and a 13% growth in the number of deals. 
Total investment reached US$10.6bn in 2014 in 5,400 investments (J.P. Morgan and Global Impact 
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Investing Network, 2015). UK social investment was forecast to increase from £165m in 2011 to £1bn 
by 2016, but this included all forms of social investment. However, it only accounted for just over 1% of 
the small business loans market (Brown and Swersky, 2012). If the £1bn was achieved with an average 
15% - 30% annual return on investment, it would divert between £150m - £300m from frontline 
services into the pockets of investors. 
An assessment of the US social impact bond market concluded:  
However, as the market grows, philanthropic participation as guarantors may not prove 
scalable. Familiarity with deal structures and evaluation methods, supportive political 
environments and longer track records for interventions should contribute to commercial 
investors gradually assuming more performance risk with lower levels of guarantees 
(Godeke Consulting, 2012).  
This would radically change the nature of ‘social’ investment. 
IN V E S T I N G  T O  P R I V A T I S E  T H E  W E L F A R E  S T A T E  
The State of New York recidivism project, funded by Bank of America Merrill Lynch and Social Finance 
US, was the first social impact bond project offered to investors via the bank’s wealth management 
platform in 2013. US$13.5m was raised from over 40 individuals and institutional investors (US National 
Advisory Board on Impact Investing, 2014). 
The Dutch bank ABN-AMRO considered the possibility of banks issuing social impact bonds as normal 
financial bonds. “…banks are already issuing bonds on a huge scale, so SIBs could be a minor addition to 
their portfolio. Making it easier to involve banks in SIBs, but also to scale SIBs. Once the bonds are up 
and running, it can be easily duplicated. If bonds are issued, it immediately creates a secondary market 
for SIBs” (Vennema and Koekoek, 2013). However, investors would want a relatively low risk return and 
it would be very difficult to fix a standard rate for dividend payments.  
The UK social investment company Allia launched the first retail social impact bond, the eight-year 
Future for Children Bond, in early 2013, but it was cancelled due to lack of interest. 78% of the fund 
would have funded a low risk, fixed rate loan to Places for People housing association for affordable 
housing, 20% was to be invested in the Essex County Council’s social impact bond project to prevent 
children going into care, and the remaining 2% was Allia’s management fee. Marketing, timing and 
features of the bond were cited for the lack of interest (Social Enterprise Buzz, 2013). 
The Triodos Bank produced a ‘blueprint for retail impact investing’, which recommended the creation of 
impact investment funds for the retail market, the expansion of impact-enabled employee savings and 
pension plans and tax incentives for retail impact investments (Social Impact Investment Taskforce, 
2014b). A ‘social pension fund’ retail model is planned to attract savers to invest part of their defined 
contribution pension fund, run by large investment companies and social finance intermediaries, to 
“…kick-start a new social impact segment of the UK pensions market” (Keohane and Rowell, 2015).  
Impact investment by Australian superannuation funds has been limited. This was primarily due to a 
pessimistic response by trustees concerned about their statutory investment obligations and a limited 
understanding of impact investment (Charlton et al, 2013). 
The ‘social investor’ is a cover ultimately to draw in mainstream private capital to fund social and other 
public services that would otherwise, at least initially, only attract a few financial companies such as 
Bank of America and Goldman Sachs. Global banks have to date committed very small exploratory 
resources to social impact bond projects and are clearly waiting to see whether the investment market 
shows potential growth. Foundations and charities have financed many social impact bond projects, but 
limited resources and changing priorities mean they are unlikely to continue to be a mainstream funder.  
Right wing organisations such as the Reason Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) are 
promoting social impact bond projects. Reason believes they are “…a PPP that uses private sector 
funding to advance new social service delivery models” and has reported on legislation and projects 
through its newsletters and annual privatisation report (Gilroy, 2013). The AEI proposed using social 
impact bond projects to leverage private capital to finance higher education, for example, State- and 
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Federal-funded remedial courses for underprepared college students and completion rates in credit-
bearing courses or job-placements rates (Kelly and McShane, 2013).  
A Rockefeller Foundation funded study to map social impact investing opportunities in the German 
education sector concluded there is scope for “…targeted social impact investments in selected areas 
might effectively complement government activities” (Hochstadter and Scheck, 2014). It did, however, 
recognise the difficulty of market-based approaches competing with established welfare institutions, 
the particular structure of federal state education provision and ethical concerns and the “…general 
distrust against the ’economization’ of the social economy” (ibid). 
TH E  E M E R G I N G  F O U R T H  S E C T O R  
The emerging US fourth sector comprises community development corporations, social enterprises, 
social businesses, non-profit enterprises, new profit companies and similar enterprises. The initiative is 
led by the Urban Institute’s Center on Nonprofits and Philanthropy and defines the four sectors by 
purpose and income (see Figure 1). They “…see profit as an entirely acceptable component of the 
process” and “…relegate the non-profit realm to the bench” (Cohen, 2015). The treatment of the public 
sector demonstrates the simplicity of the analysis. Market–driven financing of social impact bond 
projects is certain “…to exert a fundamentally corrupting influence on non-profit service delivery within 
civil society” (Malcolmson (2014).  
FIGURE 1:  THE EMERGING FOURTH SECTOR  
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2.3 IMPACT INVESTING –  EMBRACING NEOLIBERAL ISM  
Despite the uncertainty over future investment models in social impact bond projects, impact investing 
organisations have embraced neoliberalism.  
The demands of the impact investing market include deregulation, tax incentives, reduction of the due 
diligence requirement for investors and investees (Impact Investing Australia, 2014). 
Capital should be made available in Australia to build the capacity of social enterprise to 
participate in the private capital marketplace (ibid).  
But the objectives go beyond ‘doing good’ when impact investing ideologues perceive a much more 
decisive role for themselves in government: 
Additional opportunities to partner with governments in commissioning reform and 
investment (ibid).  
This statement envisages private capital teams up with non-accountable social finance organisations, 
jointly deciding the types of reform and allocating public spending. In other words, the boards of 
charitable organisations, banks and other financial institutions will be deciding social priorities rather 
than government. Furthermore, the market will heavily influence decisions for social impact bond 
projects, which in turn are dependent on expected investment rates of return. 
Making markets is a core objective: 
Build capital and opportunities for larger scale investment that can attract a range of 
investors including institutions and catalyse the market (ibid). 
Social investment leverages the private markets to provide public goods, however, the 
mechanisms to do so are not efficient and therefore can benefit from government 
intervention (OECD, 2013). 
The performance mantra has changed from the government setting external targets together with 
internal management targets on public services to: 
 …allows government to purchase results (Social Investment Taskforce, 2014). 
This is like buying outcomes off a supermarket shelf: “In this years budget we are buying a 10% 
reduction of child in care; a 13% improvement in educational attainment for 18 year olds; an 8% 
reduction in reoffending; and a 20% increase in health outcomes of care home elderly patients” (a 
fictitious statement). 
The ‘purchasing of results’ is similar to the justification used for charging student fees for higher 
education, because graduates will on average have higher salaries after graduation (this ignores the 
soaring student debt problem). Toll road charges are justified on the grounds they reduce travel time 
and increase productivity. Automation, robotics and technological change could eventually lead to 
justifying primary and secondary school fees, because with fewer highly trained workers required, 
education will increase pupils’ employment opportunities with wages significantly higher than 
unemployed benefit rates. Once the concept of charging for or buying virtually everything is 
established, neoliberal ideology will know no bounds. Some samples follow. 
From infrastructure to services - the Co-Founder and Chair of Impact Investing Australia summed up the 
opportunities for private capital: 
There are significant, concrete opportunities for private capital to take a more active role 
in delivering social infrastructure and services that are traditionally provided and funded 
by the government and not-for-profit sector alone, in areas such as aged care, health, 
affordable housing, education and international development (Addis, 2015). 
Impact Investing Australia clarified the opportunities: 
 17 
A
ltern
ative to
 p
rivate fin
an
ce o
f th
e w
elfare state
 
In some cases, public-private partnerships have been extended to these projects and 
there is willing capital in Australia. There is significant potential to further unlock capital 
and improve outcomes and alternatives for service provision where interested parties can 
come together on appropriate terms. This is not simply about contractual relationships or 
privatisation of public services. It is part of a broader shift in how we meet the needs of 
citizens and communities (Impact Investing Australia, 2014). 
They signal a move away from purchaser-provider models of contracting towards greater 
collaboration, re-positioning government as catalyst and aggregator of resources (ibid). 
A neoliberal future for government: 
The public sector will increasingly act as a facilitator of services, rather than a direct 
provider, with all areas of service delivery opened to competition. Citizens in need of 
services will exercise control over the range of services they access and the means by 
which they are delivered (Western Australia Economic Audit Committee, 2009, quoted in 
Impact Investing Australia, 2014).  
Blueprint for a quality impact investment solution in an area of social service delivery 
that has scale and includes elements of infrastructure, increasing demand on 
government budgets, and clear opportunities for innovation and improved outcomes 
(Impact Investing Australia, 2014). 
The attraction of social impact bonds and pay-for-success: 
Wall Street banks are eyeing a nascent market that improves their public image at a low 
risk and still offers them a reasonable return on capital (Reuters, 2013). 
There is an increasing number of emerging business models where the pursuit of social or 
environmental impact is a mutually reinforcing goal alongside financial return. These are 
the types of business models that impact investors actively target (JP Morgan and Global 
Impact Investing Network, 2014). 
Longer-term goals 
With sufficient engagement from institutions like Deutsche Bank, impact investment has 
the ability to become an asset class of true significance, and from this, a new model of 
‘sustainable capitalism’ can emerge. Impact investment should be fully integrated into 
the business model to make it not just a ‘nice to have’ but an integral part of business. 
My vision is for every asset manager to have a social investment fund (Colin Grassie, 
Chief Executive of Deutsche Bank UK, 8 October 2014). 
Certain consequences of markets could be commonplace such as high transaction costs, consolidation 
(takeovers and mergers between social enterprises and non-profits and by private companies); 
diversification as organisations/companies seek economies of scale; a contract culture; selective 
innovation determined by profitability and potential savings. 
The idea that a new generation of investors are seeking social outcomes, not just profits, is hardly 
credible, because banks and other financial institutions want to attract private investors who will be 
seeking the 15% - 30% annual rate of return. They may claim an element of ‘social’ responsibility, but 
the primary objective will be profitable financial investment. It will be impractical to test the ‘social’ 
credibility of potential investors.  
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3 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IMPACT INVESTING AND SOCIAL IMPACT 
BONDS  
Neoliberal ideology and objectives have been dominant for over three decades. This ideology promotes 
free trade, competition and markets to allocate resources and deliver services with government control 
of money supply. Deregulation is intended to create new opportunities for accumulation and to restore 
the falling rate of profit. The transformation of nation state and democratic governance is intended to 
form a partnership between state, finance and business interests, committed to reducing taxation and 
the cost and power of labour (Whitfield, 2014a). 
3.1 CRISES AND INEQUALITIES  
The crisis of accumulation and the falling rate of profit, labour’s declining share of national income, 
changes in the capital/labour share of power and increased inequalities were evident well before the 
2008 global financial crisis. 
A long-term trend in the falling rate of profit is evident in major economies and in particular the G7 and 
G20 groups of countries, although with periods of stabilisation and small increases (Maito, 2014 and 
Roberts, 2015). An analysis of the falling rate of profit in the G20 group of countries identified “…a mild 
recovery in the 1990s until the early 2000s. Since then the G20 rate of profit has slumped, both before 
the 2008-09 Great Recession and after, with only a tiny recovery up to 2011” (Roberts, 2015). 
The expansion of waged labour in industry and agriculture dominated capital accumulation in the 1950s 
and 1960s. Although the ownership and control of energy and transport had been a public-private 
struggle for decades, this had a new intensity from 1980 onwards.  ‘Accumulation by dispossession’ 
then became the dominant strategy (Harvey, 2005). The process of financialising, marketising and 
privatising the public sector and welfare state began in earnest as capital viewed public assets as a 
source of accumulation (Whitfield, 2001).  
The labour share of national income has fallen significantly since the early 1990s. The median labour 
share of national income fell from 66.1% to 61.7% between 1990 and 2009 in 26 out of 30 developed 
countries (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2012). Other studies identified 
financialisation to be the prime cause followed by globalisation, privatisation, welfare state 
retrenchment and union density (Stockhammer, 2013 and International Institute for Labour Studies, 
2011). Although labour productivity increased more than twice the rate of average wages in 36 
developed economies between 1999-2013, the benefits were unevenly shared between capital and 
labour (International Labour Organisation, 2015). 
The continued decline of trade union membership in many industrialised countries weakened the 
power of labour. UK trade union membership was 6.5m in 2013 compared to a peak of over 13m in 
1979. Public sector density was 55.4% in 2013 and only 14.4% in the private sector (Department for 
Business Innovation & Skills, 2014). Trade union membership and union density declined an average 
19.2% and 18.2% respectively in a sample of nine large economies (Australia, Canada, Germany, France, 
Italy, Japan, Sweden, UK and US) between 1980-2010 (Schnabel, 2012). Only Canada increased union 
membership in the same period, but had a small decrease in union density. 
Income inequality has widened in advanced economies, which can lead to higher social costs, 
particularly health and education, reduced social mobility and lower economic growth (Dabla-Norris et 
al, 2015). Equality issues concerning social impact bonds are discussed in Part 4. 
In this context, social impact bond projects increase the financialising and monetising of public services 
with private investors providing operating capital and monetising of outcomes (see Part 4). Further, 
their structure outside of the public sector results in the outsourcing of some commissioning functions, 
such as monitoring and evaluation, and service delivery. They therefore accelerate the 
commodification, marketisation and privatisation processes. Their structure erodes democratic 
accountability and transparency and on this basis, they are a typical neoliberal project. 
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3.2 F INANCIALISING THE WELFARE STATE  
Financialisation is defined as the globalisation of financial markets, the increase in income from 
financial investment, the shareholder value revolution and the penetration of finance into commercial 
relations (Cooper, 2015). Financialisation within public services and the welfare state has five 
dimensions.  
 Firstly, the design of programmes and projects that specifically require upfront private finance 
with the exclusion of public provision, such as social impact bonds and PPPs. Government 
repays the private sector, but at a much higher cost than public investment. 
 Secondly, monetizing the value of outcomes by agreeing a fixed sum of money for each 
outcome (see Part 4).  
 Thirdly, increasing the scope for private delivery of public services through outsourcing and 
privatisation as a direct consequence of private finance, such as PPPs and social impact bond 
projects. 
 Fourthly, the commercialisation of public services through arms length trading companies, 
adoption of a more passive role in partnerships, and in the case of social impact bonds, the 
withdrawal of government from traditional responsibilities in procuring and managing 
contracts.  
 Finally, governments and public bodies have funded infrastructure projects via Tax Increment 
Financing (TIF) in a particular area by borrowing against future anticipated increases in tax 
revenue over a 25-year period.  
These measures have been supported by wider use of publicly financed market support, grants, 
subsidies, guarantees and tax breaks leading to the further embedding of corporate welfare.  
The global financial crisis and subsequent austerity policies created a platform to accelerate the use of 
private finance in public services and the welfare state.  Austerity policies led to deep cuts in public 
expenditure, negative or low levels of economic growth as a result of a decline in public and private 
investment, mass unemployment, wage cuts and decreased consumer spending (Whitfield, 2014b).  
Renewed claims of ‘deficits’, ‘gaps’ and ‘government failure’ are another common theme expressed by 
business and trade organisations and their political allies. Private investment is commonly justified on 
the grounds of economic growth and markets with minimum reference to social need.  
Social impact bonds extend private finance deeper into core welfare state services. They follow the trail 
of partnerships and joint ventures with developers and private companies, tax increment financing and 
other ‘buy now-pay later’ schemes. Longer-term, the financial market could create a new ‘asset class’ or 
stream of potential investment opportunities for private and ‘social’ investors, that provide another 
way of extracting profit from the delivery of public services.  
Social impact bond projects are required to ‘monetise the gains’ via enforceable contracts of outcomes 
and the savings obtained from reduced demand of existing public services, infrastructure and welfare 
state programmes (Kaufman Foundation – ReadyNation, 2012).  
Outsourcing of public services is usually financed directly by public sector revenue budgets and does 
not incur the high cost of upfront private finance. The cost differential between public and private 
finance in the UK is stark because “…the effective interest rate of all private finance deals (7%–8%) is 
double that of all government borrowing (3%–4%)” (National Audit Office, 2015). Some social impact 
bonds have been financed by foundations and trusts eager to establish the model and have accepted 
below market rate of returns or awarded grants. If successful, foundation/trust funding will be replaced 
by private investment by financial institutions such as banks, private equity funds, pension funds, 
impact investors and wealthy individuals, which will mean private borrowing costs and market rates of 
return. This will increase the current cost of social impact bond projects. 
Social impact bond projects claim to transfer risk from government to the private sector. They monetise 
public services through the payment-by-results model and with the likelihood of a secondary market 
emerging to trade social impact bond investments – a Social Stock Exchange already operates in the UK 
(see Appendix). Meanwhile, consumerism and individualisation, together with personal budgets, have 
been extended to more health and social care service users. 
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SO CI A L  R E P R O D U C T I O N  
The imposition of market ideology comprising: the partial privatisation of commissioning; the 
commodification of services; a contract culture; the monetisation of outcomes and the 
commercialisation of service delivery, will extend from private contractors to non-profit enterprises and 
voluntary service organisations. This will have a profound effect on people’s lives, communities and 
social relations. Commercial values and business practices will shape the financialisation of social 
reproduction (Dowling and Harvie, 2014). 
The commodification and monetisation of early intervention and prevention is almost certain to have a 
negative impact particularly for women in social reproduction, in training and employment and will 
intensify gender inequality. The change of focus from poverty and social exclusion to ‘troubled families’ 
or anti-social behaviour (see Part 4) shifts the cause from underlying economic and social conditions to 
individual families. It also changes the design of public policy initiatives. The lack of participation in 
social impact bond and pay-for-success projects means that needs assessments, project design and 
delivery, excludes the very people they claim to support. 
In addition, the move to philanthrocapitalism could lead to fewer resources being available to fund the 
wide range of community projects, such as child care, housing, community and welfare services, in 
which women have the primary role, and make an important contribution to social reproduction. 
Experience shows that market ideology leads to a decline in advocacy and mobilisation by non-profit 
organisations: 
Operating within a political economy of contracts, privatization, and marketization chills 
nonprofit human-service organizations’ interest in and ability to engage in policy 
advocacy. It also limits their ability to mobilize for expansion of social rights. Advocacy, 
when it does occur, typically centers on obtaining benefits and resources for local 
constituencies (Hasenfeld and Garrow, 2012).  
Austerity policies have led to significant cuts in wages and benefits. In addition, demographic change, in 
particular the aging of populations, will impose additional pressure on women to undertake unpaid 
family and neighbourhood care duties. Additional employment opportunities will be created in care 
services, but current terms and conditions are already unsustainable (Whitfield, 2015). 
Private investors are likely to assert greater influence in the public policy-making process and 
investment decisions. They could, in effect, cherry-pick the target populations and services that will 
produce the required returns with minimum risk. This would create a two-tier system leaving the state 
responsible for the difficult social issues.  
…there might be an incentive to ‘cherry-pick’ an area or a prison if SIBs were rolled out 
more widely. For example, prisons with strong inspection reports or better facilities might 
be more attractive targets for intermediaries and investors, in the hope that outcomes 
would be easier to achieve with offenders discharged from those establishments (Disley 
et al, 2011).  
The focus on investors, achieving outcomes and government savings in social impact bond projects 
have marginalised the participants, who tend to be treated as cohorts (groups of people with similar 
characteristics). There appears to be little positive evidence of the ‘personalisation’ agenda (Whitfield, 
2012a), except to the extent that targeted and personal support for participants is essential to achieve 
the specified outcomes.  
The New Zealand government is planning a pilot social impact bond in mental health services (Ministry 
of Health New Zealand, 2013), but more fundamentally, has adopted an ‘investment approach’ to the 
future funding of welfare benefits. A similar model is being considered in Australia (see Box 3).  
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BOX 3:  'INVESTMENT APPROACH '  TO THE WELFARE STATE  
 
 
The ‘Investment Approach’ “…uses an independent actuarial model to evaluate the likely long-term costs (forward 
liability) of paying benefits to current and recent income support clients. The valuation is based on what has 
happened in the past to other people with similar backgrounds (using 30 years of data on patterns of benefit 
receipt)” (New Zealand Productivity Commission, 2015). It is similar to the way that insurance companies calculate 
risks.  
It takes a long-term view of the future fiscal liability of the benefits system. But it is a financial forecast that excludes 
cost benefit analysis. “This is a fundamental flaw: it looks only at costs to the government and at nothing else” 
(Rosenberg, 2015) and “…accounting rather than economic concepts of costs” (Chapple, 2013). Furthermore, long-
term forecasting is notoriously difficult because future performance of the global economy, national economic 
strategies and economic crises cannot be predicted and thus the level and needs of benefit claimants. 
The Ministry for Social Development uses the actuarial model and service trials to set service investment and 
disinvestment priorities. It is developing “…a return on investment framework to make this process more systematic 
by identifying the costs of delivering services down to the level of individual clients and by incorporating both 
immediate fiscal savings from reduced time on benefit and reductions in the forward liability. The framework will 
enable investments with longer-term payoffs to be evaluated alongside those with nearer-term returns” (New 
Zealand Productivity Commission, 2015). The government is considering extending the ‘investment approach’ to 
other social services. 
The ‘return on investment’ is limited because it “…is the reduction in future liability for a given expenditure without 
taking benefits into account” (Rosenberg, 2015). The system is severely constrained in developing early intervention 
and prevention strategies, because targeting clients does not take costs and benefits into account. The financial 
focus, coupled with the ideology that innovation is only possible in the private sector, will lead to further outsourcing 
of government services under the guise of ‘choosing of interventions’.  
The prime objective of the ‘investment approach’ appears to focus on reducing future financial liabilities of the 
welfare state. The government now commissions an annual valuation of the benefit system for working-age adults. 
The July 2014 valuation by an Australian actuarial consultants provided estimates of the total future cost over the 
lifetime of current beneficiaries, the impact of changes in client groups, lifetime patterns, future cost of benefit 
receipt and future changes to the client base and the liability (Taylor Fry Pty Ltd, 2015). The only outcome considered 
was financial apart from quantifying the ‘churn’ among beneficiaries: how soon they returned to a benefit. 
The National Party Minister for Social Development enthusiastically welcomed the 2014 valuation and a few months 
later announced that the outsourcing of employment services claimants with mental health conditions could be 
extended to more social services (Jones, 2015). In June 2015 the Ministry of Health announced a trial social bond 
programme to deliver employment services to people with mental health conditions (Davison, 2015).  
Outsourcing has no logical connection to the ‘investment approach’, but is closely tied politically with the 
government regularly connecting the two policies in statements. The social bond trial is one of a number of the 
government’s privatisation initiatives. 
An Australian government-commissioned review of the welfare system recommended it should adopt and adapt the 
New Zealand ‘investment approach’ model (Commonwealth of Australia, 2015a). The Australian investment 
approach “…would reduce long term income support reliance through targeted investments.  Targeted investments 
should be designed to achieve a return on investment, increase people’s self-reliance and reduce the lifetime liability 
of Australia’s social support system. In addition to improving the lives of people at risk of long term income support 
reliance this would improve the fiscal and social sustainability of the social support system over the long term” (ibid).  
“The Investment Approach in its present state is a dangerous tool promoting an impoverished, biased approach to 
public policy” (Rosenberg, 2015). 
Current and future benefit claimants are treated as financial liabilities, yet no attempt is made to identify and 
scrutinise the long-term financial liability of the Corporate Welfare system - the tax concessions, business and 
training grants, public subsidies, investment guarantees, research and development grants, low cost loans and other 
public costs of the business sector. 
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3.3 S IMILARITIES WITH ,  BUT KEY DIFFERENCES FROM PPPS  
Social and development impact bond projects have some similar attributes to Private Finance Initiative 
(PFI) or Public Private Partnerships (PPP) projects, particularly since they are ultimately financed by 
public money (Loxley, 2013). Social impact bond projects promise public expenditure savings in contrast 
to ‘value for money’ in PFI/PPP projects. Some intermediary organisations are proposing social impact 
bond projects in a similar way to PPP companies that have submitted unsolicited bids for infrastructure 
assets in the US and Australia. 
However, there are notable differences.  
Firstly, social impact bond projects are for core or semi-core public services rather than infrastructure, 
facilities management or corporate services. 
Secondly, they are normally 3-7 year contracts compared to 25-40 years for PFI/PPP projects and 50-99 
years for infrastructure concessions. 
Thirdly, the role of government is much reduced, because the intermediary organisation, or Special 
Purpose Company, is responsible for selecting the contractor(s), engaging independent evaluators, 
monitoring performance and arranging investor repayment by the government. 
Fourthly, foundations and trusts, and a small number of banks, currently finance social impact bond 
projects in contrast to PFI/PPP project finance from banks and financial institutions. The scaling up 
social impact bonds will, however, depend on attracting a broader range of private investors. 
Fifthly, social enterprises, charities and voluntary organisations are currently social impact bond 
contractors, although private contractors are likely to become involved if the market expands.  
Finally, some social impact bond services may be classified as being ‘new’, so private and social 
contractors may claim that the transfer of public sector staff and their terms and conditions of 
employment does not apply under European Union employment regulations or similar legislation in 
other countries.  
Both social impact bonds and PFI/PPP projects increase private finance of public services and the 
welfare state. However, it is important to highlight the specific threats, risks and impact of social impact 
bond projects and ensure they are not hidden in the continuing critique of PFI/PPP projects. Repeating 
the case against PPPs with reference to social impact bonds has limited scope, particularly given the 
degree to which PFI/PPP policies are unfortunately embedded in the same countries that are now 
promoting social impact bonds. Instead, the key differences between social impact bonds and PFI/PPP 
policies need to be targeted.  
LE S S O N S  F R O M  PPPS  
The World Bank has been a strong advocate and financier of PPPs for 25 years. The recent evaluation of 
the Bank’s work on PPPs between 2002-2012 revealed a scandalous lack of evidence (Independent 
Evaluation Group World Bank, 2015): 
For the World Bank, no systems exits at all that would track performance of PPPs post 
project closure. To do justice to the broad effects of PPPs, a wider set of outcome 
indicators should be kept track of throughout the life of a PPP (ibid). 
…but without a counterfactual, as usually a comparable service provision without PPP 
does not exist (ibid). 
Despite the Bank Group’s central goal of fighting poverty – reaffirmed by the new 
strategy’s dual goal of ending extreme poverty and promoting shared prosperity – little is 
recorded on the effects of PPPs on the poor (ibid).  
Project-level evaluations, IFC’s [International Finance Corporation] Development Goals, 
and its Development Outcome Tracking System measure mainly the operational aspects 
of a PPP that are relevant to cash flow, such as the number of people that obtained 
access to infrastructure. Therefore, for only about half of projects are data available for 
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one dimension. There is not a single project with data available for all the above-
mentioned dimensions (ibid).  
This evidence challenges the credibility of statements about the value of PPPs from the World Bank 
Group and reinforces substantial earlier analysis, for example, by Shaoul (2005), Pollock et al (2011) and 
other evidence summarised in Whitfield (2010). It also indicates that social and development impact 
bond projects will have a hard task in providing evidence so that they can address poverty and 
inequality. 
CO N T I N U E D  F I N A N CI A L I S A T I O N  O F  P U B LI C  I N F R A S T R U C T U R E  
It is important to take account of developments in social impact bond projects in the context of the 
continued financialisation and privatisation of public infrastructure at both global and national levels. 
Several global, EU and national initiatives have been launched to increase infrastructure investment and 
widen the range of investors, in particular to engage pension funds, insurance companies and sovereign 
wealth funds in PPP projects. These are discussed in the Appendix. 
3.4 NEW MARKETS IN EARLY INTERVENTION AND PREVENTION  
Social impact bonds extend commissioning (separation of purchaser/provider or client/contractor 
functions). They lead to the outsourcing key elements of commissioning to the intermediary 
organisation or company to recruit investors, project management, employ contractors and to monitor 
and evaluate performance. The option of in-house provision has been ‘eliminated’, thus making the 
preparation of ‘business as usual’ or ‘status quo’ options and the appraisal process redundant. 
Entrepreneurial and business ideology are widely promoted and used to reinforce the belief that only 
private contractors and non-profit enterprises can deliver social impact bond projects. 
The raft of new bond projects and payment-by-result mechanisms increase dependency on contracts, 
contractual relationships and the contract culture to increase the conditions under which projects are 
financed or aid is allocated. The effect is to reduce the distinction between the private, non-profit and 
public sectors and extend the role of so-called ‘independent’ consultants and evaluators. 
Public services have suffered under the advent and transition of compulsory competitive tendering to Best 
Value; outsourcing to strategic partnerships (support to corporate to core services); and performance 
related pay to service performance targets. Now performance-by-results or pay-for-success is fixated with 
monetising outcomes to ensure a profitable rate of return for services for the most vulnerable, poor and 
those dependent on public services and the welfare state. These performance management tools have two 
common elements – making markets and driving down staff terms and conditions. 
3.5 SOCIAL IMPACT BOND PROJECTS ARE PRIVATISATION  
Social impact bonds extend marketisation and privatisation in public services and the welfare state, 
because all their functions are outsourced. Initially, social impact bonds create new opportunities for 
non-profit and voluntary organisations, but at a price of their longer-term commercialisation, 
corporatisation and immersion into the contract culture. The centre right political ideology of the 
private impact investment sector appeals to the ‘entrepreneurial’ ambitious ‘leaders’ of the non-profit 
sector. It also opens up new opportunities for ‘social entrepreneurs’ to establish consultancies and 
agencies to provide investment advice and arrange finance. Contracting commonly leads to ‘gaming’ by 
contractors to increase performance and/or parking those service users who make it difficult to achieve 
the required performance or require a disproportionate level of resources to achieve an ‘outcome’, for 
example in the UK’s Work Programme (Carter & Whitworth, 2015). 
Government is in effect relinquishing responsibility for the provision of key parts of the welfare state 
since early intervention and prevention will increasingly be the point of entry to many public services. 
The state also relinquishes responsibility for changes in staffing levels, terms and conditions and the 
employment practices of contractors. Markets, market forces, procurement and a contract culture will 
become pervasive in early intervention and prevention, alongside the weakening of labour rights and 
equality impact assessment.  
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Some advocates of social impact bond projects have claimed they are not privatisation: 
"It is not a privatisation because it isn't being shifted to the private sector," he says. "It is 
a socialisation, but maybe we don't want to use a word like that” (Sir Ronald Cohen, 
2010). 
But this is based on an old fashioned view of privatisation dating back to the Thatcher era when 
privatisation was primarily about the sale of nationalised industries, state owned companies, land and 
property. Once large-scale asset sales proved economically and politically difficult or impossible, 
attention switched to other more diversified and small-scale forms of privatisation that created new 
pathways. They include the fracturing of public education and health systems into stand-alone school 
and hospital ‘businesses’; the transfer of services to trusts, social enterprises and arms length trading 
companies; and community rights to bid, buy, build, provide and personal budgets to enable users to 
purchase services (Whitfield, 2012a). As noted earlier, this is defined as the mutation of privatisation 
(Whitfield, 2012b). 
Social impact bond projects are very definitely privatisation. 
PFI/PPP projects have effectively privatised the design, finance, construction and maintenance of much 
public infrastructure. Now social impact bond projects potentially privatise the design, finance, service 
delivery, management, monitoring and evaluation of early intervention and prevention policies. 
It is privatisation by stealth - “Instead of making a profit to help the most vulnerable, the goal becomes 
making a profit from the most vulnerable” (NUPGE, 2014). Social impact bond projects go a step further 
because they part-privatise commissioning, contract management, monitoring and evaluation. 
Social impact bonds are an integral part of the four processes of neoliberal transformation of the public 
sector and welfare state, namely financialisation, personalisation, marketisation and privatisation 
(Whitfield, 2012a).  
3.6 FRACTURING AND PRIVATISING THE STATE  
In the last two decades UK public bodies have transferred many public services to arms length 
organisations and companies to deliver core services. They included Arms Length Management 
Organisations (ALMO - council housing), Local Authority Trading Companies (LATC - social care, 
education support services, adult disability and learning services), Arts and Leisure Trusts, Foundation 
Trusts (NHS hospitals) and social enterprises.  
Common objectives included reducing budgets and imposing spending limits, transferring employment 
responsibilities to reduce the cost of labour, increased efficiency through a more business approach, 
and to weaken direct accountability and responsibility for service delivery. Weakening trade union 
organisation was usually an undeclared objective. 
ALMOs were structured by central government to drive the transfer of council housing from local 
authorities to housing associations. NHS Trusts were pressured to become Foundation Trusts with 
greater freedom to organise services, invest and retain financial surpluses and employ staff on the 
Trust’s terms and conditions. Local Enterprise Partnerships are business led partnerships funded by 
central government, created when Regional Development Agencies were abolished in 2011, as the key 
agency responsible for economic development and infrastructure investment.  
Social impact bond projects introduce new principles to the arms length model: 
 Reliance on private investors and a commercial rate of return. 
 Intermediary organisations or companies are not directly accountable or transparent.  
 Key public functions are ceded to the intermediary organisation or company. 
 Payment-by-results contracts increase financial motives, because the public sector repays 
private investors depending on achieving prescribed outcomes.  
 Widens the role of financial institutions, contractors, consultants and social enterprises in the 
delivery of public services. 
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But even an extended arms length relationship is not satisfactory for some. The New Zealand Initiative 
recommended philanthropists “…replace the role of government as commissioner and financer of social 
impact bonds” and to avoid monitoring regimes that “…impose burdens on service providers that unduly 
impair their capacity to achieve performance targets” (Jeram and Wilkinson, 2015).  
DU A L  R O LE  F O R  G O V E R N M E N T ? 
The impact investing lobby and social impact bond advocates perceive a dual role for government: 
Governments are uniquely positioned to be both market actors and market 
stewards……There is a role for government alongside other actors to encourage flows of 
capital and enterprise development. They also have a role to play in building sector 
capacity and encouraging the development of innovative solutions, enterprise and 
intermediaries (Impact Investing Australia, 2014). 
Policy action and regulatory clarity is also critical for encouraging a greater number of 
investments and removing the existing barriers to market development (ibid). 
This is, of course, predicated on private capital and impact investors having the freedom to select 
where they want to invest to maximise the return on investment, whilst government retains 
responsibility for the population not served by social impact bond projects i.e. the population with 
more complex and ‘unprofitable’ needs. In other words, there is a high level of dependency on the state 
to facilitate ‘profitable’ social impact bond projects, whilst continuing to publicly finance public services 
to meet social need. 
Social impact bond projects might be perceived as a new form of performance orientated public private 
partnership, alongside payments by results and PPP contracts. However, this ignores the specific 
structure of social impact bond projects and the reduced role of government in commissioning and 
managing contracts, monetising outcomes and the inclusion of core public services. They are more 
likely to set a precedent for more extensive privatisation than ‘partnerships’. 
The UK Cabinet Office social impact bond contract guidance recommends that the complexity of the 
project should not be disproportionate to the anticipated benefits and payments and “…reward the 
service providers at all levels of outcome delivery (i.e. there are no points where it ceases to make 
economic sense for a party)” (Cabinet Office, 2013b). 
The OECD warned that it is “…hard to “compete” with the State and too much involvement from the 
government can impede the development of the social investment market” (OECD, 2014a). A further 
study suggested, “…the public sector can play a catalytic role in the social investment market in terms of 
creating a conducive regulatory environment, encouraging greater transparency and taking concrete 
steps to help develop the market” (OECD, 2015).  
BLU R R E D  B O U N D A R I E S  
The imposed division between commissioner and contractor is likely to become blurred in social impact 
bond projects. The New York State Recidivism and Workforce Development Pay-For-Success Project, 
(US$13.5m investment by 40 investors including Bank of America Merrill Lynch clients) is delivered by 
the Center for Employment Opportunities (CEO). It earlier had a series of standard recidivism contracts 
with the State.  
New York State “…has become an active partner in performance management in order to achieve the 
desired project outcomes”. The Department of Corrections and Community Supervision “…identifies 
recently released individuals deemed at high risk for recidivating and proactively refers them to CEO. 
Parole officers work alongside CEO outreach specialists to discuss the value CEO’s services and reinforce 
the importance of actively engaging with CEO to prepare for work and meet the conditions of their 
parole. An active governance structure oversees the project including participation from officials as high 
up as the Deputy Commissioner of Community Supervision” (Pay for Success Learning Hub, 2015a).  
The Department claims “…government involvement is “not micromanagement, but the granular support 
that actually is required” to ensure that CEO’s program can achieve its maximum potential impact” 
(ibid).  
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Fundamental contradictions arise when there are dual objectives to reduce reoffending and to 
maximise the financial return for private investors. On the one hand, it indicates a degree of 
‘dependency’ on government, which many social impact bond advocates may be reluctant to admit, 
because of their stance on ‘government failure’. It might lead others to change their stance on the strict 
operational separation of government, intermediary and contractor roles. On the other hand, it could 
be classified as another form of corporate welfare. 
The traditional boundary between core and non-core staff is also blurred. A three-part classification is 
more appropriate: 1) core staff such as teaching and medical; 2) semi-core such as skilled staff 
undertaking professional and technical tasks related to and in support of core services; 3) non-core staff 
such as administrative, corporate and facilities management services. Social impact bond projects 
currently employ staff in categories two and three. But this could change if boundaries between the 
categories become blurred. Continued public service transformation could create opportunities for 
contractors to include core services and staff.  
3.7 VALUING PUBLIC GOODS AND SERVICES  
The expectation of a financial return or profit from property investment and home ownership, or 
buying shares in companies listed on the stock exchange, is considered ‘normal’ in capitalist economies. 
More recently profiting from public infrastructure such as hospitals, schools and the criminal justice 
system has widened through PPPs and the franchising of public transport. Outsourcing has led to larger, 
multi-service, long-term contracts for support services. 
Social impact bonds extend the expectation of financial returns or profit to the provision of core social 
services, health and education. This is a fundamental change. It introduces profiteering into services for 
those most in need, such as children in preschools and prisoners awaiting release.  
A more specific and targeted approach is required because the use of ‘public value’ and ‘public benefit’ 
should be minimised, as they are vague and non-specific. Policies and strategies to tackle poverty and 
inequality must be specific, targeted, accountable and fully resourced. Dahl and Soss (2014) warn that 
“…the public value concept risks producing a new variant of neoliberal rationality, extending and 
strengthening the de-democratising, market-oriented project that its proponents seek to overturn.” 
Evaluation methods, such as ‘value for money’, are dominated by financial criteria and should be 
replaced by cost benefit analysis inclusive of economic, social, equality and environmental impact 
assessment and supported by a new set of criteria. The ‘social return on investment’ methodology can 
also be used to assess the value of social investment when it is based on this comprehensive and 
rigorous approach. 
The assessment of outcomes must be aligned with the assessment of the quality of inputs, processes 
and outputs, because they are proven key aspects of public service quality (Whitfield, 2015). 
3.8 EMBEDDING CORPORATE WELFARE  
The impact investing sector is almost certain to become part of the wider corporate welfare system 
relying on the same contracting system, same or similar tax and financial breaks, and a similar system of 
lobbying. Furthermore, it presents an opportunity for large companies to promote corporate social 
responsibility, new philanthropy and the social benefits of business and finance capital. What better 
way to help the financial sector recuperate from the banking scandals! 
Much of the impact investing literature is critical, and in some cases denigrates, public services, as a 
means of promoting the case for social impact bonds. Given the neoliberal ideology reflected in this 
literature, it comes as no surprise that impact investors want a raft of measures and public funding to 
support their activities that will further extend the corporate welfare state. They want governments to 
create an ‘enabling environment’ to include reducing corporate tax rates for impact investments (see 
Table 5 for UK example) and include: 
 Funding social enterprise start-ups (UK Cabinet Office). 
 Funding initiatives to increase development bonds (UK, USA). 
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 Procurement incentives. 
 Funding the impact investment market infrastructure – Social Finance, Big Society Capital. 
 Funding and assisting the promotion of impact investing and social/development impact bonds 
through task forces and other promotions (Rodin and Brandenburg (2014). 
The question is not whether, but the extent to which, private contractors will gradually takeover the 
current role of non-profit and voluntary organisations contracting in social impact bond projects, which 
could lead to higher costs and demand for bigger savings. 
This is another form of dependency on government, otherwise known as corporate welfare 
(Farnsworth, 2014, Whitfield, 2012a), in which governments provide tax credits, guarantees or 
subsidies, technical assistance, a friendly regulatory environment, policies to increase the supply of 
capital, strengthen demand, encourage greater transparency, enable entrepreneurship and develop the 
market (OECD, 2014a). Social impact bond projects seem certain to require various elements of 
corporate welfare to make projects sustainable and to create and support a ‘market’ (see Part 4). 
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4 ECONOMIC FLAWS IN SOCIAL IMPACT BOND AND PAYING FOR 
SUCCESS PROJECTS  
This section examines the structure of social impact bond projects, outcomes, payment-by-results, risks, 
innovation, equalities, public costs and savings, corporate welfare, free trade agreements concluding 
with a summary of the financial and public policy flaws inherent in social impact bonds. 
4.1 THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL IMPACT BOND PROJECTS  
The basic structure of a stand-alone social impact bond project is illustrated in Figure 2. Once a proposal 
for a project is agreed in principle, an intermediary organisation is selected or a special purpose 
company is set up (similar to PFI/PPP projects) which is responsible for concluding a project agreement 
with the public body, attracting investors, procuring and appointing service contractors and an 
‘independent’ evaluator. Jointly commissioned social impact bonds have more complex structures that 
are illustrated in Tan et al (2015).  
The flow of money in social impact bond projects is illustrated by the arrowed lines with investors 
providing funding for the operational costs of the intermediary and contractors. Investors are repaid by 
the public sector via the intermediary according to performance assessed by the evaluator. 
FIGURE 2:  THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL IMPACT BOND PROJECTS  
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The components of a social impact bond: 
 Selection of a service 
 Target group of the population 
 Evidence-based outcomes 
 Private Investors 
 External intermediary or special purpose company 
 Service provider(s) 
 Independent evaluation 
 Monitoring and scrutiny by special purpose company 
 Public sector innovative option deliberately excluded 
 Repayment by government or public body 
 Potential public expenditure savings 
Social impact bonds are not suitable for all services. They are deemed not “…appropriate where there 
are no benefits associated with transferring risk to an independent provider or private investors, or 
when better social outcomes cannot be reliably linked to a particular program” (Government of South 
Australia, 2013). 
CO N T R A CT O R S  
Social enterprises, other non-profit organisations and charities are the main contractors in social impact 
bond projects. Their long-term involvement in projects, particularly if they seek to become contractors 
in several projects, will inevitably raise new risks and the threat of commercialisation. 
…paradox facing successful hybrid organizations that mix market and social service 
logics. Their very success in the marketplace attracts competitors, some of which are for 
profit. Entry of firms and other organizations increases the pressures on the hybrids to 
retain their market position, further commodifying their clients (Garrow & Hasenfeld, 
2014). 
Social carpetbaggers could emerge to try to turn social enterprises and non-profits down a more 
commercial path by forging partnerships with private contractors or conversion to public limited 
company status. 
4.2 GLOBAL SPREAD OF OPERATIONAL SOCIAL IMPACT BOND P ROJECTS  
As previously stated, there are currently 54 operational social impact bond projects with about 23 more 
at the design stage. Disadvantaged families and young children and getting young people into 
employment are the two largest groups of projects which account for 54% of projects, followed by six 
projects keeping children out of the care system, five reducing homelessness and others reducing 
reoffending, early childhood education and healthcare (see Table 3). 
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TABLE 3:  GLOBAL RANGE OF SOCIAL IMPACT BOND PROJECTS  
Type of service UK USA AUS CAN DEU NLD BEL IRE PRT IND 
KOREA 
NS 
PER 
 
CHE 
Total 
 
Reduce 
reoffending 
1 3            
4 
 
Disadvantaged 
families & 
young people 
12  1           13 
Young people 
into 
employment 
11    1 2 1      1 16 
Children out of 
care system 
4 1 1           6 
Early childhood 
education 
 2       1 1    4 
Healthcare 3 1            4 
Reducing 
homelessness 
1 2  1    1      5 
Reducing 
elderly suicides 
          1   1 
Economic 
development 
           1  1 
Total 32 9 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1* 1 1 1 54 
Sources: Instiglio 2015,  
Abbreviations - OECD, 2015; UK = United Kingdom; USA = United States of America: AUST = Australia; CAN = 
Canada; DEU = Germany; NLD = Netherlands; BEL = Belgium; KOREA-NS = South Korea; IRE = Ireland; PTR 
= Portugal; IND = India; PER = Peru: CHE = Switzerland; 
* Development impact bond 
Note: 1 UK project (Peterborough Prison) and 1 US project (New York City Rikers Island) both recidivism projects 
have been terminated. 
Of the 23 projects at the design stage, eleven are located in the USA, five in Israel, and one each in 
Australia, Chile, Columbia, New Zealand, South Africa, Uganda and the UK (Instiglio, 2015). Table 4 
contains a sample of 17 projects to illustrate the range of investors and the financial investment in 
social impact bond projects. 
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TABLE 4:  SELECTED SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS 
Country Public body Project 
Contract 
duration 
(years) 
Investors 
Invest-
ment 
(m) 
UK 
Ministry of 
Justice 
Peterborough Prison 
– recidivism 
8 
Barrow Cadbury Foundation, Esmée Fairbairn 
Foundation, Friends Provident Foundation, 
Panahpur Charitable Trust and Tudor Trust 
£5.0 
UK 
Newcastle 
West Clinical 
Commissioning 
Group 
Long-term health 
conditions 
7 
Bridges Ventures private investment, Big 
Lottery Fund, Cabinet Office’s Social 
Outcomes Fund 
£1.6 
UK 
Essex County 
Council 
Preventing children 
going into care 
5 
Big Society Capital and Bridges Ventures 
private investment 
£3.1 
UK 
Greater 
London 
Authority 
Reducing 
Homelessness 
3 CAF Venturesome and St Mungo’s Broadway £1.0 
UK 
Department of 
Work and 
Pensions 
Youth 
unemployment 
3 
Bridges Ventures private investment, Big 
Society Capital, Impetus Trust, Esmee 
Fairbairn Foundation, CAF Venturesome, 
Barrow Cadbury Trust 
£3.3 
USA New York City 
Department of 
Corrections – 
recidivism 
4 
Goldman Sachs 
Bloomberg Philanthropies $7.2m grant to 
reduce lender’s risk 
US$9.6 
USA New York State Recidivism 5.5 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch and Social 
Finance – over 40 investors & foundations 
US$13.5 
USA 
Cuyahoga 
County 
Homelessness and 
child welfare 
5 
The Reinvestment Fund, George Gund 
Foundation, Nonprofit Finance Fund, 
Cleveland Foundation, Sisters of Charity 
Foundation 
US$1.6 
USA 
Chicago Public 
Schools & City 
of Chicago 
Early childhood 
education 
4 
Goldman Sachs Social Impact Fund, Northern 
Trust Company, J.B. and M.K. Pritzker Family 
Foundation 
                   
         n/a 
Australia 
New South 
Wales State 
Government 
Family support 
services & keep 
children out of care  
10 
Benevolent Society Bond 
Westpac Bank and Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia raised funds from investors 
A$10.0 
Australia 
New South 
Wales State 
Government 
Returning children in 
care to families  
7 
Newpin Bond 
Various investors 
A$7.0 
Canada 
Saskatchewan 
Government 
Housing and support 
for single mothers 
5 
50%/50% from Private investor and Conexus 
Credit Union 
C$1.0 
Ireland 
Dublin City 
Council 
Homelessness 1 n/a €0.5 
Germany 
Bavarian State 
Ministry of 
Labour & 
Social Affairs, 
Family and 
Integration, 
Augsburg 
Education and 
employment for 
young people 
2 
BHF-Bank Foundation, BonVenture, BMW 
Foundation Herbert Quandt, Eberhard von 
Kuenheim Foundation 
€0.2 
Netherlands 
Rotterdam City 
Council 
Young people to find 
work 
2 ABN-AMRO Bank and Start Foundation €0.7 
India Rajasthan 
Enrol 5,000 out-of-
school girls into 
public primary 
schools 
3 
Investor is UBS Optimus Foundation & 
Children’s Investment Fund Foundation is 
outcome payer 
US$1.0 
South Korea 
Seoul 
Metropolitan 
Government 
Child welfare 
services 
3 KDB Daewoo Securities US$9.4 
Source: Instiglio, 2015 and project briefings. 
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4.3 CONTRACT COMPLEXITY  
The structure of social impact bonds is often more complex than a standard outsourcing contract 
between a client and a contractor (Figure 3). The intermediary organisation or Special Purpose 
Company (SPC) is responsible for the procurement of contractors, in this example case the 
Peterborough Prison recidivism project. Lawyers representing the different parties feature in each box 
in Figure 3 thus contributing to the high transaction costs of social impact bond projects.  
FIGURE 3:  COMPLEX PROCESS OF NEGOTIATING AND DRAFTING THE PETERBOROUGH SIB  CONTRACT  
 
Source: Disley et al, 2011. 
4.4  MEASURING OUTCOMES  
The outcome of policies and projects are important – who they benefit, which strategies are effective, 
whether they are sustainable and cost effective, how they can be applied on a wider scale and to 
different groups of people in need. Assessing outcomes requires determining cause and effect of 
policies and programmes. This is complex because a benefit may have been a result of a combination of 
several different policies or socio-economic factors that are difficult to quantify, measure or to 
determine their relative effect. Measuring outcomes is far harder than is usually acknowledged. 
Furthermore, the consequences of policies and practices may not be evident for some time.  
Public sector practice in assessing the social, economic and environmental impact of policies and 
projects before decisions are made is often superficial (Whitfield, 2009 and 2012a). The Brookings 
Institution research concluded that social impact bonds have focused “…on areas where service inputs 
are fairly complex but outcomes are simple to measure, such as homelessness, foster care, and prison 
recidivism” (Gustafsson-Wright et al, 2015).  
The quality of inputs, such as the skills and experience of the workforce (and thus their terms and 
conditions), the working methods or processes and the equipment/materials used to deliver services 
are also vitally important. The way in which the process of service delivery treats service users, 
eliminates discrimination and reduces inequalities is similarly important. The quality of outputs is 
sometimes critical, such as new housing development. All the criteria – the quality of inputs, processes, 
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outputs and outcomes – are important. Furthermore, a Brookings Institution analysis of 38 social 
impact bond projects revealed - “Many of the deals (primarily the impact bond fund funds in the UK) 
have output rather than outcomes as their payment triggers” (Gustafsson-Wright et al, 2015). 
The Wiltshire Council ‘Help to Live at Home’ service is widely regarded as a model example of an 
‘outcomes-based approach’ to social care launched in 2012 (NHS Wiltshire Clinical Commissioning 
Group and Wiltshire Council, 2013 and Bolton, 2012). The service includes an integrated equipment and 
telecare service and out-of-hours response service. Staff from the Wiltshire re-ablement and housing 
support teams also transferred to new providers. Contractors are paid on a performance-by-results 
basis. The service design process included extensive consultation with service users, staff and 
contractors. The Council recognised that the new approach required contractors with a wider range of 
skills and flexibilities. Eight district contracts were awarded to four contractors. “Wiltshire also intended 
the approach would be based on a more professional approach to care, with salaried workers 
guaranteed at least the living wage. This has been achieved in parts of the county”  (Bolton, 2015). It is 
evident that quality of inputs and processes were required to obtain the desired outcomes. 
The reconfiguration of public services to increase early intervention and prevention, increasing 
innovation, building the evidence base, increasing the effectiveness and value of public services are not 
exclusive to impact investing or to social impact bonds, nor is there any evidence that ‘outcomes 
funding/private finance’ be effective without negative consequences. 
‘Outcomes funding’ with private finance is promoted on the grounds that it addresses fiscal pressures 
caused by austerity policies, increases ‘alternative service delivery’ such as outsourcing, supports the 
decentralisation agenda and is necessary, because expenditure on statutory crisis services crowds out 
discretionary spending on early intervention and prevention (Gold and Mendelsohn, 2014). These 
observations are thus accepted as positive or non-challengeable and actual. In the age of neoliberalism, 
politicians, public managers and consultants frequently adopt ‘new’ methods of service delivery 
without due diligence and/or an evidence base. 
The almost exclusive focus on outcomes implies that the replacement of public by private finance has a 
minimal effect on the input of financial resources. This is not the case. Private finance in the public 
sector means: 
 Higher cost of borrowing and imposes market rate of return (profit) 
 Service delivery by private contractors 
 Emergence of secondary markets to trade investments 
 Sustainability threatened if investments are sold to new owners with different priorities 
 New risks for government and public bodies, staff and service users 
 Threat of public sector principles and values being replaced by commercial values 
 Social justice and equalities marginalised 
 Investor self interest 
 Loss of democratic accountability and transparency 
The method of comparison and evaluation is crucial, particularly when the performance of social 
investment projects is compared with ‘business as usual’ public services. A like-with-like comparison is 
essential, which requires a comparison with innovative and improved public services. 
Gaming tactics such as ‘cream-skimming’ and ‘cherry-picking’ describe contractor strategies of selecting 
high value or low-cost customers, who are more profitable to serve. The other tactic is to ‘park’ or avoid 
the treatment of harder-to-help clients (Whitfield, 2012c). 
The more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision-making, the more 
subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt 
the social processes it is intended to monitor (Campbell’s Law, after Donald T. Campbell, 
quoted in Pratt, 2013). 
The outcomes debate also raises questions: What happens to the people who are not ‘turned around’? 
Are they provided with additional and more intensive support? What happens to those who are  
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‘turned around’, but fall back into previous modes of activity or behaviour after a short time or after the 
project is completed? 
TH E  N E E D  F O R  A  C O U N T E R F A CT U A L  A N D  A LT E R N A T I V E  O P T I O N  
The performance of a social impact bond project is determined by comparing its performance with a 
‘control group’ usually consisting of ‘business as usual’ public service(s) elsewhere. For example, In the 
Peterborough prison project: 
…offenders in the three cohorts will be compared to matched control groups. Each 
control group will be drawn from all prisoners released from sentences of less than 12 
months, within the same time period from other prisons nationally. One-to-many 
propensity score-matching will be used to select the control group: this means that each 
cohort prisoner will be matched to up to 10 control group prisoners (Disley et al, 2011).  
The evaluation matched 936 offenders released from Peterborough with 9,360 released from 34 other 
prisons in England and Wales (Jolliffe and Hedderman, 2014).  
Achieving comparability between the project cohort and the control group is vitally important, but 
social impact bond project performance was compared with performance at prisons that had not been 
subjected to ‘innovation and improvement’. There appears to have been no attempt to compare 
Peterborough with a smaller group of prisons where probation staff had implemented innovative 
policies to reduce reoffending.  
The importance of having a counterfactual (what would happen without the project and the status quo 
is maintained) is considered an important step in developing a social impact bond project (Tomkinson, 
2015). Whilst developing a counterfactual is a standard part of economic and social analysis, it is being 
misused by social impact bond projects, because it excludes a like-for-like comparison between the 
proposed social impact bond and an innovative and improved public service option. In fact, social 
impact bonds have to avoid comparison with innovative in-house public sector options otherwise their 
supposed benefits would decline or disappear, making them financially unviable. Some public sector 
bodies collude with this approach because they are motivated by short-term buy-now, pay-later 
investment. This follows the same approach begun by PFI/PPP projects and could lead to similar debt 
and financial crises in public sector revenue budgets (Whitfield, 2010). The social impact bond literature 
assumes that an innovative and improved in-house public service option is not possible or viable.  
A similar approach is used in most outsourcing and PPP strategic partnership procurements where a ‘do 
nothing’ or status quo in-house option is compared to a ‘new’ outsourcing option (European Services 
Strategy Unit, 2015b). Inevitably, the in-house option is rejected and the private sector does not have to 
compete against a public sector alternative. PPP/PFI projects use the same approach using a public 
sector comparator or value for money analysis (Whitfield, 2010). 
The social impact bond model is built on claims of savings – similar to those made for outsourcing and 
privatisation. But savings are frequently exaggerated and often fail to meet financial targets (European 
Services Strategy Unit, 2015a). The comparison with the status quo is essential to identify ‘savings’ and 
ensure profits to investors. If the comparison were with public services that had been reconfigured and 
improved, savings would be unlikely or minimal, hence no financial return and no social impact bond 
projects. 
In summary, the key issues are: 
 The quality of the evidence base, availability and comparability of data. 
 The selection of a comparator or control group that enables like-for-like comparisons. 
 Recognition of the difficulty in identifying the cause and effect of policies. 
 Assessing the sustainability of outcomes.  
 Identifying the potential knock-on impact on other public services.  
 Involvement of service users and employees on a continuing basis including the assessment of 
outcomes.  
 Organisational capacity and capability to monitor, measure and to evaluate. 
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 Ensuring that social investment finance intermediaries do not set the agenda in the interests of 
funders and contractors marginalising public interest and democratic accountability. 
BOX 4:  US STATES REDUCE RECIDIVISM 2007-2013  WITHOUT SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS 
 
 
4.5 SAVINGS ANALYSIS  
The need for social impact bonds/pay-for-success to achieve public expenditure savings has been 
stressed in earlier sections. Savings from improved outcomes fund the payments to investors or fund 
contractors in payment-by-results projects. They must be ‘cashable’ savings, which is determined by 
whether savings reduce current costs, whether they are fixed or variable, the service is provided in-
house or outsourced, the degree of ‘backfill’ (reduced need for one group may be backfilled by 
previously unmet need from elsewhere, and the political acceptability of decommissioning services 
(Cabinet Office, 2012). The double counting of savings must be avoided, particularly where there are 
overlapping programmes (ibid). 
The identification and quantification of financial savings is more complex than for outsourcing, because 
they are related to identifying the cause and effect of outcomes. Savings may be spread across several 
government departments and/or shared with other public bodies. There is a paucity of data available of 
actual cost savings in social impact bond projects, because none have completed their contract. 
The process of identifying and quantifying savings raises five key issues. 
Firstly, although savings are used as a prime justification for outsourcing public services, the original 
savings claims are rarely achieved. End-of-contract audits are seldom undertaken. Monetising the value 
of outcomes was noted in Part 3. It requires agreeing a fixed sum of money for each outcome. The 
value of the outcome could be determined by expected cost savings in service provision; productivity 
savings, for example a reduction in unit costs, would enable more people to receive the service; social 
or ancillary benefits could arise in other services (Accenture, 2015). The process will be more complex 
when cost savings have to be shared by other departments or public bodies. 
Eight US states reduced recidivism rates by 5.8% - 19.3% for adults released in 2007 and 2010 in the three-year 
follow up period. For the 2010 release group it meant 5,573 fewer people returned to prison in the following three 
years. An earlier analysis of seven different states revealed reductions of 6% - 18% in recidivism rates for those 
released in 2005 and 2007 for the three-year follow up period (Council of State Governments, 2012 and 2014). The 
reductions in recidivism were achieved by: 
 Public investment in community-based treatment  
 Promoting continuity of care from incarceration to the community 
 Tailoring approaches to individual needs  
 Providing incentives for participation in programs designed to reduce likelihood of a person reoffending  
 Re-entry planning and intensive supervision  
 Improving the response to people who violate conditions of probation  
 Providing continuity of care to people with mental health needs released from prison  
 Data collection and performance measurement (Council of State Governments, 2014). 
The Second Chance Act 2008 provides federal grants to government agencies and non-profit organisations to 
provide services and support to reduce reoffending. However, these policies have limited effect for over 10,000 
prisoners who have been shipped across state lines to private prisons outside their home state (Grassroots 
Leadership, 2013). 
Note: the population of state and federal prisoners reached a peak in 2009/2010 and fell slightly in the next two 
years. The 2012 incarceration rate was 707 per 100,000, over four times the 1972 rate (The Growth of Incarceration 
in the United States: Exploring Causes and Consequences, National Academies Press, 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/18613/the-growth-of-incarceration-in-the-united-states-exploring-causes ). 
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The UK Department of Work and Pensions developed a Rate Card for social impact bond projects for 
payment when outcomes are achieved via the Innovation Fund and Fair Chance Fund (HM Government, 
2012). They range from improved attitude towards school (£700), improved behaviour (£1,300) and 
improved attendance (£1,400). Four rates for qualifications ranged from entry-level qualification (£900) 
to National Vocational Qualification level 3 or equivalent (£5,100). The rate card has two payments for 
employment - entry into employment (£3,500) and sustained employment (£2,000) with a maximum 
payment per individual of £11,700 (based on 3 years of Annually Managed Expenditure savings). 
Different rates were introduced for years 10 and 11; years 12 and 13; years 14 and 15; aged 16 plus; 
and aged 18 and over (Department of Work and pensions, 2013). 
Monetisation is taken to a new level with a unit cost database that estimates the cost/saving, economic 
and social costs of outcomes in education and skills, employment, health, housing and social services 
(New Economy, 2015). Providing an evidence base is useful, but there is enormous scope for misuse 
and misunderstanding in the current political climate. There is little economic and social cost/saving 
data available. 
There is little evidence of savings achieved in the Peterborough Prison social impact bond. The project 
was limited to prisoners serving a one-year or less sentence. Many of the participants had served only a 
few weeks or months in jail. This cohort was selected because they had a high level of reoffending, 
potential savings were identified and no statutory services were available to this group of prisoners 
(Disley et al, 2011). The Peterborough project “…is not likely to result in substantial cashable savings to 
the Ministry of Justice or other government departments, which can be achieved only through 
significant reductions in the prison population or the number of court cases” (ibid).  
Secondly, the calculation of savings depends on having a control group to determine the difference in 
performance. The lack of comparison with an innovative and improved public service option is another 
dimension yet to be tested. In theory, savings will continue for many years after a social impact bond 
contract is concluded, but how should they be calculated? One widely promoted example was based on 
a three-year contract with savings assumed over 12 years and presumed no changes in 
economic/social/health conditions over 12 years (McKinsey, 2012). 
Thirdly, savings only have validity if they are verifiable and include all the public costs, such as 
transaction, reconfiguration and legacy costs plus the grants, subsidies and tax concessions for social 
impact bond projects (see Table 5). Difficulties in determining how savings should be measured and 
calculated, outcomes measured and selection of a financial model rather than a broader economic 
model, were examined in the development of the Newpin bond in New South Wales (KPMG, 2014). 
The UK Youth Justice Reinvestment Custody project negotiated demand metrics of the potential 
achievable savings to the Ministry of Justice, by a reduction in the unit cost of a metric. For example, a 
custody conviction was priced at £440 and £270 for drug treatment connected to Community Orders 
and Suspended Sentence Orders, held constant for the two-year pilot period. However, “…they do not 
represent estimates of how much it costs to deliver these services. Different prices were reduced by 
different factors based on an assessment at the time of the likely realisable savings associated with 
different disposals and this means it is not possible to use these prices to estimate the relative costs of 
one disposal against another” (Wong et al, 2013). 
Fourthly, the sustainability of costs and savings forecasts are highly influenced by the reconfiguration of 
services, policy and public sector spending changes that reflect broader political and economic 
conditions. 
Finally, concerns about the quality of the evidence base used to identify and measure outcomes, costs 
and savings have been expressed. This is applicable across the public sector and is not specific to social 
impact bonds or pay-for-success projects, although it has a more immediate impact when contracts are 
being negotiated.  
A US cost benefit model of early years programmes developed by the Washington State Institute for 
Social Policy has been adapted into a UK model, funded by Birmingham City Council, the Association of 
Greater Manchester Authorities and the Youth Justice Board. The model assesses the effectiveness of 
programmes against the “…high standards of scientific evidence”, costs and benefits are calculated to 
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produce a ranking of public policy options,  “…a ‘portfolio’ analysis reveals how a combination of policy 
options affects outcomes, costs and benefits,” and risks are measured “…by testing how bottom lines 
vary when estimates and assumptions change” (Social Research Unit, 2013). The monetisation of labour 
costs in valuing outcomes is discussed in Part 5. 
Financial and cost benefit models invariably require estimates, forecasts and rely on earlier demand, 
use and cost evidence that have to be time-adjusted. The wider use of social impact bonds and the 
need for ‘evidence’ could lead to over-reliance on such models. 
The Ministry of Justice “…undertook detailed analytical work to support the values assigned to each 
reduced reconviction event” using data on costs incurred at different stages and took account of social 
benefits of reduced reoffending (Disley et al, 2011). The tariff was agreed after considerable 
negotiations with investors and Social Finance, and ultimately signed off by HM Treasury as 
representing ‘value for money’. The value for money analysis was never published, so setting another 
pattern of no transparency or democratic accountability. 
Public services considered suitable for social impact bonds are highly vulnerable to the effects of 
economic recession. Social change and increasing mobility leads to difficulties in tracking individuals 
who have participated in projects. Attributing savings between government departments and local 
public bodies is also complex. Thus it is difficult to calculate the net present value of long-term public 
sector savings, a practice used for PPP infrastructure assets, because they are static and generally retain 
their function.  
4.6 PAYMENT-BY-RESULTS  
Government outcomes-based payment schemes preceded social impact bonds, so it is important to 
draw on their performance. An assessment of UK Payment-by-Results (PbR) contracts in four 
government departments (Work and Pensions, Communities and Local Government, International 
Development and the Ministry of Justice) with total budgets of nearly £6bn, concluded: 
…PbR contracts are hard to get right, which makes them risky and costly for 
commissioners. If PbR can deliver the benefits its supporters claim – such as innovative 
solutions to intractable problems – then the increased cost and risk may be justified, but 
this requires credible evidence.  
 …neither the Cabinet Office nor HM Treasury currently monitors how PbR is operating 
across government. Nor is there a systematic collection or evaluation of information 
about how effectively PbR is working. Without a central repository of knowledge and a 
strong evidence base to refer to, PbR schemes may be poorly designed and implemented 
and commissioners are in danger of ‘reinventing the wheel’ for each new scheme 
(National Audit Office, 2015).  
The NAO also concluded that PbR is not suited to all public services; its costs and risks are often 
underestimated; contractors must have the capacity to take on risks; clients or commissioners must 
actively monitor and manage contractor performance and evaluate the effectiveness of PbR; and 
consider alternative delivery mechanisms (ibid). 
An international review of payment-for-performance (P4P) schemes found ”…little evidence on the cost 
effectiveness of schemes” (Lagrade et el, 2013). The review found the incentivising effect of P4P 
schemes was mixed in both health and education;  
When reforms are implemented nationwide, there is no obvious comparison group to 
compare the changes in outcomes observed before and after the introduction of the P4P 
scheme. Without a counterfactual, it is difficult to ascertain whether the changes 
observed are the result of the introduction of the new scheme, or would have happened 
anyway. Many changes over time can affect the settings where P4P is introduced and 
confound the estimated impact. P4P in health care is particularly vulnerable to such 
problems, as unrelated changes in medical technology, clinical practice or payment 
methods occur continuously and are likely to affect outcomes of interest positively or 
negatively (Ibid).  
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In addition: 
When outcomes are determined not only by providers’ decisions but also by health 
systems’ structural characteristics (e.g. poor accountability and governance) or patients’ 
behaviours or lifestyles, incentives targeting providers may not be the more relevant 
interventions to improve health (ibid).  
The design and performance of the payment-by-results UK Troubled Families Programme has been 
heavily criticised (Crossley, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c; Portes, 2012 and 2015; Levitas, 2014; Garside, 2013). 
The government claimed that 105,671 ‘complex families’ had benefited from support by local authority 
teams by February 2015, saving taxpayers an estimated £1.2bn compared with the £448m cost of the 
programme (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2015). The £1.2bn claim was 
described as “…pure, unadulterated fiction” by Jonathan Portes, the Director of the National Institute of 
Economic and Social Research, because it appeared to be based on very rough, self-reported estimates 
by seven local authorities of the cost of services before and after the intervention (Portes, 2015). 
The government launched the programme in 2011 using an earlier 2007 estimate of 117,000 families in 
England who were vulnerable and ‘at risk’. This was defined as families who suffered five out of seven 
forms of deprivation: no parent in the family is in work; the family lives in poor quality and/or 
overcrowded housing; no parent has any academic or vocational qualifications; the mother has mental 
health problems; at least one parent has a long-standing limiting illness, disability or infirmity; the 
family has low income (below 60% of median income); the family cannot afford a number of food and 
clothing items. But “…none of these criteria, in themselves, have anything at all to do with disruption, 
irresponsibility or crime” (Portes, 2012) which were later used to define ‘troubled families’. 
The Troubled Families programme defined ‘troubled families’ as those who: are involved in youth crime 
or anti-social behaviour; have children who are excluded from school or regularly truanting; have an 
adult on out-of-work benefits; and cost the public sector large sums in responding to their problems. 
Drug and alcohol dependency were excluded.  
In June 2013 the government announced “An additional £200 million will be invested to start to extend 
intensive help to 400,000 high risk families to get to grips with their problems before they spiral out of 
control” (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2013). 
The programme had a remarkable ‘total’ performance success rate: 
Not one local authority has needed to work with more than their indicative number in 
order to ‘turn around’ all of their families. In fact, many local authorities can 
demonstrate a 100% success rate not just in identifying and working with ‘troubled 
families’ but in turning them around. Manchester, for example have identified, worked 
with and turned around a staggering 2385 ‘troubled families’. Not one has ‘slipped 
through the net’ or refused to engage with the programme. Leeds and Liverpool have a 
perfect success rate in each ‘turning around’ over 2000 ‘troubled families’ (Crossley, 
2015).  
The 100% outcome performance was challenged by Crossley (2015b) as it indicated that everyone 
turned up and participated with ‘no family left behind’. ‘The perfect social policy’ and “…staggering that 
work with some of the most disadvantaged families who have allegedly been immune to all previous 
policy interventions and whose ‘troubles’ have existed ‘for generations’ has been so successful at a time 
of wide-ranging and deep cuts to local authorities and others public services”. 
Local authorities were incentivised to participate in the programme with a payment of £3,200 for each 
participating family, falling to £2,400 in 2013-2014 and £1,600 in 2014-2015 with an additional £800 for 
each family ‘turned around’. Deep public spending cuts simultaneously imposed on local authorities 
accounts, at least in part, for their enthusiasm for the programme. 
‘Turned around’ is defined as: all children have been back in school for a year when they were 
previously truant or excluded; and youth crime and anti-social behaviour has been significantly cut 
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across the whole family; or an adult in the home has moved off benefits and into work for three 
consecutive months or more. 
Turnaround implies it to be permanent, because the effect of future economic slowdowns or recessions 
is not recognised. It is even more a superlative performance, because the programme did not address 
the causes of poverty and inequality. It apparently even nullified the economic and social impact of 
austerity policies. The assumption of a ‘permanent’ turnaround is illusory. 
The ‘troubled families’ payment-by-results programme exhibited most of the problems UK government 
contract guidance sought to address, namely that commissioners should consider whether a payment-
by-results mechanism is appropriate if it: 
 Pays too much for something that could be achieved by other, cheaper means.  
 Pays too little to incentivise the desired level of performance.  
 Pays for outcomes that would have happened anyway.  
 Pays for the wrong outcomes through mis-specification.  
 Pays significant set up costs that are not merited by the outcomes achieved.  
 Creates perverse incentives in service delivery, (if what is most remunerative for the service 
provider and what delivers the best outcomes as a whole are different).  
 Procures a service whose outcomes cannot be measured objectively.  
 Exposed to undue reputational risk (Cabinet Office, 2013b). 
It remains to be seen whether future payment-by-results programmes and social impact bond projects 
draw on this advice and the lessons identified by the NAO. 
Pay-for-performance (P4P) programmes have been running in US healthcare for nearly fifteen years 
with limited success. More than half of the 250 hospitals in the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid P4P 
national demonstration project initially achieved high performance scores compared to less than a third 
of the 780 hospitals in a control group not in the programme between 2004-2008. After five years, the 
two groups’ score were virtually identical (Werner et al, 2011). Another study of Medicare’s P4P 
programme assessed 250 hospitals in the demonstration programme with 250 hospitals not in the 
programme between 2004-2009 and also found a slowdown in quality improvement in hospitals in the 
P4P programme (Ryan et al, 2012). Health Affairs (2012) reports other studies with similar findings. 
Value-Added models have been used in many US states and school districts to estimate the effects of 
individual teachers and schools on student achievement. However, most studies “…find that teachers 
account for about 1% to 14% of the variability in test scores, and that the majority of opportunities for 
quality improvement are found in the system-level conditions” (American Statistical Association, 2014). 
They emphasize that these models “…typically measure correlation, not causation” and may have 
unintended effects if not used with care (ibid). 
4.7 PERFORMANCE OF SOCIAL  IMPACT BOND AND PAY-FOR-SUCCESS PROJECTS  
The Peterborough Prison social impact bond was intended to cover 3,000 male prisoners aged 18, 
serving less than 12-month sentences, in three cohorts over eight years. The 2014 performance 
assessment revealed an 8.4% reduction in reoffending, but missed the required 10% reduction for an 
interim payment. However, a payment will be made to investors in 2016 if there is a reduction in 
reoffending of more than 7.5% (Social Finance, 2014). 
The Ministry of Justice decided to terminate the project early because it had privatised the probation 
service through the Transformation Rehabilitation programme, which transferred 1,300 probation staff 
to a new National Probation Service and 21 Community Rehabilitation Companies in 2014 and wanted a 
uniform programme (Deering and Feilzer, 2015). 
Evidence from a project for young people at risk of becoming not in education, employment or training 
achieved a 55% success rate, compared to a 30% target, in obtaining five A*- C grades in the General 
Certificate of Secondary Education in the East and North London social impact bond project under the 
Department for Work and Pensions Innovation Fund (BBC News, 2013).  
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The Youth Justice Reinvestment Custody Pathfinder payment-by-results project (excludes private 
investors) was designed to “…improve the alignment of financial incentives in youth justice to encourage 
greater focus on prevention” (Wong et al, 2015). The pilot ran for two years, initially with four local 
authority Youth Custody Centres for 10-17 year olds, but two withdrew after the first year. Site 1 had a 
target of a 10% reduction in custody bed nights and achieved 28% and 42% in years one and two. Site 
2’s target was a 12% reduction and achieved 40% in year two (ibid). The reductions have to be 
considered in the context of 12% and 33% national reductions in bed nights in England and Wales in the 
same period and reductions of 22% and 14% in self reported and police reported crime respectively and 
a 50% decrease in the number of young people in the youth secure centres between 2009/10 and 
2013/14 (ibid). 
NE W  YO R K  C I T Y  P R O J E CT  T E R M I N A T E D  
The first US social impact bond project at Rikers Island, New York City, was terminated in August 2015 
after failing to reduce the recidivism rate for 16-18 year-olds detained at the prison. Eighty-seven per 
cent of nearly 1,700 adolescents, who were detained for more than seven days, participated in the 
Adolescent Behaviourial Learning Experience programme and attended at least one session and 44% 
reached a programme milestone. The programme focused on social skills, personal responsibility and 
decision-making, but it “…did not lead to reductions in recidivism for participants” (VERA Institute of 
Justice, 2015). Conditions at Rikers Island were ‘particularly toxic’ with a ‘culture of violence’ directed at 
teenagers, most of who were awaiting trial and did not stay long enough to complete the programme 
(Golden and Waters, 2015). Goldman Sachs exercised a contract option to terminate the program a 
year early and questioned whether governments were ‘paying for failure’ (Farmer, 2015). 
The project used a tried and tested approach, which “…attempted to change part of the culture inside 
Rikers Island by introducing an intervention for a very high-needs population for whom little to no 
programming was previously offered. Promoting a culture of sound decision-making and nonviolence 
inside Rikers was a worthwhile attempt at contributing to positive change. In addition, this project was 
able to generate significant buy-in from Rikers management, non-uniformed staff and uniformed staff, 
and school personnel” (Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, 2015).  
Goldman Sachs originally invested US$9.6m in the Rikers Island project, but Bloomberg Philanthropies 
guaranteed US$7.2m of this investment (see Table 4). So when the contract was terminated, Goldman 
Sachs suffered a loss of US$1.2m, but Bloomberg Philanthropies lost US$6.0m! 
A joint article by senior officers of Goldman Sachs and Bloomberg Philanthropies following the 
termination made several revealing of assertions: 
The beauty of social impact bonds is that they allow the government to avoid paying for 
programs that don't work. That's in stark contrast to the status quo in government 
contracting today. The federal government expects to spend over $1 trillion in 2015 for 
human services programs to deliver everything from early childhood education, to 
healthcare for the elderly and special transport options for the disabled. The vast 
majority of these programs are funded regardless of whether they achieve their goals. 
Government, in most cases, simply pays for the services provided. The social impact bond 
financing structure turns the old model on its head. Targets are set, impact is measured 
and government only pays for success - with private capital carrying all the risk 
(Anderson and Phillips, 2015). 
Too often, government lacks the resources and ability to mine existing data for insights. 
Because data collection and analysis is fundamental to understanding whether a project 
worked -- and whether the investors get paid -- social impact bonds provide government 
with insights they would not have otherwise found following traditional approaches 
(ibid). 
…the social impact bond allowed the government to take serious steps to help find the 
right mixture of policy prescriptions to address a pressing policy priority in a time of 
budget constraints. It can be terribly difficult for government to secure financing for new 
programs - let alone for prevention programs, which are often the last funded and first 
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cut. We're proud to have opened up a new pool of capital to enable governments to 
bring more promising social service approaches to young people in need (ibid). 
The statements about government spending and contracts are predictable and claims of ‘new insights’ 
and ’new pool of capital’ are grossly exaggerated. The Urban Institute, a social impact bond advocate, 
made the same comment about government contracts (Milner et al, 2015). 
A Canadian public sector trade union had a very different perspective: 
“The failure of the Rikers Island project shows Social Impact Bonds and other pay-for-
success schemes are fundamentally flawed,” said James Clancy, National President of 
Canada’s National Union of Public and General Employees (NUPGE, 2015). 
The organization delivering the Rikers Island project admitted that, even for a relatively 
simple project, success or failure depends on many factors that have nothing to do with 
whether services funded through Social Impact Bonds projects are effective.  
That explanation confirms what those of us concerned about Social Impact Bonds have 
been saying for sometime — that whether governments end up paying out will have little 
to do with whether Social Impact Bond projects made a difference (ibid). 
AU S T RA L I A  S OC I A L  BE N E F I T  BON D  P E RF OR M A N C E  
Australia’s first social impact bond project was intended to fund the expansion of the programme run 
by Uniting Care to restore children in out-of-home care to the care of their families and to prevent 
children at risk of significant harm from entering out-of-home care. In the first year 138 families with 
228 children participated in the programme to June 2014 with 28 children restored to their families and 
ten families supported to prevent their children entering care. The 60% restoration rate led to the first 
interest payment of 7.5%, based on a 15-month period (Social Ventures Australia, 2014). 
In the second year 42 children were resorted to their families by June 30 June 2015 (Social Ventures 
Australia, 2015a). However, eight restorations had been reversed since the start of the project, but the 
contract did not take account of the failed restorations in the payment mechanism (Tomkinson, 2015). 
A strict interpretation of the contract meant these reversals would not be taken into account in the 
calculation of the interest payable to the Newpin SBB Trust and ultimately to investors. If the reversals 
had been ignored the interest rate would have been 13.5% instead of 8.9% agreed for 2015. This led to 
proposals to amendment the contract, which were approved by the Newpin SBB Trust in July 2015 
(Social Ventures Australia, 2015a and 2015b). 
However, investor interests are all too apparent in the plan to “…mitigate uncertainty about the 
potential impact of explicitly allowing for reversals on investor returns, UnitingCare has agreed that a 
cap should be placed on the number of reversals counted in the determination of the Restoration Rate. 
This cap is proposed to be 10% of the cumulative number of restorations” (ibid). Reversals above this 
cap will be treated as successful restorations in calculating payments to investors. 
4.8 IDENTIFYING RISK  
It is commonly asserted that: “If the interventions fail and outcomes are not achieved, investors will lose 
money. In this way the public sector transfers to the investors financial risk associated with delivering 
the target social outcomes” (Marsh et al, 2011). Despite the focus on the transfer of financial risk from 
the public sector to investors, different types of risks are borne by the government or public body, 
investors, intermediary organisation, contractors, staff and service users.  
Risks include programme design, innovation, financial, pricing of risks and rewards, statistical sampling 
errors, scaling up risk, performance (selection, implementation and outcome risks), intermediary and 
contractor corporate risk, termination (policy change or contractual failure, contractor gaming tactics, 
reductions in terms and conditions, political, reputational, governance, transaction costs, market 
failure, due diligence, impact evaluation and unintended impact risks. 
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The contractor in at least one social impact bond project, the New York City recidivism project, was paid 
up front, so did not bear any performance risk. 
The talking-up and exaggeration of levels of risks for investors has been frequently used to promote 
PFI/PPP projects and outsourcing. In practice, risk transfer to the private sector was overpriced and 
many risks were retained by the public sector (Shaoul, 2005, Pollock and Price, 2008). 
It is not within the remit of this analysis to examine risk assessment in detail, however the following 
statements indicate the scope and complexity of identifying, allocating, determining probability, and 
pricing risk in social impact bond projects: 
…increase the risk of commissioners choosing outcomes which do not match their wider 
social objectives, simply because they are available and measurable, and/or achieve 
significant savings (Cabinet Office, 2012). 
A SIB that focuses on proven interventions carries primarily execution risk related to the 
intervention, whereas a SIB that seeks to scale up promising but unproven interventions 
carries both execution risk and model risk related to the intervention, and is much less 
likely to attract investment (McKinsey, 2012).  
The vast majority of benefits associated with health services are quality of life benefits. 
The feasibility of a SIB would depend on the willingness of a health commissioner to pay 
out cash on the basis of QALY [quality adjusted life years] gains expected to accrue to the 
population, rather than distribute a share of cashable or resource savings (Marsh et al, 
2011).  
Another risk is that payment by results might encourage an overly-narrow focus on the 
single outcome used to determine payment, rather than considering the wider scope of 
clients’ needs which may be important to the service user and/or the wider 
community…….Outcome measurement becomes more challenging as the number of 
payment by results schemes increases, as there is a risk of overlapping provision of 
services making it increasingly difficult to attribute any impact achieved to individual 
providers funded through a SIB or other forms of payment by results (Culley et al., 2012) 
(Disley and Rubin, 2014).  
With SIB programs, welfare services are opened to the free market and the associated 
risks of market failures. Where price excludes intangible social benefits, SIBs fail to 
provide a level of quality that is not represented by market value (Princeton University, 
2014).  
Given the difficulty of linking the evaluation of a social program to a highly complex 
contract centered on an outcome payment, the government may actually increase its 
operational risks in undertaking a SIB (State of Maryland, 2013).  
…direct conflicts arise between the government’s priority to transfer the risk of 
generating outcomes to the investors and the investors’ priority to receive a risk-adjusted 
return on their investments from the government (Godeke Consulting, 2012).  
References to ‘risk adjusted market rate’ (Rodin and Brandenburg, 2014) usually mean that 
the risk remains the same, but that investors have found a mechanism to transfer the risk 
elsewhere – usually to the government and taxpayers in the form of guarantees, subsidies, tax 
breaks or others forms of financial support. 
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BOX 5:  CHICAGO PRESCHOOL INVESTOR PROTECTIONS  
 
Chicago Public Schools (CPS) – Child-Parent Center Pay-for-Success Initiative 
Goldman Sachs and Northern Trust Company (a wealth/asset management firm) are the senior lenders, with J.B. and M.K. 
Pritzker Foundation as subordinate investor, and have jointly invested $17m to provide 2,600 additional half-day places 
over four years in Chicago’s successful Child Parent Centre (CPC) education programme. 
The foundation is serving as the subordinate lender, meaning it’ll take any financial hits before the banks -- 
which reduces the banks' risk…….As an added bonus, banks can use the social-impact bonds to boost their 
ratings under the federal Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), which encourages lending in low-income 
communities” (Sanchez, 2014). High CRA ratings help banks avoid community opposition to merger and 
acquisition deals.  
The CPC model has a proven track record of improving educational outcomes and lifelong trajectories for 
disadvantaged children in pre-school and beyond. Students who participate in the CPC program are better 
prepared for Kindergarten, perform better on standardized tests, are less likely to need special education 
services, are more likely to graduate from high school, and be successful in life (City of Chicago et al, 2014).  
If there is any doubt about innovation, the following statement from Andrea Phillips, Vice President, Urban Investment 
Group at Goldman Sachs, provides clarity: "Innovative models like social impact bonds and Pay for Success programs allow 
the private sector to provide the capital needed to expand successful initiatives in our cities and communities” (Northern 
Trust, 2014). 
The loan agreement reveals “…that the deal relies on a complicated formula that poses little risk to investors. That’s due 
largely to the proven track record of the project’s chosen preschool program, child-parent centers. In addition, investors gain 
good will and publicity in the deal” (Sanchez, 2014). 
A review of the documents revealed: 
Nearly $1.3 million of the $16.6 million loan will never reach CPS. That money will go to pay a third-party project 
manager, audits, additional social services, and legal fees – including up to $250,000 for the investors’ own 
legal costs. 
In addition, the city must pay $319,000 for an outside group to evaluate the project in the third and fourth 
years. 
According to the city’s projections, CPS would pay about $21.5 million over the life of the 16-year program in 
payments for “savings” from fewer special education services. However, if the program is more successful than 
expected, CPS will have to pay more, up to a maximum of $30 million. 
The city expects to kick in an additional $4.4 million in “success payments” based on children’s performance on 
kindergarten readiness and third-grade literacy tests. 
This means that if it's very successful, investors could get back more than double their money over the life of the 
program (ibid). 
Chicago City Council has not disclosed the potential level of savings. 
Costs included $470,000 for the intermediary, IFF, a community development financial institution plus $75,000 for its legal 
fees; $200,000 to Metropolitan Family Services for parent support and training; $170,000 audit fees; $100,000 for legal fees 
of Chicago City Council and Chicago Public Schools; $319,000 for an evaluator – a total of $1.3m (7.6% of investment). 
Children with severe disabilities, including autism, deafness, visual impairment and intellectual disability, will be excluded 
from the study group “…or at any point during the course of the study is diagnosed with a severe disability” (City of Chicago, 
2014). 
Outcomes will be compared with a control group of children from similar neighbourhoods who did not attend preschool at 
any CPS preschool or any Head Start project that is overseen by the City Council. This is another example of a flawed 
comparator group when performance should be tested against current CPS best practice preschools to test the 
performance of the social impact bond project methodology. CPS knows that preschool child/parent programmes produce 
significant benefits – a 41% reduction in the need for special education placements (Sanchez, 2014). 
The project had a slow start. Only 297 children were enrolled by March 2015. Most children had already been enrolled at 
an existing preschool, which meant the project’s half-day placements became full day placements thanks to the use of 
Federal Title 1 (education grants for the disadvantaged) and Head Start (comprehensive early childhood education and 
health programme) funding. 
“More full-day classrooms bodes well for the lenders. Research shows that children who attend a full day of 
preschool at child-parent centers have better academic outcomes than children who attend a half day” 
(Sanchez, 2015). 
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4.9 EXAGGERATED INNOVATION  
The innovation agenda often leads to exaggerated self-serving claims and the adoption of proposals 
that are not necessarily very innovative. Many social impact bond projects implement proven policies 
and methodologies, for example, the Peterborough Prison recidivism bond and the Newpin bond in 
Australia. Most private investors are likely to seek projects that apply approaches that have been 
proven to work and use evaluation techniques that are most likely to demonstrate positive impact.  
…the biggest SIB innovation is the transaction itself, and its accompanying financial 
instruments and intermediaries, not the service method (Pratt, 2013). 
The non-profit sector has often been ‘innovative’ by widening their scope of activities and becoming 
more business-like as governments pursued neoliberal policies. For example, many housing associations 
colluded with government to implement large-scale privatisation of local authority housing stock 
(Smyth, 2013). One of the largest UK housing associations, Genesis, with 33,000 homes in London and 
the south east, has stopped building social housing and will only build homes for sale, rent at market 
rates, or shared ownership (Murtha, 2015). 
It is important that the type and scale of innovation claimed for each project is rigorously assessed for 
its operational sustainability, financial viability and the degree to which the working methods and skill 
base will achieve the outcomes and objectives. 
The New South Wales (NSW) social impact bond scope for innovation included the need to: 
– Widen the array of mechanisms by which governments can commission their 
services 
– Incentivise public servants and NGOs to properly define outcomes, including 
against future performance counterfactuals 
– Improve the measurement of public and social impact (including ‘savings’) 
– Facilitate cross-sectoral collaboration in the design and delivery of the programs 
 and services  
– Allow the NGO sector (with private sector support) to initiate their own  
approaches to the creation of public value, unencumbered by government  
micromanagement of their business 
– Fund human services prevention measures rather than simply directing  
expenditure to crisis interventions” (KPMG, 2014). 
However, the perspective on innovation is revealing: “…the programs that have been selected are not 
seen to be particularly innovative as they are not ‘new’ programs. The Newpin program is a pre-existing 
program; and the Resilient Families Service is based on other international programs and has been 
tailored to NSW” (ibid).  
4.10 EQUALITIES AND SO CIAL JUSTICE  
The latest annual global impact investment survey covers all types of impact investment and reported 
“About one-third of respondents explicitly target gender equality as an impact theme, while just over 
half target environmental conservation as an impact theme” (JP Morgan and Global Impact Investing 
Network, 2015).  
A lack of social justice and equalities policies is evident in social impact bond policy analysis and 
commentary, for example OECD, 2014a and 2015, KPMG, 2014, Alternative Commission on Social 
Investment, 2015, Policy Innovation Research Unit et al, 2015, Mulgan et al, 2011, Warner, 2013 and 
many others.  Despite the widespread use of ‘social’ as a linguistic prefix to finance, innovation, impact 
and enterprise, there is minimal evidence of regard to equalities policies. 
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Economic, social and health impact assessments should be undertaken once a social impact bond/pay-
for-success project has been agreed, before contracts are signed. It should assess the wider effect of 
the project on the local economy, community and other public services. The failure to incorporate 
equality policies and address the relevant issues could lead to significant additional risks for social 
impact bond projects. 
The lack of transparency is a contributory factor, as is the continuation of austerity policies and the lack 
of involvement of service users and employees in social impact bond projects. The Coalition 
government weakened UK equality legislation, and further changes are likely by the current 
Conservative government. Equalities impact assessments in the public procurement process are little 
more than a tick box exercise. 
A social justice framework provides a more comprehensive approach to equalities, because it includes 
the distribution of opportunities; redistribution and improving life chances; eliminating discrimination; 
improving quality of life and community well being; participation, involvement and governance; and 
reducing inequalities (Whitfield, 2015).  
The criteria and selection of a target population for social impact bond and pay-for-success projects is 
of paramount importance. The selection of ‘what works’ in the interests of investors and creating 
‘successful’ projects, are likely to influence the selection of a target population. The question is how are 
equality rights, responsibilities and policies taken into account in selecting target groups?  
In some cases governments have delegated the selection of contractors to the intermediary 
organisation, for example the Peterborough Prison project. This raises fundamental issues regarding 
public procurement, particularly the capability of the delegated organisation to procure or award a 
contract when the intermediary organisation may not have adequate equalities policies and practices 
and/or the ability to fully evaluate contractors equality policies and practices. 
Potential legal challenges could emerge from services users who consider they are in greater need than 
those selected in a target population. This could lead to divisions between service users and within 
communities regarding who is included or excluded, on what grounds, and could ultimately set back 
social cohesion strategies.  
Many social problems, however, do not lend themselves to quantitative analysis or do 
not present a potential for cost savings. Issues that are difficult to measure are likely to 
be ignored by SIB programming. For example, racial inequality is not easily measured 
and could not be effectively translated into the metrics necessary for SIB evaluation 
(Princeton University, 2014).     
Potential challenges could arise over the effectiveness of early intervention strategies for some service 
users, disputes over the quality of employment and sustainability of earnings relative to benefits, and 
legal challenges to the withdrawal/reduction of benefits. 
The adoption of gaming tactics such as ‘cherry picking’, ‘creaming’ and ‘parking’ by a contractor could 
lead to legal action for discrimination and differential treatment in additional to disputes between the 
public body, intermediary, investors, contractors and the evaluator.  
Proposals to reconfigure or decommission services raises critical issues, such as the scope of equality 
impact assessments, and the extent to which this evidence is taken into account in the decision making 
process. 
The disclosure of project documentation, value for money assessments, economic and social impact 
assessments and performance information is vital to provide information about the extent to which 
equalities and social justice policies are incorporated in the design, planning and operation of social 
impact bond projects.  
It is also essential to make service user and staff participation meaningful. Access to information is 
crucial in determining the implementation of equalities policies and practices. Private and non-profit 
companies are excluded from the UK freedom of information regulations. 
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Social impact bond projects should seek to reduce income inequality of service users and staff. They 
should ensure that private and non-profit contractors and consultants are prepared to commit to 
equality policies over and above the legal minimum, which is particularly important given the target 
populations and the early intervention and prevention agenda. Government, public sector and 
intermediary organisations should ensure that employers in social impact bond projects implement 
equality policies and practices in staffing, such as pay and conditions, pensions, workforce 
development, trade union recognition and industrial relations.  
Despite the work with ‘troubled families’ being a ‘core element’ of the first child poverty 
strategy, the alleviation of poverty is not part of the Payments-by-Results framework and 
the word ‘poverty’ barely features in the government documents relating to the TFP 
[Troubled Families Programme] (Crossley, 2015d). 
4.11 PUBLIC COST OF SOCIAL  IMPACT BOND PROJECTS  
Nearly £520m of UK public money has been given to social enterprises and social impact bond projects 
in recent years in the form of grants and financial support (Table 5). Finance for social impact bond 
projects is divided between the Innovation, Youth Engagement and Fair Chance Funds to directly fund 
projects and programmes that finance technical support and subsidies. For example, the Social 
Outcomes Fund (Cabinet Office) and the complementary Commissioning Better Outcomes (Big Lottery 
Fund) were launched in 2013 with £20m and £40m respectively.  
The Social Outcomes Fund provides public funding “…where commissioners may believe that the narrow 
economic case for the government department, agency or local authority in question is insufficient to 
justify offering adequate reward payments” (Keohane et al, 2013). Commissioning Better Outcomes 
fund provides finance for technical support for the development of social impact bonds. 
The Investment & Contract Readiness Fund £10m “…will provide grants to social sector organisations to 
purchase the capacity building support needed to help raise investment” (ibid). This is akin to PFI/PPP 
contractors wanting the state to pay their bid costs! “In the absence of sufficient subsidised external 
capital, the state must be willing to subsidise the costs if it wants SIBs to expand to achieve the benefits 
identified earlier” (ibid).  
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TABLE 5:  THE COST OF SUBSIDIES  AND SUPPORT TO UK  SOCIAL INVESTMENT  
Public funds and support programmes Cost (£m) 
Social Outcomes Fund (Cabinet Office) 2013  20.0 
Commissioning Better Outcomes (Big Lottery Fund) 2013 to grow market in social impact bonds and 
access new forms of financing*** 
40.0 
Department for Work and Pensions Innovation Fund to establish 10 social impact bond contracts to 
address youth unemployment (Cabinet Office)**** 
28.4 
Investment and Contract Readiness Fund to build their capacity to be able to receive investment and bid 
for public service contracts.* 
10.0 
Impact Readiness Fund to help social venture attract investment and win contracts* 1.5 
Social Investment Tax Relief (HM Revenues & Customs) £10m, £15m, £25m and £25m respectively 
between 2016/17 and 2019/20***** 
75.0 
Social Enterprise Investment Fund for social enterprises in health and social care 2009-2012* 119.0 
Mutual Support Programme (Cabinet Office) training, technical and legal support for ‘spin-outs’ from 
public sector 2011-2015*** 
10.0 
Social Incubation Fund for social enterprises 2012-2013 for organisations that provide finance and 
support to social venture start-ups 
10.0 
Centre for Social Impact Bonds (Cabinet Office) – a small team of civil servants and sector experts 
established in 2012 – 3 years at estimated cost of £250,000 per annum** 
0.75 
Mutuals Support Programme team (Cabinet Office) 2012-2013 to 2014-2015 0.75 
Social Finance support to develop SIBs from Big Lottery Fund 5.0 
P2P Impact Fund (Cabinet Office) substitute for social venture directors’ personal guarantees* 2.0 
Big Potential (BIG Lottery Fund) for voluntary, community and social enterprise sector to prepare for 
social investment* 
20.0 
Youth Engagement Fund – education and employability young people: Fair Chance Fund – homeless 
young people (Cabinet Office)****** 
30.0 
Futurebuilders Fund (Cabinet Office) set up in in 2004 to help third sector organisations win public 
service contracts* 
145.0 
Arts Impact Fund (Cabinet Office, Arts Council England, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Esmee Fairbairn 
and Gulbenkian Foundations) £7m fund for social, artistic and financial return from arts based 
organisations, 2015 
n/a 
Total 517.4 
Sources: * A Tale of Two Funds: Futurebuilders, Boston Consulting Group, 2015; ** Centre for Social Impact 
Bonds, 2015; *** Cabinet Office, 2015; **** Cabinet Office, 2013c; ***** HM Treasury, 2015: ****** Cabinet 
Office, 2014.  
The US Department of Labor provided US$20m grants for pilot Pay-for-Success projects to test the 
viability of projects to achieve positive workforce outcomes, commencing in 2012. The grants were 
intended to test a model for government investment in service delivery models that transfer risk to the 
private sector whether preventative social services “…pays off” (United States Department of Labor, 
2012). 
The New York State Pay-for-Success Project: Employment to Break the Cycle of Recidivism received a 
grant under this programme to fund the first two years of service delivery (Bank, 2015). In 2014, the 
Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act came into effect to revamp how US$2.6bn funding to state 
and local labour boards for employment projects. Projects can either be ‘payment for performance’ 
contracts or ‘pay-for-success’ social impact bond projects (Social Finance US, 2015). 
A bipartisan Bill in Congress would, if approved, allocate US$300m to fund social impact bond projects. 
The US Treasury would be allowed to spend up to US$1m annually to provide technical assistance, 
feasibility and evaluation studies (Young, 2014). 
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TA X  R E L I E F  
The UK government introduced Social Investment Tax Relief in 2014 (including social impact bond 
investments) for individuals comprising income tax relief at 30% of the amount invested and capital 
gains disposal relief if it is sold at a profit. It will cost £10.0m in 2016/17 rising to £15.0m per annum in 
2017-18 and £25.0m in the following two years (HM Treasury, 2015).  
H I G H  T R A N S A CT I O N  A N D  I M P LE M E N T A T I O N  C O S T S   
Some of the activities that incur significant transactions costs when selecting a target population 
(cohort) include compiling an evidence base or accessing data, deciding on the eligibility criteria, the 
selection methodology, identifying a control or comparator group, agreements with investors, 
procurement of contractors, design of monitoring and evaluation methodology, measurement of 
outcomes, identification of savings, contract negotiations and due diligence. The time and cost of 
participation of potential service users and staff should be another factor. 
The joint development phase of social impact bonds in Australia was very labour intensive – “…the 
number of hours equates to six FTEs working solely on the development of one social benefit bond over 
an intensive 12 month period (based on a 5 day workweek of 37.5 hours)” (KPMG, 2014). Government 
and service provider advisers accounted for 29.1% of the labour days per bond, the second highest 
labour element (Table 6). No costs were available, but the cost of 463 consultant/lawyer days would 
have been considerable. Provision of some consultant/legal advice on a pro-bono or heavily discounted 
basis, would reduce the cost of pilot or trial bond projects, but is not sustainable long-term.  
TABLE 6:  AVERAGE LABOUR RESOURCE COMMITTED TO THE PLANNING AND DEVEL OPMENT OF TWO AUSTRALIAN BONDS  
 
Central 
Agencies 
Line 
Agencies 
Service 
Providers 
Govt. 
Advisers 
Service 
Provider 
Advisers 
Total 
Average number of 
labour hours per bond 
1,692    3,630 2,984 2,262 1,144 11,712 
Average number of days 
per bond 
225.6 484.0 397.9 301.6 152.5 1,561.6 
Percentage of labour 
days per bond 
14.4% 31.0% 25.5% 19.3% 9.8% 100.0% 
Source: KPMG, 2014 
In another example, the project development process took 23, 19 and 2 months for the Essex County 
Council (reducing children in care project), Greater London Authority (reducing homelessness) and the 
Consortium for Voluntary Adoption Agencies projects respectively (Griffiths and Meinicke, 2014). 
SIBs are an expensive method of expanding social sector interventions. They are 
programme specific, thus requiring in-depth analysis of the impact of interventions in a 
specific environment. Independent evaluation of performance under the SIB is expensive. 
Such costs absorb a significant proportion of the returns available to investors or value to 
commissioners. Related to this is the problem that their small scale and bespoke nature 
means that the transaction costs of setting up a SIB can be prohibitively large (Keohane 
et al, 2013). 
The Peterborough Prison social impact bond project is reported to have taken the equivalent of 2.5 
years of staff time and 300 hours of legal and tax advice over 18 months (Jeram and Wilkinson, 2015). 
Proposals to try to reduce transaction costs in Australia include selecting similar policy areas for future 
bonds to produce efficiencies; choosing policy areas with an established evidence base; use of 
adaptable legal contracting templates; using the bond structure established for the first two bonds; and 
government contract directly with service contractor “…which then establishes a separate arrangement 
with a special purpose entity (a trust) which is managed by a financial intermediary” (KPMG, 2014). 
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RE I N V E S T M E N T  O F  P R O F I T S  
In Canada, the Saskatchewan social impact bond project was financed by two C$500,000 payments 
from the Conexus Credit Union in Sasakatoon and a private investor. The credit union stated that profits 
would be reinvested in the community, a common practice of non-profit organisations elsewhere. 
However, private investors are already funding social impact bonds even in the early stages of their 
development. Taking this as an example, if the social impact bonds grow at the pace forecast by their 
advocates, the proportion of profit-seeking investments by private and financial institutions will 
increase, hence reducing the scope for community reinvestment. 
WH A T  H A P P E N S  W H E N  A  S O CI A L  I M P A CT  B O N D  P R O J E C T  I S  CO N C LU D E D ? 
There are virtually no references to what happens after a social impact bond project is concluded or 
withdraws prematurely.  
 Will services return to public provision, will another project be proposed or will services be 
outsourced to the private or voluntary sector? 
 Social impact bond contracts are relatively short-term compared to the length of time people 
are expected to stay out of care, prison or stay in employment or training and to deal with 
future personal or family crises, so who will continue to give them support? 
 Will another project be established for the same group of service users or for a different 
group? This raises obvious questions about the continuity of provision. 
 What happens when the next financial crisis or economic recession results in further austerity 
measures, or rising unemployment – will project intermediaries and contractors be left to deal 
with rising costs or will they seek a bailout from government or private investors? 
4.12 SOCIAL IMPACT BOND PROJECTS AND FREE TRAD E AGREEMENTS  
There has been no public acknowledgement of disputes between social impact bond project investors, 
contractors, project companies and public sector bodies, largely because of the relatively small number 
of currently operational projects. However, this is likely to change if the number and scope of projects 
increases significantly. Although performance is assessed by an ‘independent’ evaluator, there is little 
evidence that their role will mitigate the risk of disputes and potential legal action, particularly if the 
evaluator’s performance is disputed. The definition of ‘independent’ can often be misleading. 
International cooperation, and potentially international bidding for contracts, could lead to the future 
use of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) clauses in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) currently being negotiated, which could allow 
firms to ‘sue’ governments to obtain taxpayer compensation for loss of ‘expected future profits’ if social 
impact bond projects are terminated or the policy is significantly reduced in scope. Companies 
and investors would be empowered to challenge regulations, rules, government action and court 
rulings at tribunals. Further liberalisation of services and deregulation under the planned Trade in 
Services Agreement (TISA) is almost certain to increase opportunities for private finance of public 
services and privatisation. 
4.13 F INANCIAL FLAWS  
Summary of financial flaws in social impact bond projects: 
Accumulation and profit: Creating a new source of investment and profit for social and private investors 
has attracted banks and financial institutions.  Impact investment, and social impact bonds in particular, 
financialise social need to create new opportunities for accumulation. This could lead to the acceptance 
of profiteering across social policy provision and selecting social need that is profitable, ignoring needs 
that are not. The financial return on investment inevitably means services are run on a commercial 
basis – annual returns of 15% - 30% or more, are significantly higher than most private contractors 
obtain from outsourcing! The attempt to embed the ‘innovation = profit’ link in public services, should 
be rejected as an economic, social and political objective. 
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Profitable private investment: A market rate of return on investment has a major influence in the 
selection of social policies and projects that will become social impact bond projects, such as early 
childhood development, health, education, health, recidivism and homelessness. The question of what 
happens to the services and functions that cannot provide a market rate of return appears to be 
ignored by the impact investment lobby and many governments.  
The focus on a new financial mechanism and service-based approach: Early childhood intervention, 
tackling recidivism and other similar challenges only partially address the causes of poverty, inequalities 
and crises in people’s lives. Social impact bond projects are a diversion from the more fundamental 
changes needed to tackle poverty and inequality. 
Public budgets: A UK independent report on early intervention concluded that a social impact bond 
“…has more characteristics of a traditional equity vehicle. Under this model the intermediary was 
classified to the private sector, and the outcome-based payments did not need to be accounted for 
because there is no certainty that the outcomes will be achieved” (Allen, 2011). 
It further concludes “…outcome-based contracts would not require the Government to reflect the 
intermediaries’ activity in the national accounts or for local or central government to reflect the 
contingent revenue claim in future years’ accounts (although this would currently be assessed on a case-
by-case basis). However, if a greater number of SIBs are going to emerge, more thought needs to be 
given as to how this could work on a broader cross-Whitehall level “ (Allen, 2011).  
If the number of social impact bonds continues to increase, then public bodies will have to ratchet up 
the lump sum contractual payments due from revenue budgets on completion of projects. This raises 
questions about how these debts are accounted for when the final payment is unknown, because the 
future level of performance will determine the final payment.   
The Government cannot afford to continue to fund both legacy services and payments for 
outcomes; however, it has a number of long-term commitments to the in-house provision 
of services that typically have high fixed costs.  
Central government must look to decommission services, which are reduced due to Early 
Intervention to be able to pay for outcomes. It needs to get to a position where it is ‘fleet 
of foot’; where commissioners can adjust budgets more rapidly to the emerging 
problems of today and not the legacy services that address the problems of yesterday 
(Allen, 2011).  
Yet the same report had earlier stated: 
Early Intervention should reduce the requirement for children to be taken into care, but a 
local authority may still find itself taking more children into care after an Early 
Intervention programme  is completed, simply because more children from dysfunctional 
families have become part of its population. It may take a number of interventions, over 
a number of years, to reach a point where unmet need is reduced sufficiently to close a 
care home down, for instance. This indicates that, in the short term, it may not be 
possible to rely entirely on cashable savings being delivered before an outcome is paid 
for. Nevertheless, there is strong and mounting evidence to suggest that Early 
Intervention can deliver significant cashable savings for local areas in the longer term 
(ibid). 
This is a confused and contradictory analysis. It highlights the problem for governments in 
implementing early intervention and preventive policies whilst continuing to fund core services and 
infrastructure. The concept of early intervention and development will surely exist for the foreseeable 
future and will, therefore, never be “completed”. Decommissioning services on a significant scale due 
to social impact bond projects will not immediately, although the legacy costs cannot be ignored. The 
need for core services will continue in addition to acute services for those who are not covered or fall 
through the early intervention/prevention strategies outcome net. 
Off-balance sheet financing: If public sector repayments to private and social investors in social impact 
bond projects are treated ‘off balance sheet’ this could lead to further budgetary and financial 
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problems and the categorisation of debt. This is different from PPPs because payment of the monthly 
unitary charge (consisting of construction, finance and facility management services costs) commences 
as soon as the building or facility is operational. 
Revenue budget pressures squeeze other services: The buy now-pay later approach to public finance has 
caused severe problems in the UK’s National Health Service with many Hospital Trusts in financial crisis, 
because PFI/PPP contractual payments account for a significant slice of their revenue budgets, leading 
to cuts in other services. 
High transaction costs: Procurement, bidding, consultants and lawyers divert much need resources 
from frontline services. But this is only one part of the cost of outsourcing, markets and privatisation. 
The additional cost of private finance, regulating markets, direct and indirect subsidies, wasted bids and 
contract terminations, increased administration costs, management consultants, public sector 
reorganisation, is estimated to be £7.5bn per annum in the NHS alone (Whitfield, 2015).  
Savings forecasts: Quantifying and forecasting potential public sector savings is very difficult. There is a 
long history of savings from outsourcing and PPP strategic partnership contracts either failing to 
materialise or being significantly smaller then originally envisaged (Whitfield, 2014c). Private 
contractors, trade bodies and some public bodies regularly exaggerate the size of expected savings. 
Although savings targets are a common objective of outsourcing contracts and feature in Key 
Performance Indicators and contracts, taking legal action to seek readdress for failure to achieve 
financial savings has not been possible in the UK. For example, the Maryland recidivism project forecast 
a 10% reduction in reoffending and a 6% reduction in the cost of running the pilot programme based on 
optimistic assumptions (McKay, 2013).  
Secondary trading when investors want out: A UK Social Stock Exchange was recently established to 
facilitate secondary market trading in social enterprise investments. Whether trading in social impact 
bond investments reaches the same scale of PFI/PPP equity in the UK, is too early to judge. However, 
some degree of trading is likely to emerge if investors seek to sell their investment before the end of a 
contract (see Appendix).  
New financial instruments: Financial institutions may develop new financial instruments for impact 
investing which, given previous experience, could seek to evade the new financial regulatory regimes. 
Potential financial disputes: Disputes could arise if the distribution of savings between public bodies are 
lower than forecast or are shared unequally or if the public disputes the evaluator’s performance 
assessment and the level of profit required by investors. 
New funding? Social Finance UK claimed the Peterborough social impact bond attracted new sources of 
funding for public services and specifically for criminal justice (Disley et al, 2011). The authors correctly 
concluded this could not be determined without an analysis of the investors funding decisions (in this 
case charities and foundations) both before and after social impact bond investments. Funding of one 
sector could be at the expense of another. Increased private investment in public services does not 
automatically mean increased funding for public services. In the current context it almost certainly does 
not replace current public expenditure, let alone increase it. 
4.14 PUBLIC POLICY FLAWS  
Summary of public policy flaws in social impact bond projects: 
New markets: Social impact bond projects create new markets for investors, financial intermediaries, 
service providers, consultants, lawyers and evaluators. The marketisation and commercialisation of 
social problems is already evident in health, education, housing, social services, employment training, 
welfare services and the criminal justice system. The continued neoliberal-driven search for new buy 
now – pay later, off balance sheet or new actuarial-dominated financial schemes, automatically 
increase the scope for private contractors and consultants. This is not effective, productive or 
sustainable. 
Flawed comparison and evaluation: Social impact bond proposals are normally only compared with 
status quo, or business as usual, public provision. The lack of an innovative and improved public sector 
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option, and rigorous options appraisal, fails dismally to meet basic evaluation principles of comparing 
like with like. Offenders in the Peterborough Prison social impact bond project are compared to 
“…matched control groups. Each control group will be drawn from all prisoners released from sentences 
of less than 12 months, within the same time period from other prisons nationally. One-to-many 
propensity score-matching will be used to select the control group: this means that each cohort prisoner 
will be matched to up to 10 control group prisoners” (Disley et al, 2011).  
Competition: Direct public provision is usually excluded as a service delivery option, which leave social 
enterprises, charities, voluntary organisations, consultants and private contractors to compete for 
contracts. Whilst publicly owned arms-length commercial companies may continue for a while, they will 
ultimately fall prey to private sector takeovers. Markets and competition leads to consolidation to 
achieve market share through the merger or takeover of private contractors and non-profit enterprises, 
within and between sectors. 
Commissioning, commercialisation and contract culture: High transaction costs, 3-7 year contracts, and 
the exclusion of in-house provision, will lead to further rationalisation and retrenchment as services are 
privatized, the loss of experience in frontline service delivery and direct contact with service users. Non-
profit enterprises and voluntary organisations are under increasing pressure to commercialise their 
activities. 
Reduced role of the state: Continued outsourcing and privatisation of other welfare state services and 
functions water down the benefits of early intervention policies. This is almost certain to weaken the 
role of the state in addressing the root causes of poverty and disadvantage. 
Decline of in-house provision: The expansion of impact investing and widening use of social impact 
bonds will challenge the continued provision of in-house public services. The idea that they are a 
temporary measure to jump start systemic change with service provision continuing in-house, would 
require a very significant change in the political economy. Current conditions make the reverse more 
likely, leading to full-scale privatisation.  
Flexible labour policies: This is code for private contractors, non-profit enterprises and voluntary 
organisations to evade public sector terms and conditions, industrial relations framework and 
workforce development policies. Public sector bodies relinquish responsibility for staffing levels, terms 
and conditions, workforce development and the employment practices of contractors. A significant 
element of savings is dependent on low cost labour. The Peterborough Prison social impact bond 
project engaged 56 volunteers alongside 7 full-time and 3 part-time staff (see Part 7). 
Economic, social, equalities and environmental impacts: There is little evidence that social impact bond 
and pay-for-success projects have, or are willing, to adopt best practice in assessing the full impact of 
policies and projects. This is a particular concern in countries, such as the UK, where government has 
already weakened equalities regulations and further reduction of workers rights is planned, in the form 
of new trade union legislation. 
Significant risks are borne by government, staff, service users and contractors – not just the private 
investors as claimed by the advocates of social impact bonds.  
Service users may gain more individualised and personalised services, but fewer opportunities for 
collective organising, because this is not part of the specified outcomes. Selective targeted support for 
individual children and parents is a core part of early intervention strategies. However, individualisation 
and personalisation are a quadrant in the neoliberal public sector reform model, which is almost certain 
to emphasize individual choice mechanisms and consumerism, rather than community and workplace 
democratisation (Whitfield, 2012a).  
…the conception of citizenship embodied in participatory democratic theory is that 
citizens are not at all like consumers. Citizens have the right to public provision, the right 
to participate in decision-making about their collective life and to live within authority 
structures that make such participation possible (Pateman, 2012).  
Weakened democratic accountability and participation: Public control is ceded to a ‘partnership’ of 
social finance intermediaries, non-profit organisations, private contractors and consultants. Monitoring, 
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scrutiny and disclosure will be even more problematic, because of the current limitations of freedom of 
information regulations. The private sector will have wider involvement in the public policy making 
process. 
Reduced public service principles and values: The combination of accumulation, markets, competition, 
commercialisation and contract culture, arms length democratic accountability will inevitably erode 
public service principles and values (Whitfield, 2014b). The various forms of ‘social responsibility’, the 
social objectives of organisations engaged in social impact bond projects, and tweaking procurement 
process towards ‘social value’, will be unable to counter the dominant effects of commercial values and 
business practices. 
Fracturing of public provision: Selective use of the social impact bond model in services that maximise 
the opportunity for investor profits, leads to the fracturing of service provision.  
Fragmented public planning: The planning of public infrastructure and service provision is constrained 
by economic performance and market forces. Social impact bonds projects increase the role of financial 
interests and market forces in service provision making longer term planning even more precarious. 
Privatisation of the welfare state: Continuing austerity and a planned £12bn cut in UK welfare state 
spending, coupled with the mutation pathways, will lead to further destabilisation and fracturing of 
services and welfare benefits, and probably lead to new financial mechanisms to commodify and 
commercialise public services. Social impact bond projects are privatisation. 
The negative consequences of social impact bonds are summarised in Table 1. 
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5 EXPORTING IMPACT BONDS TO THE GLOBAL SOUTH  
5.1 DEVELOPMENT IMPACT BOND PROJECTS  
Development impact bond projects are financed by foreign aid programmes, such as the UK’s 
Department for International Development (DIFD) and US Aid and/or by foundations, when 
governments do not have the resources. In contrast, social impact bonds are financed by private 
investors and repaid by governments or public bodies. 
The claims made about for development impact bond projects are virtually the same as those for social 
impact bond projects, hence the analysis in other parts of this report are equally applicable. 
The Center for Global Development and Social Finance (2013) recently observed that the US$2 trillion 
public funding of development aid in the last 50 years could have been more successful. They claimed 
poor targeting of resources, inadequate incentives to focus on outcomes, limited innovation, short-
term funding and insufficient evidence to support decision-making.  
According to a development impact bond working group:  
…having private investors provide funding for (and assume risk for) social programmes 
and by introducing financial returns that are tied to the achievement of social outcomes 
– the distinguishing feature of the model – DIBs present a paradigm shift in how we fund 
social programmes. They are not merely a new financing mechanism but a new approach 
or business model for how development programmes are designed and operated (Center 
for Global Development and Social Finance, 2013).  
They claim development impact bonds “…transform neglected social problems into investible 
opportunities….introduce market rigour to achieving social outcomes…create incentives to make funds 
available for longer periods of time” (ibid).   
There is little evidence that the development impact bond approach will be more effective. 
The first Development Impact Bond was launched in Rajasthan, India, in April 2015 with the objective of 
enrolling 5,000 out-of-school girls into public primary schools over a three-year period (see Table 4). In 
Peru, a cocoa and coffee project is operational and other projects are at the design stage in Pakistan, 
Mozambique, Swaziland, South Africa, Israel, Chile and Columbia. 
A US$5.3m facility to support social impact bonds in Latin America was launched by the Multilateral 
Investment Fund of the Inter-American Development Bank in 2014. Part of the funding will be used to 
fund three pilot social impact bonds and the remainder to promote bond projects with governments 
and public bodies (Perakis, 2014). 
A private education company, GEMS Education, with 71 schools worldwide, examined the scope for 
social impact bonds in early childhood, primary, secondary and vocational education in Latin America, 
although it currently has no schools in the region. It recognised that social impact bonds are largely 
unproven. However, it identified the scope for social impact bonds in primary education:  
…may be best suited in areas where there are clear gaps in services or where 
complementary programmes can enhance educational outcomes, without having to 
displace the existing programmes. In addition, SIBs and performance contracting may 
also be relevant in instances where primary education services are already publicly-
financed but privately-delivered, such as through voucher programmes (Bloomgarden et 
al, 2014).  
Private investment could be useful to help finance and implement school improvement 
programmes, as well as combine traditional PPPs structures, alongside outcomes- based 
contracting structures for services provided (ibid).  
After-school programmes in secondary education were considered more suitable for social impact 
bonds than school-based reforms “…because investors will have greater jurisdiction over independent 
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operators, than they might have over publicly-operated school systems in a school-based reform 
setting” (ibid). The scope for social impact bonds in vocational training and employment was tempered 
by the difficulty in obtaining sufficient cashable savings to finance projects. 
The International Development Working Group, part of the G8 initiated Social Impact Investment 
Taskforce, recommended establishment of a new Impact Finance Facility to develop new and 
innovative companies, business models and innovative social sector organisations to build a pipeline of 
impact investments; create a Development Impact Bond Outcomes Fund to create development impact 
bond pilots; and improve metrics and transparency and support growth of the impact investing market 
(Social Impact Investment Taskforce, 2014c). 
5.2 PROMOTING PAYMENT-BY-RESULTS  
The World Bank’s Programme-for-Results (PforR) was launched in 2012 to “(a) finance and support 
borrowers’ programs of expenditures and activities, (b) disburse against achievement of program results 
rather than against inputs, (c) focus on strengthening institutional capacity to implement the program, 
and (d) provide assurance that the Bank’s financing is used appropriately and that the environmental 
and social impacts of the program are adequately addressed. PforR was also intended to promote 
partnership working” (World Bank, 2015). 
By the end of 2014 the World Bank had funded 22 PforR projects providing US$3.5bn bank financing to 
support a total of US$8.5bn government programmes (ibid). The PforR programme was not officially 
launched and a 5% cap was placed on PforR commitments. 
The review concluded: “Overall implementation of PforR operations is also on track, with performance 
ratings of satisfactory or moderately satisfactory for all but one operation and risk ratings stable 
through early implementation” (ibid). A survey of Bank staff and government officials, who had used the 
PforR mechanism “…indicated satisfaction with most of the specific features of the instrument” (ibid). 
The review found increased costs due to extensive discussions during the preparation and negotiations 
in the use of PforR. The review recommended a continued managed roll out of payment by results. 
The UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) launched a strategy to increase the use of 
payment-by-results contracts – 71% of contracts for services issued centrally in the year ending 
September 2013, had a performance by results element (DFID, 2014). The strategy is intended to 
strengthen their ‘best commercial practice’ to PbR. 
The Department has also been funding the pre-implementation stage of a development impact bond in 
Uganda to tackle sleeping sickness, which is caused by a parasitic infection that attacks the central 
nervous system and can be fatal (ibid). 
The Center for Global Development use the term ‘Cash on Delivery Aid’ instead of payment by results, a 
more brutal, but honest description (Center for Global Development, 2015). 
NE W  SU S T A I N A B LE  DE V E L O P M E N T  GO A LS   
New sustainable development goals are planned in autumn 2015. 
If the private sector succeeded in fulfilling the annual Sustainable Development Goal US$2.5 trillion 
investment gap with impact investing and development bond projects (United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, 2014), it would generate a US$375 billion annual transfer of profits primarily 
to banks, private equity and hedge funds and wealthy individuals in industrialised countries, based on 
an average 15% annual return on investment.   
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6 DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY,  PARTICIPATION AND TRANSPARENCY  
6.1 ERODED ACCOUNTABILITY  
Democratic accountability and transparency is absent from case studies and documents promoting 
social impact bond projects. This is largely due to the concept of the intermediary organisation being 
external to government and in an influential position, responsible for the recruiting investors and 
selecting providers and consultants. Public sector commissioners, in effect, collude with the 
privatisation of the intermediary function, despite them being responsible for how they respond to, or 
initiate, social impact bond projects. The relationship between a public body and a private contractor 
requires new channels of accountability within the public body (commissioner and elected members 
oversight and scrutiny) and between the public body, private contractor and service users/public. 
Outsourcing public services to private contractors and consultants changes the distribution of power 
between government, the public and the private sector. Social impact bond projects also disperse 
power because the public sector commissioner, or client, has less direct control over the social finance 
intermediary and often has no direct control over the service providers (Baliga, 2013). 
Outsourcing public services to private entities for private profit profoundly affects the 
distribution of power among the state, the public, and the private sector (ibid).  
National impact investing organisations are emerging, which, in effect, act as trade organisations to 
promote social impact bonds and to lobby for legislative change. Alliances of non-profit, voluntary and 
public sector managers committed to social impact bonds, impact investing and social impact 
measurement, are also emerging in several countries. 
6.2 ABSENT PARTICIPATION  
There is little evidence that service users, community organisations and public sector trade unions have 
been involved in the planning and procurement process for social impact bonds to date. Their 
involvement is absent from the social impact bond and payment-by-results literature. 
…the voices of low-income and other marginalised people are almost completely absent 
from the literature on venture philanthropy and social enterprise, where things seem to 
be done to, for, or around but never with or by them (Edwards, 2010). 
For example, a report on the feasibility and design stage for the Payment-by-Results for Troubled 
Families Programme, commissioned by the Cabinet Office, examined delivery options involving local 
authorities, a social impact bond agency, a large prime contractor, a consortium and a social investment 
partnership. The study concluded with a one-day briefing, similar to pre-procurement events “…but 
with the added dimension introduced by PBR/SIBs that there was direct engagement with those who 
might invest in the programmes as well those who deliver them” (Cabinet Office, 2012).  
Provider and investor concerns were summarised: 
 Confirmation that providers and investors would be concerned if there were procurement of 
too many outcomes, and, therefore, a process of undue complexity with ‘too many moving 
parts’. This would affect their ability both to manage risk and to measure success;   
 The need for a multiple tariff if there were multiple outcomes, so that the price per outcome 
could relate to both the cost of intervention and the potential for savings;   
 The need for clarity on how the proceeds of savings would be shared between commissioners 
and investors;   
 Concern that cohorts would not be large enough to help providers and investors balance  risk 
of over and under-performance; and   
 Confirmation of the view that investment and delivery models other than social impact bond 
projects need to be considered (ibid).  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The concern for investors was a dominant feature – “…investors generally need to see much more 
detailed information on e.g. payments, volumes, likely success rates, etc before they can make sensible 
investment decisions” (ibid).  Furthermore, “…commissioners will need to consider how they adapt their 
“normal” commissioning and procurement processes so that they can successfully accommodate 
investors and intermediaries, as well as providers, and enable providers and investors better to assess 
risk and return” (ibid). This could include holding more detailed discussions with investors once 
commissioners’ procurement plans were clarified. 
Government guidance on the template contract for social impact bond and payment-by-results projects 
a year later did recognise:  
There may be significant value in the commissioner engaging with current or past users 
of the service and/or service providers, to understand better what is likely to be effective, 
before designing its project. Alternatively, an authority may elect to build that sort of 
input into the procurement process itself, engaging in a form of competitive dialogue 
with its bidders (Cabinet Office, 2013b).  
The second part of this quote provides an escape clause, because service users are normally excluded 
from the procurement process. However, the advantages of involving service users was recognised in 
the second Peterborough Prison social impact bond: 
Future SIB and payment by results schemes which target a specific group of service users 
may benefit from greater input of operational staff at the contract drafting stage to 
ensure greater clarity around establishing clear procedures for cohort identification, data 
collection and analysis, including which data systems will be used (Disley and Rubin, 
2014). 
It remains to be seen whether this advice will be heeded. 
A prisoner focus group meeting was held in Peterborough Prison on 5 August 2009 that discussed the 
main challenges that people faced on leaving prison, the support they would like to receive, and who 
should provide the services (Social Finance, 2011). This occurred before the contract was signed. The 
Peterborough project reviews refer only to ‘stakeholder groups’, which consisted of the intermediary 
and the contractors The One Service, Social Finance, Mind, Ormiston Children and Families Trust, Sova 
and St Giles Trust (Disley et al, 2011, Disley and Rubin, 2014).  
Innovation and improvement of public services will be severely limited if service users, community 
organisations, staff and trade unions and civil society organisations are not involved in the planning, 
design and delivery of early intervention and prevention strategies. Two Canadian public sector unions, 
National Union of Public and General Employees (NUPGE) and the Canadian Union of Public Employees 
(CUPE), have campaigned vociferously against social impact bonds, as has the American Federation of 
State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME). However, a search of other main public sector trade 
union web sites in the UK, US and Australia revealed few references to, let alone content on social 
impact bond projects. 
C I T I Z E N  P A R T I C I P A T I O N  I N  D E V E LO P M E N T  I M P A CT  B O N D S  
Stakeholder consultation is exclusive to the impact investment market and does not include public 
consultation. For example, the stakeholder consultation to the Impact Investing Australia study ranged 
from investors, philanthropist, fund manager, capacity builder, community and mainstream financial 
intermediaries, not for profit, social enterprise to policy maker and product developer! (Impact 
Investing Australia, 2014). 
Participation in social impact bond projects is always likely to be secondary to the interests of private 
investors securing a return on their investment and governments achieving public sector savings. And 
since the intermediary, contractors, consultants, lawyers and evaluators are not publicly accountable 
organisations, genuine participative social impact bond projects appear intangible. 
Citizen participation in the planning, design and delivery of social impact bonds and payment-by-results 
projects is absent from a range of studies by international organisations (G8 Social Investment Rask 
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Force, 2014; OECD, 2014a and 2015; World Bank, 2015; Independent Evaluation Group World Bank, 
2014). Any references to ‘participation’ or ‘engagement’ in these documents referred to the 
participation of providers or market engagement. It is however, implicit that impact investing 
organisations and social enterprises will be empowered! 
Five impact investing principles were drawn up to assist governments “…looking at policy tools to bring 
private capital to support the achievement of social objectives” (Impact Investing Policy Collaborative, 
2013). Stakeholder engagement is included, but is non-specific about whom ‘relevant’ or ‘key’ 
stakeholders’ are and is thus vague. The principle of ‘universal transparency’ refers to ‘the public at 
large’ and ‘empowers citizen participation’. 
A Code of Good Impact Practice has been drawn up in the UK (Inspiring Impact, 2013) together with 
examples of how the eight high-level principles have been put into practice (Inspiring Impact, 2014). 
Principle three encourages the involvement of beneficiaries, staff, volunteers and project partners in 
defining impacts and collecting and reviewing information. However, there is no systemic approach to 
service user, community organisations, staff and trade union involvement in the planning, design and 
delivery of early intervention and prevention strategies. Instead the emphasis appears to promote 
involvement that will enhance the contractor’s reputation rather than strengthen community 
organisations. 
The World Bank’s two-year review of Program-for-Results included only four examples of citizen 
engagement. Ethiopia set an example  “Citizens’ participation in the planning process under the Local 
Government Program is a performance measure that helps determine the financial allocation from the 
Program” (World Bank, 2015). Other examples included Mexico, Uganda and India, but it is clear that 
citizen engagement is not a central part of the PforR programme. There are no proposals for citizen 
participation in the Department for International Development’s strategy for payment-by-results (DFID, 
2014).  
A different perspective is provided with the following statement: 
People want not to need international assistance. They want to live politically, socially, 
environmentally, and economically secure lives without depending on outside help. What 
they want, therefore, from international assistance is a system that supports indigenous 
processes so that outside aid will be unnecessary (Anderson et al, 2012).  
The three principles of participation, ownership and sustainability are interlinked 
cornerstones of good practice and effective development, or peacebuilding (ibid). 
6.3 L IMITED TRANSPARENCY  
It is important that governments and public bodies establish procedures to respond to unsolicited social 
impact bond projects when intermediary organisations propose new projects to increase market share 
and/or diversify their activities. This is similar to the practice of permitting unsolicited PPP 
infrastructure projects in US and Australia. 
Project abstracts for the New York State and Massachusetts Pay-for-Success recidivism projects, which 
received US Department of Labor grants, redacted the names of investors. The Massachusetts abstract 
went further and redacted the name of the intermediary and a summary of the economic model that 
identified the expected cost savings. The Department of Labor used Part 230, Regulation D, Rules 
Covering the Limited Offer and Sale of Securities Without Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933. 
The Massachusetts contract was eventually released under state regulations (State of Massachusetts, 
2014). 
The use of financial market regulations to restrict the disclosure of key information relating to public 
service projects that are ultimately financed by public money raises key transparency issues. Similar 
regulations may apply in other countries. 
6.4 CORPORATISATION OF NON-PROFIT ORGANISATIONS  
The threat of the corporatisation of the non-profit sector is real: 
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The emphasis on sustainability, efficiency, and market share has the potential to 
endanger the most basic value of the nonprofit sector — the availability of “free space” 
within the society for people to freely invent solutions to social problems and to serve the 
public good. Transferring market language and market concepts to the nonprofit sector 
without adapting those concepts to include the value of participation and engagement 
endangers the core transformational purpose of the sector and reduces it to a 
transactional marketplace (W.K. Kellogg Foundation, 2003) 
The participation of voluntary service organisations (VSGs) as sponsors or contractors in the emerging 
social investment market and the use of social impact bonds provides an additional opportunity to 
identify with so-called service innovation, and to diversify and consolidate their role in the outsourcing 
of public services. The social investment market extends the financialisation, personalisation, 
marketisation and privatisation of public services to activities and functions previously considered not 
politically acceptable for outsourcing and privatisation. 
Just as government promotion of social enterprises has led to a mushrooming of advisers and 
consultants, a market is growing with the expansion of social investment projects.  
The National Coalition for Independent Action (NCIA) Inquiry into the Future of Voluntary Services 
concluded: 
Through these moves some VSGs are now engaging with the ‘social investment market’ 
intended to replace public funding for public services, through the use of financial 
instruments such as payment by results and social impact bonds. This has been 
accompanied by, and further encouraged, the rise of the new ‘social entrepreneur’ – a 
cadre of managers and owners who are happily complicit with the expansion of the 
‘financialisation’ and ‘marketisation’ of human need. Despite considerable sums of public 
money being committed to assist this shift, including currently £600 million via Big 
Society Capital, results are poor. The vast bulk of social enterprises that attract private 
finance do so by entering into debt commitments with private investors, whilst 
continuing to rely on public sector finance both to provide the contracted service and 
repay their investors. These developments sound an echo of the disastrous financial 
consequences for the public purse of the Private Finance Initiative programme (NCIA, 
2015).  
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7 EMPLOYMENT IMPACT  
This section examines the employment impact of social impact bond projects. Austerity policies caused 
mass unemployment, imposed cuts in public spending, wage cuts and freezes and the growth of 
precarious employment with zero-hour and temporary contracts. Increased outsourcing and 
privatisation have driven down wages and created a market with a more diverse range of employers. 
7.1 JOBS –  THE FORGOTTEN IMPACT  
There are few references to jobs, terms and conditions for staff either displaced by, or employed in, 
organisations delivering social impact bonds projects. This appears to indicate a disregard for public 
employees affected by impact investing since they face transfer to a non-profit employer with average 
wages and benefits significantly lower than those in the public sector, or redundancy. Economic, social 
and equality impact assessments of social impact bond projects are absent.  
Social impact bond literature has virtually ignored the employment consequences of projects and the 
privatisation of service delivery and some commissioning functions. The lack of employment data was 
further investigated using a sample of project literature and reports of 13 social impact Bond projects (4 
in UK, 5 USA, and one each in Australia, Belgium and Canada) to identify references to the staff 
employed in project delivery. Only two references to ‘employment’, ‘staff’ and ‘workers’ were found. 
The first reference was contained in the review of the Peterborough Prison social impact bond project, 
which revealed that the One Service, responsible for service delivery, employed seven full-time staff, 
three part-time and 56 volunteers in the prison and the community (Table 7).  
TABLE 7:  STAFFING LEVEL IN PETERBOROUGH PRISON SIB 
Employees and volunteers Employed staff Volunteers 
in prison & 
community 
Full time Part-time 
Case workers – St Giles Trust 6 0 0 
Volunteers trained and managed by Sova 0 0 50 
Volunteers – on probation or experience of criminal justice 
system – St Giles Trust 
0 0 6 
Family specialist practitioners - Ormiston Children and Families 
Trust 
0 2 0 
Recovery workers - Mind 0 1 0 
Construction skills course trainer – John Laing Training 1 0 0 
Total 7 3 56 
               Source: Disley and Rubin, 2014. 
A report on the lessons learned from the planning and early implementation of the Peterborough 
Prison SIB contained an appendix with the following statement: 
“The St Giles Trust team is made up of paid staff, volunteers within the prison and 
volunteers in the community. The volunteers within the prison are usually prisoners 
serving longer sentences that are undertaking, or have completed, a NVQ at Level 3 in 
Advice and Guidance. The role of these volunteers is to advise and support offenders, 
encourage them to access services and support while in prison, and to follow up on any 
missed appointments. The use of volunteers within the prison ensures that St Giles Trust 
has access to offenders throughout the prison” (Disley et al, 2011).  
The second review of the Peterborough Prison social impact bond project noted that the original plan 
called for distinct roles of employees and volunteers, but this had changed after the first year of the 
project. Volunteers worked alongside full/part time caseworkers, which allowed them to focus on the 
more complex with volunteers on the less complex caseload: 
 61 
A
ltern
ative to
 p
rivate fin
an
ce o
f th
e w
elfare state
 
Lay volunteers, managed and trained by Sova, were an important resource and were 
viewed positively by a range of interviewees. They provided staff capacity by working 
with lower risk cases, allowing caseworkers to focus on more complex cases. Some 
volunteers also brought specialist skills, for example, legal expertise or knowledge of 
debt and finance (Disley and Rubin, 2014).  
The second reference was in a project summary of the Cuyahoga County, Ohio, family support social 
impact bond which made reference to “…hire and train key staff for project implementation” (Pay-For-
Success Learning Hub (2015b).   
Further evidence was sought from the UK Cabinet Office Knowledge Hub and the US Pay-For-Success 
Learning Hub for references to employment in thirteen social impact bonds, but no information was 
available on:  
 The number of jobs created by the social impact bond project; 
 The number of staff transferred or made redundant from public organisations; 
 The number of volunteers engaged in service delivery; 
 The terms and conditions of staff engaged in project management and delivery; 
 Whether staff are in pension schemes; 
 Trade union recognition and industrial relations frameworks. 
The Youth Custody project cited in Part 4 engaged staff in reviewing progress to meet the targets and 
their practice and participated in workshops and interviews in the evaluation of the project (Wong et al, 
2015). 
A survey of potential investors in financing US Pay-for-Success projects concluded: 
Investors wanted to understand the underlying source of the government cost savings. 
While investors are relatively comfortable with cost savings that result from lower capital 
costs (e.g., through more efficient construction), the fact that much of the SIB cost 
savings could result from lower or outsourced personnel costs raised concerns about this 
aspect of political risk (Godeke Consulting, 2012)  
TR A N S F E R  A N D  R E D U N D A N C Y   
The European Union and several other countries have similar legislation to protect jobs, terms and 
conditions when services are outsourced or privatised. A transfer of staff to the new employer is 
dependent on an ‘economic entity’ being transferred and the continuation of service delivery by the 
new employer. If a new service is planned that is significantly different from the existing service, then 
the impact on jobs, terms and conditions will vary depending on employment legislation. A ‘new’ 
service situation allows social impact bond contractors to use their existing and newly recruited staff to 
deliver services. 
7.2 NON-PROFIT EMPLOYMENT IN CONTEXT  
Although the non-profit sector contributes an average 5% of Gross Domestic Product in several 
industrialised countries and between 2.6% – 11.5% of national employment, the average wage in the 
sector is 20% - 30% less than the national average wage, let alone the equivalent public sector wage 
(Table 8). The limited evidence points to relatively high levels of temporary staff and only about half of 
staff in a pension scheme. Trade union representation is also significantly lower in the non-profit sector 
compared to the public sector. 
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TABLE 8:  NON-PROFIT SECTOR IN CONTEXT  
Country 
Non-Profit 
% of Gross 
Domestic 
Product 
Non-profit % 
national 
employment 
Average non-
profit wage as 
% of national 
average wage 
% trade union 
members or 
covered by 
collective 
agreement 
% temporary 
employment 
% of staff 
with pension 
provision 
UK  (GVA)  
1
0.9 
1
2.6 
1
78.2 
1
17.0 
1
11.0 n/a 
USA 
2
5.4     
2
10.6 
3
71.5 n/a n/a 
4
57.0 
Canada 6.9 10.0 
5
69.0 
5
20.9 
5
14.3 
5
45.3 
Australia 
6
4.1 
6
8.5 
6
50.0-80.0 n/a 
6
24.3 n/a 
Belgium 
7
5.1 
7
11.5 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Portugal    
8
2.0 
8
4.3 
8
78.7 n/a n/a n/a 
Sources: 1. Skills Third Sector, 2013; 2. Urban Institute, 2014 and Urban Institute Nonprofit Almanac 2012; 3. 
United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labour Statistics, 2014; 4. Center for Nonprofit Management, 2014; 
5. HR Council for the Non-Profit Sector, 2008 and 2013; 6. Australian Government Productivity Commission, 2010; 
7. Salamon et al, 2013; 8. Salamon et al, 2012;   
SO CI A L  E N T E R P R I S E  A N D  CH A R I T Y  E M P LO Y E R S  
Voluntary organisations and social enterprises often value a commitment to ‘social change’ and ‘doing 
good’ more highly than good quality terms and conditions for their employees. Similarly, impact 
investing is focused on securing profit for private investors, yet appears to be unconcerned about the 
terms and conditions of the staff they employ to deliver services.  
7.3 EMPLOYMENT SCENARIOS  
The continued growth in social impact bond and pay-for-success projects could lead to four possible 
scenarios: 
The growth in private and non-profit employment: Nationally, this is currently a slow process, which 
could increase if the rate of new projects accelerated, together with a significant scaling-up of their 
scope. ‘Labour flexibility’ is a consequence of commercialisation and the contract culture. The transfer 
of public services to social enterprises is simply a transfer of employment from the public sector to the 
non-profit sector. It is a zero-sum gain and privatisation.  
Contractual conflicts: The continued increase and widening scope of UK public service outsourcing could 
eventually lead to conflicts of interest between commissioners and contractors and with the investors, 
intermediaries and contractors seeking new social bond projects.  
Reconfiguring and decommissioning services: In theory, the more effective early intervention and 
prevention becomes, the need for facilities such as children’s homes and prisons should decline in size, 
if not in number. This may not lead a reduction in employment, but a change in roles and job 
descriptions. The question is not whether reconfiguration of public services is necessary, but the speed 
at which it takes place, how it is planned, phased and resourced with strategies in place to support 
service users and employees including (re)training and redeployment. There is also a conflict between 
large-scale early intervention “…to enable the decommissioning of services to ensure future cashable 
savings are achieved” (Allen, 2011) and the need to continue provision of core services and finance the 
transition period. 
Impact of investor demands, procurement and contract culture: These impacts are almost certain to 
lead to a downward pressure on terms and conditions for most, if not all, employees in social impact 
bond projects. The scaling-up of social impact bond projects could lead to a type of ‘whole service’ 
provision (Whitfield, 2014c), hence the economic impact is likely to be more significant than the 
outsourcing of certain functions. 
The scenarios will incur public costs and other impacts, which should be considered an integral cost of 
the implementation of social impact bonds.  
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7.4 LABOUR COSTS IN SAVINGS FORECASTS  
The valuation of outcomes are partially monetised with labour market earnings (see Part 4). Average 
earnings were estimated per person for each year between 18-65 years for the total population and 
four levels of educational attainment in England and Wales derived from the 2010 Labour Force Survey 
(Social Research Unit, 2013). The model uses a 2% average annual growth rate in real earnings drawing 
on Office for National Statistics (ONS) data. This was applied to all educational groups because the 
model does not provide separate estimates. The model uses an annual ratio of benefits to wages and 
salaries of 1.21 (employers’ social contributions form 21% of employee benefits and earnings (ibid). 
However, if the recent significant changes in the labour market continue, then the above forecasts may 
not reflect the reality of labour market conditions, for example: 
 Wage cuts and restraint has continued since 2010 and UK austerity polices are set to continue 
until 2019/2020 (HM Treasury, 2015). 
 The government is committed to continued implementation of flexible labour market policies, 
which have resulted in low wage strategies, a rapid rise in zero hour and temporary contracts 
and part-time work (Office for National Statistics, 2015a and Trades Union Congress, 2015). 
 There is a growing gap between increasing the labour productivity index and the real wage 
index in G20 countries revealing that capital captured the bulk of the benefits of increased 
productivity between 1999-2013 (International Labour Organisation, 2015). 
 UK unemployment has decreased from its national peak in 2011, but remains relatively high at 
1.83m in March 2015, particularly in regions and local authorities where early childhood 
development is most needed (Office for National Statistics, 2015b). 
 The UK’s Working Tax Credit lifts many families out of poverty, but the £21bn annual 
programme increasingly subsidises private and public sector employers’ low wage policies 
(Whitfield, 2014b and HM Revenue & Customs, 2014). The government announced major 
reduction and reform of the tax credit system in the Summer Budget 2015 (HM Treasury, 
2015). 
Consequently, the valuation of outcomes and labour market earnings could be overstated and 
ultimately distort cost benefit analysis. 
Furthermore, cost benefit analyses have not taken account of the employment impact of non-profit and 
voluntary sector organisation delivery of social impact bond programmes, in particular the transfer, 
redeployment or redundancy of public sector staff and the public sector and non-profit/voluntary 
sector difference in pay and conditions (Pro Bono Economics and Frontier Economics, 2010 and Greater 
London Authority, 2011). 
Growth in the number of contracts with wage rates that are over 20% lower than the national average 
wage, will ultimately have a negative impact on average wage rates. The gap between public sector and 
private/non-profit terms and conditions will widen. This is not simply about differential wage rates 
because there is also the matter of significantly lower pension provision, health and safety practice, 
trade union recognition, industrial relations frameworks and workforce development policies. 
The growth of social impact bonds and pay-for-success projects in combination with neoliberalism, 
fiscal conservatism and austerity policies will further destabilise public services and the welfare state. 
7.5 IMPORTANCE OF A QUALITY WORKFORCE  
The above evidence contrasts strongly with the recommendation of the Early Intervention Review for 
the UK government (Allen, 2011). 
Workforce development will remain critical – in early education for example, evidence 
clearly shows that quality matters to child outcomes and narrowing the gap in learning 
and development. Children’s centre leaders and staff (particularly those working in early 
education and in outreach and family support) need to be well qualified and well 
supervised, and to have opportunities to develop skills that enable them to use evidence- 
based approaches. The UK Effective Provision of Pre-School Education study has shown 
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the strong relationship between the quality of early childcare and outcomes, and all this 
especially more so for disadvantaged groups. 
The quality of the workforce is often an issue for specific programmes as well. Trained 
nurses, midwives and health visitors are needed for the FNP [Family Nurse Partnership], 
and attempts to use less qualified staff have resulted in weaker improvements.  
A workforce development framework could establish training and salary structures which 
recognise the challenge and importance of early years staff and especially staff engaging 
with multi-problem families. Training in parent engagement would also be appropriate.  
… we need to ensure we have a large enough workforce for the future to provide the 
programmes and offer childcare provision. We need to find a way to make the vocation 
attractive to more highly qualified candidates and we need to be encouraging schools, 
colleges and universities to be teaching and developing resources for the future (ibid).  
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8 PUBLIC SERVICE INNOVATION AND IMPROVEMENT  
8.1 GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC  SECTOR INNOVATION  
The state has played an important role in funding, supporting and developing innovation in industry and 
public services. For example, in the development of computers (such as, Apple), the Internet, 
biotechnology, green technology, pharmaceuticals, aeronautical and space industries and even in 
research and development in the nineteenth century (Mazzacuto, 2013). This is mirrored by public 
bodies that have designed and implemented a wide range of innovative strategies in economic 
development, transport, education, health and social care for many decades. Some innovation has been 
rooted in meeting social needs, but other innovation has been at the behest of finance capital, 
transnational companies and/or conservative political objectives. 
The qualitative record of public sector innovation is in sharp contrast to the image that social finance 
and impact investment organisations portray, which implies that they are the only genuine source of 
innovation. This same narrow view promoted the transfer and privatisation of public services, created 
new vested interests and further embedded neoliberal ideology. Social enterprises and non-profit 
organisations can be innovative, but they never have, nor will have, a monopoly on innovation.  
In practice, much public service innovation has been generated by public bodies; tenants and 
community organisation proposals for policy, design and service delivery changes; staff and trade union 
proposals; NGOs, think tanks, voluntary organisations and social enterprises; and by research and 
development projects. Innovation and improvement have always been an integral part of the public 
sector agenda, although too frequently blocked by those seeking to maintain the status quo. 
The social impact bond literature claims this funding model and non-profit organisations have the 
freedom to innovate in contrast to public bodies, which often are risk averse and sometimes slower to 
innovate. But the stereotypes should be challenged. The public sector’s position is contradictory. It is 
often more cautious in adopting innovation because of political and/or professional conservatism in 
allocating resources to unproven policies or projects. But that has not stopped the UK government 
spending nearly £520m in the last few years funding social enterprises and social impact bonds, which 
are certainly unproven. It did not prevent recent UK governments funding a large national programme 
of academies and free schools that continue to have limited performance and created a fractured 
public education service. Governments have been very responsive to radical change demanded by 
business and calls to extend neoliberalism. 
Given that a simpler version of these arrangements might be less expensive, perhaps 
governments will just do this work themselves using the expertise developed in this 
process…….Then more of the savings to government could go to serve other social need 
rather than to investors or transaction costs (Clara Miller, President, F.B. Heron 
Foundation, 2015). 
The question is whether social impact bonds are “…the best way to achieve the intended results, or are 
there simpler, more efficient and perhaps even more effective ways to finance programs that realize the 
social benefit and the cashable savings?” (Demel, 2012). The answer surely lies in increasing tax 
revenue to enable the public sector to widen investment in effective early intervention and prevention 
and to reduce poverty and inequality.  
A four-part strategy is required: 
1. An alternative vision of public services that provide early intervention and prevention, good 
quality integrated core services and multi-purpose use of public buildings. 
2. Public Service Innovation and Improvement Plans at departmental or service level. 
3. Agreements with government and public bodies not to propose or approve social and 
development impact bond/pay-for-success projects. 
4. Action strategies to build alliances of staff/trade unions, service users/community 
organisations and other campaigns to organise support for strategies and scope for 
transnational action. 
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Each strategy is discussed in more detail. 
8.2 ALTERNATIVE VISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES  
A vision for public services and the welfare state should combine provision of early intervention and 
prevention policies, integrated good quality core services and, where necessary, multi-service use of 
public facilities. It is vital to set out the means to increase resistance to neoliberal policies with 
alternatives that contribute towards a wider longer-term strategy, although this study can only set out 
its broad direction. These plans could contribute to a broader challenge of the role of private capital, 
market forces and neoliberalism in public services and the welfare state. 
A ten-part public service policy framework sets out policies around which to organise and challenge the 
continued financialising, personalising, marketising and privatising of public services. It is a starting 
point that should be developed and extended as part of a wider economic strategy. 
 Early intervention and prevention 
 Democratisation of public services 
 Innovation and improvement 
 New public service management 
 Social justice and reducing inequalities 
 Cost benefit and impact assessment 
 Progressive taxation 
 Public ownership and investment 
 Good quality jobs 
 Public service principles and values 
The ten elements are summarised below: 
Early intervention and prevention strategies: Governments and public bodies should incorporate plans 
for early intervention and prevention in policy and strategic plans alongside the reconfiguration of core 
services, and where necessary, develop proposals to amend/change the use of facilities. Policies should 
be prepared for children’s’ services, education, health and social care, housing and justice and re-
allocate resources to tackle poverty and gender, race, disability and age inequalities. 
Democratisation of public services: Improved governance and accountability of public bodies including 
the termination of, or radically new governance structures, for arms length bodies, joint venture and 
partnerships, together with the participation of service users, community organisations, staff and trade 
unions in the planning and provision of services and facilities. This should include the democratisation 
of service planning, rigorous monitoring and scrutiny of procurement and contracts. 
Innovation and improvement: Every public service should have a Service Innovation and Improvement 
Plan which sets out how early intervention and prevention policies will be implemented to increase the 
sustainability, equity and quality of services to meet social needs. They should be reviewed and 
renewed every three years (see Table 9). Public bodies should be required to take immediate steps to 
involve staff and trade unions in the reconfiguration of services and to draw on their ideas, experience 
and innovation. Public bodies would have an agreed protocol detailing the participation, monitoring 
and review processes.  
New public service management: Public service management should replace neoliberal public 
management, terminate the flawed divide between purchaser and provider of public services and 
remove the wasteful competition and contract culture. Public service capability to design, plan, finance, 
deliver and manage projects and services must be consolidated in direct provision, with democratic 
governance, public planning and investment, quality management practice, new innovation and 
improvement strategies and flexible and accountable organisational structures at its centre (Whitfield, 
2012a). The new approach would begin to dismantle the public sector outsourcing market as direct 
provision removes the need for procurement of core and support services.  
Social justice and reducing inequalities: Equality impact assessments are essential to assess the effect of 
policies and projects on citizens, service users, staff, communities and local economies. Social justice 
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should include the distribution of opportunities locally and nationally, redistribution and improving life 
chances, reducing inequalities, eliminating discrimination, improving quality of life and community 
well-being and ensuring participation in the policy making process and service delivery.  
Cost benefit analysis combined with economic, social, equalities and environmental impact assessment:  
Key policies and projects should be assessed for local, regional and national economic, social and 
environmental impact, which should engage community organisations and trade unions with the 
findings publicly disclosed. Re-regulation should include new labour and equality rights. 
Progressive taxation: Taxation should be the prime revenue source to fund public services and the 
welfare state with a progressive tax system to redistribute income and wealth, reduce poverty and 
inequality, with the percentage tax rate increasing as income rises. Equally important, a progressive 
approach is needed for the scope and rates of other forms of taxation such as national insurance, VAT 
or sales taxes, excise and other levies, accompanied by measures to tackle tax avoidance and evasion. 
Public ownership and investment: Increased public expenditure on early intervention and prevention 
strategies, public sector workforce training, research and development, improving the public 
infrastructure and providing good quality employment has large economic and social benefits. 
Collective ownership models should be promoted in industrial and business services sectors. 
Good quality jobs: There is significant evidence of the connection between the quality of service and the 
quality of employment and staff engagement in the planning and delivery of services. Workforce 
development programmes should seek to improve the quality of services and the terms and conditions 
for staff (cutting zero-hour and temporary jobs and increasing pay for those below living wage rates and 
improving access to pension schemes).  
Public service principles and values: Public service principles should be mainstreamed in all services and 
functions and focus on the quality of inputs, processes, outputs and outcomes - they will vary according 
to the service, function and investment undertaken, but all are relevant to the quality of service and/or 
facilities (Whitfield, 2014b). Their application ultimately reflects the degree of commitment to tackling 
the root causes of poverty and inequalities.  
8.3 PUBLIC SERVICES INNOVATION AND IMPROVEMENT PLANS  
The preparation of Public Service Innovation and Improvement Plans has a vital role in interventions to 
oppose social impact bonds/pay-for-success and other forms of privatisation.  Plans should be 
developed in one of two ways. Firstly, by public bodies involving staff/trade unions and service 
users/community organisations. Secondly, jointly by staff/trade unions and service users/community 
organisations to demand a public body adopts a new approach to innovation and improvement. 
A strong relationship has been established between a high level of employee engagement and patient-
centred care, quality and safety outcomes, patient satisfaction and improved productivity in health and 
social care. In addition, research studies have evidenced the relationship between the quality of 
employment and the quality of service (Whitfield, 2015). 
Some trade union members may argue that it is not their responsibility, rather management’s job to 
develop alternative plans and policies. Trade union initiatives must be aware of political and managerial 
opportunism which takes ownership of ideas and proposals, block their progress or to exploit the 
situation to impose cuts, reduce staffing and/or introduce new working practices. However, a 
defensive, status quo position is strategically not sustainable and almost certain to have negative 
consequences for basic rights, terms and conditions (Whitfield, 2012a).  
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TABLE 9:  SCOPE OF PUBLIC SERVICE INNOVATION AND IMPROVEMENT PLANS 
Service Innovation and Improvement Plans 
New approaches to tackling early intervention and prevention, integrated with improved core services and where 
opportunities arise, the multi-purpose use of public facilities. 
Scope for reconfiguration and improvement Monitoring, reporting and scrutiny review at key stages 
Objectives, principles and values Staff and trade union participation at all stages 
Social needs, priorities, demographic change, economic 
trends and new legislation 
Identify methods and resources to reduce inequalities 
and discrimination 
Priorities for early intervention, prevention and 
improvement strategies 
Re-training, redeployment, staff recruitment and 
workforce development 
Scope for service and operational integration and 
reconfiguration 
Improved governance, accountability and transparency 
New methods of service delivery and working practices Strategy to accommodate change of use in legacy 
buildings and infrastructure 
Public service management, capacity to manage 
projects and availability of technical, financial and legal 
support 
Resources, budget pooling and investment required 
Service user, citizen and community organisations 
participation in planning and service delivery 
Summary of planned changes, targets, action strategy, 
timetable and responsibilities 
Source: Whitfield, forthcoming. 
8.4 AGREEMENT NOT TO PROP OSE OR APPROVE OF SOCIAL AND DEVELOPMENT 
BOND/PAY-FOR-SUCCESS PROJECTS  
Firstly, opposition to social and development impact bond and pay-for-success projects should seek to 
persuade governments and public bodies to commit to direct provision of early intervention and 
prevention policies. The adoption of Public Service Innovation and Improvement Plans should be part of 
this commitment. 
Secondly, they should ensure there are rigorous procedures and criteria in place to assess any proposed 
projects. The wide range of issues examined in this report, in particular Parts 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 provide the 
basis for a comprehensive cost benefit analysis and impact assessment. 
CH A L LE N G E  I M P A CT  O F  S O CI A L  I M P A CT  B O N D  P R O J E C T S  
 Build an evidence base and local and national information about operational and planned social 
impact bond and pay-for-success projects. It should include performance, failures, investors and 
profits and the public cost of subsidies and guarantees. Share this information internationally. 
 Challenge public expenditure savings claims because they are usually exaggerated, rarely achieved 
and not inclusive of all the public costs. 
 Explain the potential future consequences of another private ‘buy now-pay later’ scheme. 
 Detail the risks and consequences for users, community organisations, staff and government/public 
bodies. 
 Expose the threat to jobs, terms and conditions and workforce development. 
 Detail the impact of social impact bond projects on public services and welfare state and the effect 
on democratic accountability, participation and transparency. 
 Demand a full and transparent comparison with an in-house public sector innovation and 
improvement model when social impact bond projects are proposed.  
 Ensure the employment impacts of innovation and improvement initiatives are assessed and public 
sector pay and conditions maintained. 
OR G A N I S E  I N  T H E  W O R K P LA CE  A N D  C O M M U N I T Y   
 A survey of potential users provides useful information and simultaneously obtain their views 
about social impact bonds and privatisation of core public services. 
 Prepare briefings and articles to explain the consequences of social impact bonds, their costs and 
impact for service users, staff and public services. 
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 Recruit and organise in the community and workplace with specific strategies targeted to 
organisations who engage volunteers and interns. 
 Combine national and local organising and action with critical analysis of social impact bonds to 
advance these policies. 
CH A L LE N G E  T H E  V E S T E D  I N T E R E S T S  O F  B U S I N E S S  O R G A N I S A T I O N S  A N D  P O LI T I CA L  A L L I E S   
 Expose the ‘social investment’ front of big banks and wealthy private investors when in fact it is 
private investment. 
 Raise the ethical issues concerning private investment to profit from social needs. 
 Highlight the potential scale of profiteering by private investors and contractors. 
BOX 6:  TRANSPARENCY REQUIREM ENTS FOR SOCIAL IMPACT BOND PROPOSALS  
 
8.5 ALLIANCES FOR PUBLIC SECTOR INNOVATION AND INVESTMENT  
It is vital to develop a vision for the future of public services and welfare state that draws together ways 
in which the public service principles can be implemented to meet social needs, democratic 
accountability and to tackle poverty and inequalities (Whitfield, 2014b). The ten-part strategy outlined 
above provides a starting point. 
The concept of the Public Service Innovation and Improvement Plan is intended to be useful to develop 
a public sector option where social impact bond projects are planned. It can also be used locally to 
increase the focus on early intervention and prevention.  
SC O P E  F O R  T R A N S N A T I O N A L  A CT I O N  
Social impact bond projects should be opposed nationally and internationally through research, 
evidence sharing and building alliances.  
The impact investing lobby make the same case irrespective of location, promote the same model with 
similar conditions and make the same assertions about public expenditure savings. Many of the 
intermediary organisations, philanthrocapitalists and financial institutions involved in advancing the 
social and development bond model operate internationally. So there is a strong case for international 
trade union action to coordinate opposition to social and development impact bond and pay-for-
success projects, and to share information, evidence, lessons learnt and undertake joint research. 
Transnational action should also include targeted organising campaigns, expose of the role of private 
investors and to develop alternative public sector strategies. 
Social impact bond projects are, irrespective of initial investor funding, ultimately financed by 
government. The following information should be disclosed for public debate and scrutiny and is an 
essential prerequisite for democratic accountability and basic consultation rights: 
 Proposals for social impact bond projects.  
 Demand full community and trade union involvement and transparency. 
 Development of in-house innovation and improvement plan and options appraisal. 
 Report of evaluation of project proposals. 
 Disclosure of bidders and investors prior to or during the procurement process. 
 Ensure contracts give the public sector the power to amend or terminate projects and contracts 
do not include non-competitive clauses. 
 Evaluation methodology and criteria. 
 Report of contract award.  
 Publication of contracts. 
 Performance monitoring reports. 
 Interim audit or review reports. 
 Disclosure of final project report including calculation of payments to investors. 
 70 WISeR & ESSU (2015) 
AC T I O N  S T R A T E G I E S  
Develop early intervention and preventative policies and plans 
 Make the case for in-house public sector innovation and improvement to pre-empt the case for 
social impact bonds and develop best practice public service management.  
 Make the case for integrated public services and oppose further marketisation and privatisation. 
 Ensure public bodies prepare in-house public service innovation and improvement plans centred on 
early intervention and prevention strategies. 
Intervene in the ‘transformation’ of services 
 Public bodies should have an agreed protocol for supporting, evaluating and responding to 
proposals and a mechanism where implementation or pilot projects can be fast-tracked. 
 A full social and economic case for change should replace the limited ‘business case’. It will often 
involve a degree of joint working with other public bodies and with community, voluntary or non-
profit organisations. 
 A comprehensive and rigorous economic, social and equality impact assessment should be 
undertaken for policies and projects with the findings publicly disclosed. 
 Service users and community organisations and staff/trade unions should be involved in the 
planning and implementation of innovation and improvement strategies. 
 Options appraisals must include a forward looking public sector innovative and improvement 
option. 
 Protocols should be in place to fully evaluate and consider proposals from community organisations 
and trade unions for early intervention and preventative strategies  
Forge coalitions and organise public service alliances 
 Build alliances of community, trade union, civil society and political organisations to make the case 
for direct public sector investment and provision of early intervention and prevention policies and 
good quality integrated core services. 
 Ensure that community organisations, trade unions, MPs, elected members and the public are fully 
informed about the local and wider effects of social impact bond projects. 
 Set out why and how accountability, participation and transparency of public bodies can be 
radically improved. 
Organise industrial, civil and community action  
 Organise joint public action against austerity, outsourcing and privatisation policies. 
 Use selective industrial and/or community action to increase pressure at key stages. 
These strategies have a vital role in advancing innovation and improvement in the public sector and 
challenging the promotion of social impact bond projects. 
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KEY LESSONS  
Social impact bond projects represent a further stage in the financialisation, marketisation and 
privatisation of public services and welfare state. 
Social impact bond projects give the impression they are tackling the root causes of poverty and 
inequality. This is rarely the case and should be evidenced at an early stage. 
Although the structure of the project may be innovative, the services and delivery methods are rarely 
innovative. Private investors want proven services-based evidenced results to minimise risk. 
The transfer of risk to private investors is a gross simplification of reality, because risks are borne by the 
government or public body, service users, staff, the intermediary, contractors and the evaluator. 
The obsessive focus on outcomes marginalises the quality of inputs and processes (and outputs in some 
cases), which are proven key aspects of public service quality. 
Financialising and monetising of welfare state services and initiatives impose financial values on 
people’s lives, life chances and well being. They can only be assessed through comprehensive cost 
benefit analysis, inclusive of economic, social, equalities and environmental impact assessment. 
A secondary market is likely to emerge to allow private investors to trade investments enabling further 
scope for profiteering, the transfer of financial assets offshore and potentially leading to the creation of 
new financial derivatives to attract new tranches of private investors and/or increase profits.  
Public sector savings are a regular justification for social impact bond projects. However, savings targets 
from outsourcing have rarely been achieved, and the full public sector costs remain illusory in most 
public bodies. Analysis must include the public cost of grants, subsidies, tax relief and guarantees. 
The rapid spread of social impact bond projects undermine the claims of evidence-based policy making, 
because they have been heavily promoted and copied without any substantive evidence. The first 
projects in the UK and US failed. 
Pilot projects should be precisely what they are intended to be - limited in scale and subjected to 
rigorous analysis and challenge to determine whether they are appropriate, effective, viable and 
sustainable before decisions are made on rejecting or mainstreaming as public policy.  
Social impact bond projects are a product of the New Labour era, promoted by social financiers, 
supported by the G8 group of countries through the UK Conservative Prime Minister, to become 
integrated in austerity policies and neoliberal ideology. 
A democratic deficit is built into social impact bond projects from the outset. No part of the delivery 
structure – the intermediary organisation, contractors, consultants, lawyers and evaluator – is 
democratically accountable; service user and staff participation has been minimal; and transparency is 
eroded because the companies and social enterprises are excluded from freedom of information 
legislation. 
The social impact bond structure has been designed to provide a new ‘social economy’ market for social 
finance and social enterprises, influenced by the PFI/PPP infrastructure model, and the exclusion of 
public provision. ‘Partnership’ ideology will continue to generate new models with less and less public 
content until they are full privatisation. 
New ‘partnership’ models and the delegation of public duties to non-public organisations often leads to 
a loss of commitment to equalities policies.   
Non-profit and private sector employment terms and conditions are significantly worse than those in 
the public sector. The reliance of social impact bond projects on a contract culture is likely to aggravate 
this problem and make trade union organising even more complex.  
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Since Development Impact Bond projects are closely modelled on social impact bond projects, most, if 
not all, of the above lessons are equally applicable. With few projects operational, or at the design 
stage in the global south, they should be immediately terminated. 
Neoliberal and austerity policies exposed the limitations of defensive strategies, the absence of ideas 
and proposals to radically change and improve public services and the role of the state. Social impact 
bond projects widen this exposure and illustrate the need for alternative public sector visions of early 
intervention and prevention. 
Social impact bond projects bring into sharp focus how privatisation has mutated and created new ways 
in which services and assets can be outsourced and transferred to the private sector to create new 
markets. This has a profound impact on jobs, incomes, the quality of services and the way people live 
their lives. Trade unions and community organisations must be more proactive in advancing alternative 
policies and innovation to retain and improve in-house services.  
An alternative strategy should consist of: 
 government and public sector plans specifically to address early intervention and prevention;  
 good quality integrated core services and multi purpose use of public buildings;  
 Public Service Innovation and Improvement Plans at departmental or service level;  
 and an agreement not to propose or approve social and development impact bond/pay-for-
success projects.  
 Staff/trade union and service user/community organisation alliances are essential to develop 
early intervention and prevention strategies and scope for transnational action. 
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Appendix A. CONTINUED FINANCIALISATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE  
COMPETITION FOR PRIVATE INVESTMENT  
It is important to take account of developments in social impact bond projects in the context of 
continued financialisation and privatisation of public infrastructure at both global and national levels. 
Several global, EU and national initiatives have been launched to increase infrastructure investment and 
widen the range of investors, in particular to engage pension funds, insurance companies and sovereign 
wealth funds in PPP projects.  
The G20 Leaders Summit in St Petersburg in September 2013 endorsed the G20/OECD High-Level 
Principles on Long-Term Investment Financing by Institutional Investors (OECD, 2013). The eight 
principles were followed by reports to the G20 Brisbane Summit in November 2014 on effective 
approaches to implement the principles (OECD, 2014b) and what was essentially a primer on PPPs for 
infrastructure investment (OECD, 2014c). 
The World Bank launched the Global Infrastructure Facility in October 2014 to “…be a platform for 
collaboration between public and private partners to help prepare and design complex PPP 
infrastructure projects making them viable for new sources of long-term private capital” in low and 
middle income countries (World Bank, 2014). Twenty six of the world’s largest asset management and 
private equity firms, pension and insurance funds, commercial banks and other multilateral 
development institutions were present, including Citibank, HSBC, Macquarie and AXA.  
The EU 2020 Project Bond Initiative was intended to reverse the recent decline in PPP transactions in 
trans-European transport, energy and ICT/broadband network projects, but showed a bias towards 
projects that would increase the life-time of existing fossil fuel infrastructure (Counter Balance, 2014). 
The €21bn European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI), or Juncker Plan, is another initiative, 
accompanied by a European Commission list of 2,000 infrastructure projects worth €1.3 trillion. The 
funding consists of €16bn guarantees plus €5bn from the European Investment Bank, which is forecast 
to attract leverage 15 times greater leading to a €315bn boost to the European economy. The EIB 
contribution is not new money, but recycled from research budgets.  
However, the EFSI “…is not bond driven, as in the Juncker commitment to the European Parliament in  
July last year, but a PFI private finance initiative. These are notorious for seeking public guarantees and 
then costing more than direct public finance” (Holland, 2015). Furthermore, the European Commission 
recommended the leverage be reduced to five but “…but, without public co-finance, this also is 
improbable” (ibid). The EFSI was launched in July 2015 with the funding and forecasts unchanged 
(European Investment Bank, 2015). 
The UK government sought to increase pension fund investment in infrastructure through a Pensions 
Infrastructure Platform (PIP) since 2011. The investment target was £2bn, but by February 2015 the PIP 
had committed about £450m (€600m) of which £255m (€340m) had been invested in operational PPP 
projects and only £170m (€225m) in new projects. Three of the original ten pension funds had 
withdrawn by early 2014. 
PENSION FUNDS TARGETED FOR PPPS  
The search for new sources of investment is likely to involve persuading pension funds to increase their 
investment in PPP infrastructure projects. This could expose further contradictions and conflicts placing 
pension fund assets (deferred wages) at the centre of a strategy of commodifying and financialising 
early child development, health prevention and other welfare state policies in addition to public 
infrastructure. 
There are common themes in these initiatives. Firstly, recognition of constraints on public sector capital 
expenditure, but a willingness to commit future revenue budgets with significantly higher contractual 
debt payments than the cost of repayments with public investment.  
 74 WISeR & ESSU (2015) 
Secondly, recognition that continuing private finance of infrastructure can only succeed if pension 
funds, insurance companies, sovereign wealth funds and other institutional investors are drawn into 
financing projects. The global finance crisis and subsequent increased regulation of banks has limited 
their ability to fund infrastructure projects, although these regulations will not necessarily reduce the 
risk of further crises. 
Thirdly, reliance on PPPs as the main vehicle for implementation. 
Fourthly, a secondary market in the trading of existing PFI/PPP projects diverted some investment in 
new infrastructure to buying and selling existing projects (Whitfield, 2010 and 2012d). By early 2015 
over fifty UK PFI/PPP projects were 100% owned by infrastructure funds. The average annual return on 
the sale of equity in UK PPP project companies was 29% between 1998-2012, twice the 12%-15% rate of 
return in PPP business cases at financial close in the same period (Ibid).  
A  SECONDARY MARKET IN SOCIAL AND DEVELOPMENT IMPACT BOND AND P AY-
FOR-SUCCESS PROJECT INVE STMENTS  
A similar secondary market could emerge in social and development impact bond and pay-for-success 
projects to enable investors who need or want to exit their investment. Some investors may not want 
to wait until the end of the contract, some may be forced to sell for financial reasons and others may 
make strategic decisions based on performance risks. Social Finance commented on the absence of a 
secondary market in the first Peterborough Prison evaluation. “…there is not yet a secondary market 
that would allow investors to sell on their investment” (Disley et al, 2011). In 2013 the UK Social Stock 
Exchange began trading in securities and derivatives and enabled impact investors and companies to 
invest and raise capital.  
Although it took six years between the launch of the UK PFI/PPP programme and the first secondary 
transaction and a further two years until the nascent market began to grow (Whitfield, 2012d), a social 
impact bond secondary market could emerge more quickly. A combination of the financialisation of 
public services through private investment, a social impact bond investment market, private investors 
(increasingly financial institutions) adopting risk aversion and profit maximisation strategies, could lead 
to a secondary market with assets increasingly held in offshore tax havens. 
Finally, the Australian government launched an Asset Recycling Initiative in 2014, an attempt to 
incentivise privatisation to increase investment in infrastructure. States will receive 15% of the sale 
price of privatised assets for reinvestment in new infrastructure projects. Asset sales must be 
completed and construction of the new infrastructure must commence before 30 June 2019. The 
initiative is capped at A$5bn (€3.6bn) and forecast to support up to A$38bn (€27.4bn) of new 
investment (Commonwealth of Australia, 2015b). 
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